This article actually argues against parody being included under the fair use clause, saying that the treatment should be very narrow and should not include my definition of satire (or works that parody others to attack a third). Posner claims that use should only be fair when the costs of transacting with the copyright owner over permission to use the copyrighted work would exceed the benefits of transacting. Posner argues three specific points:

1. Fair use should only provide a defense to infrigement if the work is a parody, not a satire.

2. The parodist should not be allowed to take so large a fraction of the copyrighted features as to make the parody a substitute for the original work.

3. The fact that a parodist appropriates a small amount should not be relevant to fair use.

Interestingly, Posner writes: "If all but one form of intellectual property is priced, dumping the remaining form into the public domain, where it can be used without being paid for, may cause the priced forms to be even more underutilized from a social standpoint. Underutilized and also underproduced, as potential buyers of this intellectual property switch to its free competitor."

However, if parody can be protected by fair use and satire cannot, Posner's argument suggests that everyone will switch to parody rather than risk or pay for satire.

In this article, Tushnet and Keller define parody and satire, and how such strict definitions can lead to problems. Like Long, they argue that such a clear definition can allow the court to almost choose which genre the works fall under, and therefore indirectly suppress what works are allowable. They go through a history of cases, including copyright and trademark, but I will concentrate on copyright as specifically relating to my project.

Therefore, Tushnet and Keller argue that the current mutually exclusive definitions of parody and satire should be forgotten. Instead, it is the critical insights that should be examined, without judging the merits of those insights the way parody or satire might. Otherwise, parody is favored unfairly over satire, suppressing one form of expression and promoting the other, which is not the purpose of the copyright laws.

In this article, Adriana Collado summarizes the distinction between parody and satire and the interpretation of this difference in fair use cases over time. Collado goes on to discuss the present state of the law, what the law should be, and possible solutions and compromises for satire, which is not currently mostly included under fair use provisions.

However, Collado also argues that by Supreme Court's own definition of fair use works ("for purposes such as criticism [and] comment"), satire should already been included. Satire has been defined as a commentary or critical work, one of the uses specifically enumerated in the Fair Use Doctrine, so it should technically be protected.

Since satire is currently not included under fair use, Collado discusses potential solutions and compromises, although none are very promising. Collado quotes Tom W. Bell, who suggests that copyright owners and secondary users should be able to opt out of copyright law and contract under a fared use system, although he fails to mention what would happen for satirists if copyright owners refuse to license (which would probably happen due to the self-esteem issue). Collado adds another possibility of courts requiring unauthorized satirists to pay copyright holders for actual damages sustained from the use of the copyrighted work, but understands that such a method might still dissuade satirists who cannot predict such a number in advance.

This blog on fair use, written by law professor Peter Friedman, covers many elements of fair use, including satire and parody. This page deals specifically with blog entries covering satire and fair use, including an excerpt from Andrew S. Long's "Mashed Up Videos and Broken Down Copyright," written for the Oklahoma Law Review. Friedman discusses how parody has more extensive coverage than satire under fair use, including the recent example of Little Brown's Good Night, Moon. Similarly to Dr. Juice's satire on The Cat and the Hat and the O.J. Simpson murder trial, this book will probably not be defensable under fair use due to its satiric rather than parodic nature.

Long's article includes a section on the effect os the parody-satire distinction, which discusses the confusion similar to Bridy's article about hybrids of satire and parody. Long even suggests that "this seemingly arbitrary distinction allows judges to find parody when it suits the results the wish to achieve." Hardly a promotion of progess that the Copyright Act is supposed to protect. Long also argues that the distinction between satire and parody ignores that satire must also transform the original work, which adds new, transformative meaning.

Michael Einhorn, Ph.D., suggests that licensing arbitration is preferable to the existing "all or nothing" method of fair use that currently exists for works that add new interpretation to existing works (ie parody and satire). If we vacate such rules, Einhorn argues, owners of intellectual property would be guaranteed compensation, producer incentives are great without the worries of punitive uncertainites, and collecting societies and licensing agents may emerge when tradable rights are defined. These would perhaps more effectively promote the progress of arts and sciences that the copyright laws are designed to do.

This argument follows Judge Kozinski's argument about changing the rules for satire, and not trying to apply fair use to the genre. Otherwise, the two options are too extreme: one party ends up getting the worst end of the deal, and the other party walks away almost unscathed.

Judge Kozinski delivered a lecture for the 1999 Donald C. Brace Memorial at Fordham University School of Law on November 11, 1999. His speech was published in the Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA in the summer of 1999.

In this speech, Kozinski addresses one of the controversial decisions of his court, the Ninth Circuit, about the case Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin Books. Penguin published a book about the O.J. Simpson trial, which was illustrated and wirtten to resemble a Dr. Seuss picture book. The Court ruled that Penguin's book was not fair use because it was satire rather than parody, meaning that it did not comment on Dr. Seuss's book but only used it as a springboard to comment on the O.J. Simpson trial.

Judge Kozinski, however, indicates that had he delivered the decision, it might have been different; although he does not want to criticize his colleagues, he doubts he "would have decided the case the same way." He examines the tradition of fair use theory in dealing with intellectual property, questioning when its protection starts to defeat the purpose of having it.

The most relevant part of his speech to my topic is when he discusses the importance of form to satire, even if the satire does not necessarily comment on the original work. As Supreme Court pointed out, restraining the form suppresses content; furthermore, he argues with the Supreme Court's decision in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, who claimed that satire attempts to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh. Instead, it takes "some creativity and work to write a sustained satirical pastiche that people will enjoy enough to pay money for." The satirist cannot latch onto any work to achieve their purpose, either, because something about the original fits or doesn't fit the subject.

