he dominant project of cyberlaw is to parse the implications of the Internet's structural rules or "code." n302 Legal scholars seeking to explain the Internet's dynamism as a unified platform have emphasized a particular structural factor: the so-called "end-to-end" model. n303 An end-to-end network is one that pushes control out to the endpoints. n304 The network focuses on moving bits from one place to another, without considering what those bits contain. Any edge device, such as a computer or mobile phone, can add a new application, and those edge devices are solely responsible for factors such as reliability and security that ensure the success of that application. Because innovations do not require the consent or updating of the network core, those innovations can be deployed more quickly.n305 As edge devices become more powerful, which they do as computing power improves over time, their enhancements can immediately be joined to the network. So, new services such as Google, Skype, Hotmail, Facebook, and Amazon.com can catch on and grow rapidly, generating significantly more social and economic benefits than in a network like the PSTN, where central control nodes must approve new features. n306
The end-to-end model emphasizes only one side of the equation - the edges. The Internet gives extraordinary power to its endpoints, but it also embodies linkages between those endpoints, and between [*400] aggregations of systems that connect into a composite network. The fact that the edges of the network define the applications say nothing about how those edges are wired together. An endpoint can offer a brilliant innovation, but such innovation will be of no value if other endpoints cannot access it, or cannot access it easily. n307 Something more than the end-to-end principle must explain how the Internet holds together.
McGeveran, William and Fisher, William W., "The Digital Learning Challenge: Obstacles to Educational Uses of Copyrighted Material in the Digital Age" (August 2006). Berkman Center
Research Publication No. 2006-09 Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=923465
This is a report on a yearlong study produced by The Berkman Center for Internet and Society at Harvard University. It looks at the obstacles that Fair Use law and copyright owners create in the process of attempting to further develop the full potential of the educational uses of technology. The report identifies four main problematic areas:
a. The lack of clarity within the copyright law.
b. The large adoption of digital rights that keeps users from accessing content.
c. The increasing amount of licensing that creates mounting paperwork for users to overcome.
d. The extreme practices by gatekeepers.
This report speaks of the problematic nature of copyright laws and current practices of Fair Use. It informs the readers about the great wall that is being created between students and the materials that should be available for their education and about the perils that such a state of affairs brings to the future of education. At the same time, the report effectively documents and clearly identifies the top four obstacles. Thus, it gives readers a reachable solution and concludes with a series of sound recommendations that if applied, will bring much clarity and fairness to the tense relationships between copyright owners with professors, scholars and artists who claim Fair Use.
"Will Fair Use Survive?" (New York: Brennan Center for Justice, 2005).
This study conducted by the Brennan Center for Justice at New York University School of law researched the causes and consequences of the increasingly heavy hand that is being exercised by copyright and trademark owners on limiting Fair Use. The study highlights the importance of preserving Fair Use for the benefit of democracy, the public in general and to ensure that "the owners of intellectual property cannot close down the free exchange of ideas." It states that copyrighting is a confusing arena for users and one in which the powerful can overstep limitations of Fair Use. It can also be a permissive arena in which intellectual property owners can exercise undue authority. The study concludes with a series of normative and legal recommendations to improve the standing for the users and encourage copyright owner to exercise restraint.
The study's central team is helping the reader to understand the increasing pressures facing Fair Use consumers and the urgent need to take action to prevent copyright owners from eroding the establish laws of Fair Use. It bases it claims on research that points out the weakening of Fair Use law as well as the fact that intellectual property owners have effectively developed an atmosphere of fear around it. By doing so, they have deterred and ultimately limited the free exchange ideas. The study documents several examples of big corporations taking action against individuals whom they claim had violated their intellectual property rights. These examples underscore the unequal legal status that individual users face when attempting to claim Fair Use. Finally, the study questions the survival of Fair Use under the current practices.
The above article is a PR address from the Association of American Publishers regarding the infringement lawsuit brought up on Georgia State University by Oxford University Press, Cambridge University Press and SAGE Publications. The document gives the reasons why these three publishers felt it necessary to bring up charges against GSU and why it is important that the copyright they hold over their published works is important (mainly because of the significant funds they spend publishing their works).
