Dr. Strangelove, or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb (1964) is the satirical look at the nuclear Cold War era of the 1950s and 60s. General Ripper, a crazed US officer convinced Russians are trying to poison American waters through fluoridation, initiates a plan to essentially instigate World War III. All the while a incompetent American president, constantly urged by a trigger-happy general, attempts to negotiate with the intoxicated Russian leader. With destruction looming, the leaders convene in the War Room to plan a resolution, where Dr. Strangelove reveals a plan to save top government officials. The film ends with the inevitable bomb drop, which triggers the Russian doomsday mechanism causing a series of dramatic explosions.

Stanley Kubrick’s comical depiction of nuclear armament and international confrontation lampoons the alarm of the Cold War era, though at the same time it illustrates the important political issues of the 1950s and 60s. The film demonstrates the irrationality behind the concept of “mutually assured destruction” – knowledge that the use of weapons would also destroy the aggressor. The characters of the film are exaggerated and laughable, though their correlation to actually leaders comes across so strong that viewers are able to draw connections between reality and the plot of the movie. Similarly, the plot is fanciful with the purpose of criticizing a system reliant on a delicate stalemate to ensure security.

The film Dr. Strangelove successfully addresses the absurdity of Cold War policies and on a larger level criticizes humanity's progression towards separatism, in the movie marked by international distrust and dischord. Interestingly, even long after the 1950s and 60s, the message of destructive security remains resilient as ever.  At the heart of Kubrick's film lie issues of global cooperation and the dangers that exist in its void; these messages are not bound to the Cold War era but rather continue through time. 

In his book Apocalypse Movies author Kim Newman examines the different genres and periods of apocalyptic films. Particularly notable is Newman’s focus on movies that emphasize the use of weapons to save the world and those that depict weapons destroying the world. Interestingly, in separate chapters the author points out that both types of movie debuted near the beginning of the 1950s, a time of anxiety and progress. The different uses of bombs in movies embody the conflicting perspectives of society. On one hand, one might identify nuclear weapons as a safeguard, an instrument to employ when threatened. Newman points out this attitude in Mant, when a man has to use a weapon to destroy a mutated giant ant man. On the other hand, movies on the other side of the spectrum portrayed weapon use in much different manner. The Damned, for example, “conjures up an age of senseless violence of which the bomb is merely the most fearsome part” (p. 168).

Kubrick’s satiric use of nuclear weapons in Dr. Strangelove is quite different from either of the two extreme modes mentioned. While the film does depict a world that ultimately is destroyed by weapons, the film is humorous and lighthearted enough that it allows the audience to absord a message rather than experience a thrill. Where most weapon films of the time portrayed dismal, alarming environments Dr. Strangelove is comical enough that the message becomes the focus. Other films risk heightening the viewer’s alarm, distracting from actual situations and possibly discouraging the spectator. Unlike many “bomb” films, because Kubrick takes a satirical approach Dr. Strangelove is able to address the issue of nuclear proliferation in a way that allows viewers to approach it critically.

In his article “Atomic Energy and the Democratic Process” Robert Dahl examines the way in which democracy governs atomic production. Dahl notes that in a democracy really only a portion of the public actually participates in an issue, though any individual can be mobilized into the active group if compelled by an issue. The author notes that when addressing atomic energy the group allowed to participate is constricted by the requirement of secrecy (regarding details of weapon production and emergency plans). Dahl points out that citizens “in the absence of secrecy, perhaps could and would be activated as attentive citizens” (p. 2). The author then steps further to indicate that to maintain this secrecy only a handful of “elites” are allowed to rule. The fact such important decisions lie in the hands of a few is alarming. Secrecy contradicts the idea of democracy in itself. Considering the actions of leaders in the Cold War and the sentiments of the public, one must question whether nuclear proliferation by both the US and the USSR were moves that benefited public interest or a handful of individuals acting on their own behalf.

The idea of elitist control permeates Dr. Strangelove's message. In the film a deranged general sends US planes towards Russia to be intercepted, essentially precipitating WWIII. The general’s relatively unchecked control signifies the power leaders commanded and could manipulate regardless of public interest. One must question whether given the concerns of nuclear accumulation society as a whole would have pursued the path of nuclear development. Considering the apocalyptic ending of Dr. Strangelove it would seem Kubrick thinks not.

America’s insistence on involving itself in the control of foreign nations, an issue recurrent in many of the articles regarding Dr. Strangelove and more broadly the Cold War, is again addressed in the article “Central America as a Theater of U.S. Cold War Politics.” Here author Susanne Jonas observes the late 1980s political movements in Central America that mirror actions of the Cold War era. Jonas also notes tendencies of US government to “control its allies (particularly in Europe)” (p. 125). As mentioned in the article by Robert Frase, Jonas points out that elitists run political programs, especially international agendas, and in the case of Central America the majority’s interests were not considered when drafting policy. For example when considering wealth reallocations Jonas points out that “[i]n short, the new strategy was based on the assumption that the Central American working class (both rural and urban) would be kept at bare subsistence level” (p. 124).