Lastly, Judge Kozinski points out that our fair use laws leave something to be desired: either we deny fair use and enjoin the work out of existence, or we claim fair use and the work remains and the copyright owner has to pay the attorney fees. He suggests a remedy outside of the fair use doctrine, a question of appropriate remedy rather than fair use. In the end, the effect would be to "strip copyright owners of their right to control the uses to which their work is put, while strengthening their right to demand compensation for the value they create."

In this journal article, Annemarie Bridy discusses the history of satire and parody throughout a variety of cases, concentrating especially on the Campbell case. She argues that Justice Souter's decision entitles parodists more than satirists when deciding how much and what kind of borrowing is appropriate for fair use arguments. So, what happens when a parodic work "shades into satire?" Is it no longer classifiable and therefore defensible as a parody?

In order to answer this question, Bridy draws upon literary theory and the distinction of "indirect satire" and "direct satire" to argue that some satire (direct) is definitely not permissible under fair use, but others (indirect) should be. As is, the definitions of parody and satire seem to be mutually exclusive, which can draw unfair consequences for indirect parody. Instead of employing such a distinct definition between satire and parody, she argues that the distinction should be drawn between two types of satirical parody, eliminating the problems that result from a hybrid of satire and parody.

Daniel Green discusses the statuses of parody and satire under current Supreme Court guidance, including the uncertainity and variance among courts. He argues that satire is unequivocally the underprivileged of the two for fair use cases, although it is allowed in certain circumstances. For his article, he had three purposes: to differentiate between parody and satire, to prove that protection for satire under fair use is important for both copyright law and the First Amendment, and to recommend some methods to incorporate this view while leaving all current precedent (although his methods may be a bit extreme, due to his satire of Gulliver's "A Modest Proposal."

One of his crucial arguments occurs when he discusses the Dr. Seuss Enterprises v. Penguin books case. Green argues that the Court overly criticized the satirist because the satirist followed traditional satire, and that his point of transposing the childish style and moral content to the world of adult concerns was an important juxtaposition. It is difficult to conceive The Cat NOT in the Hat! harming Dr. Seuss Enterprises because the books appeal to entirely different markets; only because the book was satirical did it not earn protection.  Satire is still a valuable social criticism, just like parody.

Green goes on to outline five more guidelines that should be used to determine fair use, including subjective intent of infringer, manifested effects on  the market, injury, "value" of the satire, and relevance or necessity of appropriated work to the satire. This way, perhaps, satirists will be able to deliver their modest (or perhaps not so modest) proposals without having to become parodists.

In this 1986 Court case, Marvin Fisher and Jack Segal brought a suit against Rick Dees for infringing their song "When Sunny Gets Blue" with a parody song entitled "When Sonny Sniffs Glue." Besides infringement, they claimed unfair competition, defamation, and product disparagement. The Court decided that Rick Dees did indeed deserve fair-use protection because it was a parody.

The important points in this case are that every instance of parody defense must be considered individually, that a humorous or satiric work deserves protection only if the copied work is at least partly the target of the work in question, and that parodists will seldom get permission from those whose works are parodied. As they state, "The parody defense to copyright infringement exists precisely to make possible a use that generally cannot be bought" since "[s]elf-esteem is seldom strong enough to permit the granting of permission even in exchange for a reasonable fee." I would argue that the same is true of satires, even if they do not specifically comment on the original work, so they also need some form of protection or compromise for when the rights are denied. This follows Judge Kozinski's logic, so that satires are not stifled simply due to the nature of their work.

Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. filed suit against the members of the rap music group 2 Live Crew and company, claiming that 2 Live Crew's song "Pretty Woman" infringed their copyright in Roy Orbinson's rock ballad, "Oh Pretty Woman." Supreme Court ruled that 2 Live Crew did not infringe on "Oh Pretty Woman" because their song was a parody, and did in fact fall under the fair use clause.

This 1994 case is extremely important to my topic because it was one of the first to differentiate between satire and parody and how they deal with fair use. According to the Supreme Court's definition, parody is "the use of some elements of a prior author's composition to create one that, at least in part, comments on that author's work." It counts as fair use due to its critical nature. If the commentary "has no critical bearing on the substance or style of the original composition," on the other hand, it is satire, which does not have the same protection. In the Supreme Court's mind, satire should be able to stand on its own, and borrowing of another work is just to "avoid the drudgery of working up something fresh."

The most interesting aspect, however, is footnote 14, which allows that satire may in certain circumstances also fall under fair use (although these circumstances are much more narrow than for parody) if "there is little or no risk of market substitution."

In this case, Jeff Koons used Art Roger's photographs of his wife and eight puppies to create a group of 20 sculptures for a 1988 exhibition. Koons acknowledged that his source matieral was a notecard of Roger's "Puppies." Not only did he use Roger's idea, he also copied the expression: the composition, the poses, and the expressions. Koons claims that his work is fair use because he argues that "his scuplture is a satire or parody of soceity at large. He insists that 'String of Puppies' is a fair social criticism." The Court, however, ruled against him, saying that it does not comment on the original work.

For my essay, I will highlight the discussion on satire and parody. The Court agrees that both are "valued forms of criticism" and foster more creativity protected by copyright law. However, the Court also argues that the parody or satire must comment on the original work or there would be no limitation to fair use; credit must be given to the original work. The Court does not prevent Koon's expression, but says that Koon must recognize any such exploitation requires "paying the customary price." I agree with this assesment, and wonder if satire could somehow incorporate acknowledgment of its source, could it be treated more similarly to parody, ie as applicable to the fair use clause?