The above link directs you to the legal complaint in its original form. Using the above legal cliam and the press release to help decipher and guide me through this legal document will help me to better understand why the publishers feel they have been wronged by Georgia State University. The infringements listed by Georgia State University have most assuredly been facilitated by the library/libraries of GSU or at least exacerbated by the library/libraries.
I will use the above article as a way of understanding what was it exactly that publishers feel are significant reasons to bring up suit against an entity. By examining the stated reasons for the lawsuit, I could further research as to what could be done to eliminate the possibility of being sued for supplying copyrighted works to students, faculty, and staff by the university library. The above articles will help me to define in my essay what is sufficient cause for a publisher to take up suit against a university / library.
tagged classroom_use copyright copyright_clearance copyright_law copyright_legal_aspects fair_use law librarian librarians libraries library library_issues scholarly_communication scholarly_publishing teaching u.s._law university_library by aulisio ...on 23-JUL-09
Note: Lexis Nexis doesn't give persistent links (or else I am unable to find where they do) in order to retrieve this article simply search for "a lay perspective on the copyright wars" with only the legal box checkmarked and it will be the first result.
In this Lecture, Columbia University's University Librarian, James G. Neal, addresses the current environment of libraries in regards to copyright and open access. Neal's lecture mostly addresses the findings of the 108 Study Group which was formed to research copyright. Neal explains the current state of copyright, the findings of the 108 Study Group, and the framework necessary in order to facilitate a more open environment for publications and libraries. Neal's lecture defines the library as an all encompassing entity which disseminates information, a center for research, a publisher in its own right. Because of the library's role as a center for just about everything scholarly, the library has a vision of embracing legacy as well as current trends. The library is an information repository and a portal to information. Serving so many roles simultaneously makes the library at the forefront of the copyright war.
In my essay it will be important to state why it is the duty of the librarian to rebel against copyright in order to push for more open access. Neal helps define the library as the center of the copyright war, the very front of the action. By citing Neal and his 108 Study Group's findings, I will be able to convey the importance of the librarian to stand up against copyright in order to defend the very embodiment and idea of the library itself. Neal's article also gives information on the opninion of librarians and library organizations on the issue of copyright and open access. Using some of this information will help me to define how to faciliate a better enviornment for the sharing of intellectual materials.
tagged classroom_use copyright copyright_clearance copyright_law copyright_legal_aspects fair_use law librarians library library_issues open_access scholarly_communication scholarly_publishing teaching u.s._law university_library by aulisio ...on 23-JUL-09
News from the Future of Public Media Posted by Patricia Aufderheide on May 7, 2009 at 4:12 PM.http://www.centerforsocialmedia.org/blogs/future_of_public_media/dmca_fair_use_and_educators/
This news report from The American University Center for Social Media reports on the recent efforts of media professors and professor from other disciplines to obtain renewals and extensions on exceptions in copyright law. After battling industry lawyers three years ago, the reports say professors such as Dr. Peter Decherney are again in the courtroom to once again attempt to make cases on behalf of educators and their students.
Coming for the Center for Social Media the report is very sympathetic to the professors who are trying to convince the industry and the lawmakers that when it comes to education, the rules for copyright use should be different, because (among other things) it is in the best interest of society, and because profits are not derived as a result of materials used in the classroom.
The Growth of Intellectual Property:A History of the Ownership of Ideas in the United StatesWilliam W. Fisher III. forthcoming in Eigentumskulturen im Vergleich (Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1999) http://cyber.law.harvard.edu/property99/history.html
This publication is best described as an historical and outlined recompilation of who or what created legislation such as copyright law and intellectual property. It includes the rights to protect an author's "original" work as well as the protection of celebrities who wish to profit from their own image.
William W. Fisher's publication on the historical growth of intellectual property in the United States summarizes the history of copyright law while at the same time takes the reader on a journey that both explains and criticizes the forces that had taken copyright law to the place that it occupies today. Fisher identifies three main forces that impact the growth of intellectual property: economics, ideology and politics. He consistently emphasizes that for the most part and throughout the entire process, the consumer (the public) has been left out of the discussion. Thus, the growth of copyright law has been primarily developed and described by those having a personal interest in it and wish to profit from it. Dr. Fisher calls into questions ideas such as "original writing" pointing out that writers always support and draw their work from previous work. This is a very well documented and well written article that at the same time points out the problems with intellectual property and on some level encourages readers to develop their own agency in order to prevent the erosion of consumer protections such as Fair Use.
