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<title>Rethinking the Dual City -- Reichl 42 (5): 659 -- Urban Affairs Review</title>
<description>Urban Affairs Review, Vol. 42, No. 5, 659-687 (2007)&lt;br /&gt;DOI: 10.1177/1078087406298118&lt;br /&gt;&amp;copy; 2007 SAGE Publications&lt;br /&gt;Rethinking the Dual City&lt;br /&gt;Alexander J. Reichl&lt;p&gt;Queens College, CUNY, Flushing, New York&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This article examines social polarization in New York City: first, as an objective condition among city neighborhoods; and second, as an issue in city politics. Data on income, poverty, housing, and crime provide little evidence of growing polarization between low- and high-income neighborhoods in the 1990s. However, the data reveal a striking contrast between the spectacular gains of core areas and the widespread stagnation and decline across low-, middle-, and high-income neighborhoods outside the core. Polarization has not proved a viable political issue because it becomes subsumed in racial/ethnic politics; yet the data suggest that progressives might prevail with a dual-city discourse that highlights the significance of polarization for neighborhoods outside the core.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;Key Words: social polarization &amp;bull; New York City politics &amp;bull; dual city &amp;bull; neighborhood decline &amp;bull; urban neoliberalism&lt;/p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Exerpt P. 683&lt;br /&gt;------------------------------&lt;br /&gt;Despite Ferrer&amp;rsquo;s failures there are indications that a nascent outerborough coalition (one that bridges the racial/ethnic and class divides) stirs beneath the surface of New York politics, awaiting a political movement to represent its interests. For one thing there is some evidence that the outerborough coalition operates as something akin to the &amp;ldquo;potential groups&amp;rdquo; described by Truman (1951), which influence policy precisely because officials fear their mobilization. Mayor Bloomberg&amp;rsquo;s backpedaling on plans to curtail trash collection outside Manhattan, close zoos in Brooklyn and Queens, and eliminate a scholarship program for the city university can be interpreted as efforts to preempt swelling discontent in the outer boroughs. Indeed, midway through Bloomberg&amp;rsquo;s first term some observers saw a new &amp;ldquo;borough politics&amp;rdquo; emerging in opposition to the mayor&amp;rsquo;s handling of the city&amp;rsquo;s fiscal crisis (Steinhauer 2003). As one Democratic strategist put it: &amp;ldquo;[A] Democratic strategy for victory in the [2005] mayoral race has to involve uniting African-Americans and Latinos with Whites in the outer boroughs who are unhappy with Bloomberg and who are upset about taxes and other issues&amp;rdquo; (quoted in Steinhauer 2003). Bloomberg&amp;rsquo;s image as a wealthy Manhattanite out of touch with the everyday struggles of middleclass New Yorkers seemed to provide a galvanizing target, and discursive trope, for an outer-borough coalition.&lt;br /&gt;------------------------------</description>
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