The article by Jonas also recognizes the effects of Vietnam on the Cold War attitude of the US. After essential losing in Vietnam, America “no longer dominat[ed] the capitalist world like it once did and [was] no longer able to impose its will by unilateral action” (p. 126). The circumstances of Vietnam help put in perspectives the policies adopted by the US government regarding arms. Confronted with failure, the US may have found it necessary to outpace the USSR to reaffirm its position as an international superpower. Such competition would drive the arms race and create tensions between the countries.

America’s actions in Central America resemble the type that Dr. Strangelove satirizes. Again, the US appears like the over-zealous fighter ready to get a hand into other countries operations. Although the Central American countries don’t have the resources that were available to Russia, the underlying circumstances of the situation resemble those that started the arms race and Cold War between the US and the USSR.

Charles Maland’s article “Dr. Strangelove (1964): Nightmare Comedy and the Ideology of the Liberal Consensus” reviews the way in which Stanley Kubrick’s film responds to dominant culture’s social norms of the 1930s and later war years. The article notes the way which Dr. Strangelove, and other Kubrick films, addressed the “gap between man’s scientific and technological skill and his social, political, and moral ineptitude” (p. 701). Kubrick’s message in the film comes across strong; man’s technological progression has outpaced his morality and wisdom. Skill and good judgment should balance each other, but because of their disproportion scientific progression is able to do more harm than good.

Considering the social conditions leading up to the production of Dr. Strangelove one can understand the formation of Kubrick’s perspectives. The 1930s saw social concentration shift from the economy to foreign governments. The war years directed attention towards defeating opposing powers. Success in war and economic prosperity created a paradigm that required the US lead other countries (p. 698). Russians, under new leadership and not wanting to appear the weaker nation after a difficult war, pursued a similar course of action. The resulting international tension established an atmosphere ripe for a film like Dr. Strangelove. Anxiety ran high and the most paradoxical elements of public policy seemed to lie at the heart of the guidelines. Dr. Strangelove masterfully captures the realities of its period but in a mode so embellished one can discern the message propagated by the film.

From Faust to Strangelove takes a look at the motivation of a group largely overlooked in the consideration of Dr. Strangelove – the scientists themselves. When considering the proponents behind the nuclear proliferation plans in the film one easily identifies the military and political leaders. Author Roslynn Haynes points out that another important factor to assess is the “motivation of the scientists themselves, especially the physicists, whose exceptional intellectual talents were employed by the military-industrial complex in producing ever more ingenious weapons of mass destruction” (p. 199). These individual’s interests are largely overlooked, but Kubrick’s movie certainly touches upon them. In the movie Dr. Strangelove, a scientist and strategist, works to create the doomsday device and later has to work to figure out a solution to the situation. Taking into account that scientists were largely employed by the governments, it makes sense too that these individuals would want to promote the escalation of war.

Considering the narrow interests of many different parties in Dr. Strangelove, the theme of individuals acting selfishly and thereby causing troubles for society as a whole seems to arise. Interestingly, this contradicts the invisible hand theory of capitalism. It seems the foundation of US ideals, at least to some degree, are included in Kubrick's satire. Similarly, near the end of Dr. Strangelove when the doctor describes his plan to move to underground caverns for survival, the mode of acting in ones best interest seems absurd. In a sense, Kubrick seems to attack narrow individual interests, which lie at the heart of capitalism, preferring instead a system that monitors individuals actions to ensure the collective good of society.

Robert Frase’s article “International Control of Nuclear Weapons” immediately addresses the notion that control of nuclear power “is as much a psychological and political problem as a technical one” (p. 16).  In the article Frase recognizes four issues that prevented the United Nations and the Soviet Union from establishing an atomic energy resolution, a deal which would have allowed the international observation of nuclear programs and possibly have prevented an arms race.  The four issues Frase identifies are 1) a fear of contact with the west, 2) Soviet attitude of inferiority in joint enterprise, 3) lack of immediate economic benefits included in a Soviet atomic energy plan, and 4) hedges placed around offers of an international joint effort (p. 17).  Recurrent behind these points is the issue of American insistence upon cooperation in joint projects.  Soviet concern that non-military information would be given up then lead to adamant rejection of energy proposals.  It seems, as mentioned in the Maland piece, that determination on both sides to establish themself as the superior power lead to the irreversible accumulation of weapons.  It is interesting to consider that the Frase article, written in 1953, essentially identifies reasons for and predicts a tense continuation of the arms race yet could not create a change to prevent it.

In Dr. Strangelove the obstinate doggedness of each leader and the illogical agreement between countries epitomizes the actual indifferences the US and the Soviet Union couldn’t overcome.  Also, unlike the rather ineffective message of the Frase article, Kubrick’s satirical approach to the confrontations between countries opened the doors to a great deal of political criticism.       

The article “The Macroeconomics of Dr. Strangelove” by Andrew John, Rowena Pecchenino, and Stacy Schreft considers weapons accumulation through an economic model and works to find an equilibrium between countries’ strategies. The authors construct a situation in which individual of two nations can choose to amass weapons by allocating resources. By monitoring the moves of the other, a country can calculate its probability of winning and decide appropriately whether or not to attack. One can then calculate the benefits and disadvantages of accumulating and using weapons.

