In this scholarly paper, Arthur De Vany and W. David Walls discuss, among many other things, how the studios used the “blockbuster” strategy in which advertising, box office ranking, and movie stars play integral roles in a film’s success. They acknowledge Jaws as the first movie to employ this technique on a national level, using television advertising in addition to a nationwide release.
According to this theory, the opening of the movie is the most important event in a film’s life. Producer Robert Evans compared it to a parachute jump, “If it doesn’t open, you are dead.” De Vany and Walls believe that if the theory were true, the choices of early movie-goers directly affect the decisions of people who see the movie later. Furthermore, a strong opening weekend or week can lead to a “dominant position in the film market.”
Jaws is indeed a strong example of the “blockbuster” strategy of marketing because it was the highest grossing film at the time (dominating the box office), and created a national buzz about the film, which included television advertising. However, Jaws was somewhat different in that it did not have any big stars, but rather quality actors on the rise in the industry.
There are people who refute the “blockbuster” strategy and argue that the success of a film depends almost entirely on the early audience of the film and how those moviegoers express their opinions to friends, family and acquaintances. In closing, De Vany and Walls agree that the aspects of a successful film depend both on a strong opening as well as positive feedback from the early viewers.
In this article, James Surowiecki analyzes the marketing scheme of big Hollywood films like Jaws. In doing so, he looks at how blockbusters have been marketed since Jaws first opened in 1975. Among the factors discussed, the opening weekend and the behavior of the moviegoers are the most important.
In 1975, Stephen Farber, a movie critic, wrote that the success of Steven Spielberg’s Jaws was due to an “aggressive media blitz” that utilized prime-time television advertising along with an unusual national opening weekend at over 400 theaters across the country. Farber believed that audience members were manipulated into seeing the film and that the studio executives controlled what they wanted people to see.
As Surowiecki writes, Hollywood wanted to believe that the success of Jaws could be imitated by employing the same marketing strategies because there were huge profit opportunities. The studios believed that by giving certain films “a big enough push out of the gate” that enough people would go see it without regard for the actual quality of the movie’s content. This is called a “non-informative information cascade” in which the actions of the later moviegoers are based on the early moviegoers, who were persuaded to see the film due to the massive advertising campaign. Unfortunately, there have been many blockbusters that bring in large profits early on, followed by mediocre numbers in the following weeks (i.e. The Matrix: Reloaded).
However, as De Vany and Walls state in their in-depth study of what makes a blockbuster, they find that a big budget and expensive advertising campaign may make it possible for a big opening; its success truly depends on how the audience rates the film. This strategy has garnered some media criticism, but Surowicki argues Hollywood is sensible because this method increases revenues in a shorter time so that they can remove the film from theaters in order to keep a larger percentage of the profits.
In this New York Times article, Terrance Rafferty explains why he believes that Jaws was the first summer movie to cause the summer blockbusters that this generation has come to know all too well. He argues that Jaws gave studio executives the idea to target youth audiences during the summer months and even compares Hollywood to Amity, the setting of the film.
It is easy to see why Jaws was such a hit when it opened in the summer of 1975 because it was filled with drama, action and above all – horror. It was the first American film to earn over $100 million and the studios made certain not to miss out on the huge possible profits awaiting them in the summer blockbuster area. Previously, older audiences were the aim for action movies, but the younger generations quickly became the target for this genre. Rafferty jokes that the executives must have seen dollar signs after seeing the immense success of Jaws. He also feels that in today’s context, one could compare the mayor not wanting to close the beaches to how the Hollywood studio executives refused to remove box office duds like Speed 2.
Although Jaws is a great movie, Rafferty states that although some people are quick to criticize it because it was such an impetus for some awful summer films released after Jaws, they should realize it was the studio executives who are to blame. Spielberg even made apologetic comments on how the film affected the industry, trying to downplay how ingenious his use of terror and suspense really were.
Rafferty puts it well when he says that Jaws should not be blamed for its lackluster descendants because if all of the summer films were of equal quality, nobody would be complaining.