The model presented mathematically analyzes the issue of nuclear proliferation. In its calculated approach, however, the model fails to capture the element of humanity; the model only measures success and failure not innate human worth. In this way the article doesn’t drive the same message as Dr. Strangelove. Instead of emphasizing the danger of nuclear armament like the film, the article examines whether or not nuclear accrual is beneficial or detrimental to a country. Interestingly, the article finds that equilibrium can exist where neither country amasses weapons and where both countries “accumulate weapons to the point where conflict initiation is so dangerous that it never occurs” (p. 44). This finding supports the ideology held by Cold War hardliners, the same ideology Kubrick satirizes with Dr. Strangelove. Through a purely analytic model it may seem possible for a country to protect itself with weaponry, though, as the Kubrick’s film indicates, the dangers incurred through such defense are too immense to tolerate.

Is there a way to effectively deter a Soviet attack without the threat of retribution?  As we see in Dr. Strangelove and the circumstances of the Cold War, it appears that if either party discontinued its pursuit of arms or renounced forceful retaliation plans the opponent would immediately have an advantage and an incentive to attack.  In the article “Nuclear Arms as a Philosophical and Moral Issue” author Robert Churchill addresses that issue, closely examining the ethical implications of retaliation and alternatives.  Harming the innocent, including not protecting them if an attack is suspect, is central to the morality issue, according to Churchill.  While considering whether to abandon retributive plans a country must also contemplate whether doing so would invite an attack upon its civilians by the other country.  Here arise questions of human nature.

As evidenced by the Cold War, the common mentality is to assume that countries will not cooperate.  Immediately individuals assume that the other nation is an opponent or adversary and means harm.  In Dr. Strangelove the deranged general, certain the Russians plotted to fluoridate US drinking water, embodied the paranoid mindset.  Such suspicious attitudes only strengthen the distrust between countries.  The situation is essentially a catch 22.  Once one country starts amassing weapons the other must do so to avoid attack, and if one stops producing weapons it risks being attacked.  Both countries would benefit from abandoning their programs, but neither can.

The issue seems to rest on the perception of human nature.  Through cooperation both countries could direct resources elsewhere and avoid the anxiety of nuclear competition.  The success of disarmament lies in the balance of whether the two could successful exist without challenging each other.      

Reelpolitik II studies how political perspectives influenced and were influenced by film and media in the 1950s and 60s. Specifically, chapter 9 of the book, “Cold War Dovism in Dr. Strangelove”, closely examines social perception of nuclear war and the effect opinions had on the acceptance of the film’s message. In the book, author Beverly Kelley argues that “dovism”, pacifist, anti-war attitude, overwhelmed militarism because of the public’s apprehension of the consequences of international conflict.

The chapter starts by detailing important Cold War events that escalated international alarm, and shows the impact such incidents had on the public. The book then focuses on the presidents that guided the country through the perilous times, noting how both President Eisenhower and President Kennedy (it notes President Johnson only briefly) avoided nuclear warfare using polar approaches. Finally, the chapter turns its attention to Dr. Strangelove, or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb. This section addresses first the representation of characters in the film, and then the consequences of the message on the public. Dr. Strangelove satirically highlights the absurdity of nuclear armament, and, though humorously, addresses frightening issues.

In its review of mid-1900 political ideology, Reelpolitik II illuminates the issues that underlie the message of Dr. Strangelove. The film wittily captures the irrationality behind the use of weapons as protection. Reelpolitik II summarizes the political atmosphere that the film satirizes and indicates how socieity's attitude was influenced by the film's message and how the film's message was shaped by society's posture.

Phyllis La Farge’s book The Strangelove Legacy examines how anxiety of nuclear threats from the Cold War impacted children and adolescents.  La Farge utilizes prior research dating back to the early years of the Cold War and presents studies of her own from the 1980s.  The findings from the studies are surprising, showing significant percentages of students across periods confident of inevitable nuclear war and disheartened by prospects of surviving such an event.  For example, a study from 1962 showed that 45 percent of junior-high students expected a war (p. 25).  Similarly, a study from 1984 reported that 29.5 percent of high-school seniors often worried about the chance of nuclear war, while another 39.9 percent responded that they sometimes worried (p. 27).  The numbers show the immediacy of nuclear concerns and demonstrate that “mutually assured destruction”, which left unalleviated society’s angst, wasn’t the best international policy.

La Farge’s work also indicates that since the beginning of the Cold War concerns of nuclear war have actually increased.  Surveys show that in 1955 only 27 percent of high school respondents thought the world would be destroyed in nuclear war.  In 1984 a similar survey found 89 percent said they thought the world would (p. 34).  This increased concern shows how nuclear accumulation failed to alleviate global disagreement and kept the public in a state of panic.    

            The Strangelove Legacy illustrates that inherent in the stalemate that stems from nuclear proliferation is a constant fear of conflict.  The plot of Dr. Strangelove stems from that alarm in society in an exaggerated manner that illuminates the irrationality behind perilous security.  The findings of The Strangelove Legacy bolster the message of Dr. Strangelove; defense guaranteed by retaliation is counterproductive.