U.S. Code Title 17 is the definitive legal resource for the U.S. Laws regardining copyright. This resource has relevant information on what constitutes copyright infringement and what actions are needed to remedy said infringements.
I will use the above resource as a primary source. This source will help me to define exactly what copyright infringement is according to the law. The above material will help me to define what actions a librarian could take when addressing sensitive copyrighted materials. By knowing the extent of the law I could then determine what are suitable actions to take when coming in contact with something which is questionable -- and in turn what is definitively illegal -- in order to argue for what actions a librarian could take to "push the envelope" on copyright law.
This resource aims to address as many legal aspects of copyright infringement that the site's authors deem are most relevant to instruction and libraries. The site acts as a bibliography or index to various topics within coypright right law and links the user to a main source of information on each specific topic. In addition to linking to various topics on copyright law, it also links to legal information on copyright law and how it pertains to libraries and instruction. Under each section and sub-headings are abstracts explaining what is covered under each topic.
The following resource is an invaluable tool for addressing specific copyright concerns of libraries. After researching what each of the concerns are and making note of them, I will then be able to click through to find out more information on each specific topic. Though likely not a comprehensive source of copyright law which specifically affects libraries, it seems to be fairly wide ranging and well written.
The following article compares copyright law in so much as it involves document delivery (or Interlibrary loan) in different countries: Australia, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The section of the law, deemed most relevant by the author, is listed and an examination of the law is undergone. The author tries to re-explain the word of the law in laymans terms and make it more approachable to the average reader. I plan on using the following article to get a better understanding of how copyright law differs in western countries and how it affects libraries and their ability to provide free documents to patrons. Using the authors explanations will help me to get a better grasp of "legal-ese," so as to better understand U.S. Law when conducting my own research.
The following article compares copyright law in so much as it involves document delivery (or Interlibrary loan) in different countries: Australia, Canada, Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The section of the law, deemed most relevant by the author, is listed and an examination of the law is undergone. The author tries to re-explain the word of the law in laymans terms and make it more approachable to the average reader.
I plan on using the following article to get a better understanding of how copyright law differs in western countries and how it affects libraries and their ability to provide free documents to patrons. Using the authors explanations will help me to get a better grasp of "legal-ese," so as to better understand U.S. Law when conducting my own research.
Heller, Steven. "Shepard Fairey Is Not a Crook." 10 Apr. 2009. <http://themoment.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/04/10/graphic-content-shepard-fairey-is-not-a-crook/?hpw>.
The author is Steven Heller, former art director at the New York Times and current co-chair of the MFA design department at the School of Visual Arts. The blog entry is a response to Mark Vallen's Obey Plagiarist Fairey essay which attacks Fairey for using Chinese and Russian propaganda imagery. He labeled the acts misappropriation. Heller's article begins by briefly laying out the Fairey vs. AP court case. This case is perhaps the most current high profile copyright lawsuit. Its decision will be extremely important for the mindset of artists. The decision will either encourage or discourage appropriation art. The uproar surrounding the Hope image is yet again an example how in copyright everything is but black and white.
The author argues Fairey is not a thief. Heller thinks the usage is protected under fair use. His work in general acts to criticize media's consumer outlook. As Heller writes about his Obey poster, "Fairey is essentially arguing that icons can be conflated and repurposed to achieve manipulative results. Fairey's appropriation refers to that which goes on in the mass media every day. At its most articulate, his work is a critique of image ownership." The article concludes by noting that Fairey has made rigid efforts to protect his own brand from the appropriation of other artists. For my research paper, this latter point is significant. It makes us question the degrees to which appropriation can take on. We must wonder is there ever an end to the cycle of appropriating a single image. As I begin to write about appropriation art, I will use Fairey as my jumping off point. The current case and Fairey's tactics to stop his art from being appropriated are emblematic of how copyright law exists among artist, media, and institutions today.
Newton v. Diamond is a court case that, similar to Bridgeport Music v. Dimension Films, revolves around de minimis sampling. The case involves the rap group, the Beastie Boys, and accomplished jazz flutist, James Newton. The Beastie Boys, in their song “Pass the Mic,” sampled a very small segment of Newton’s recording, “Choir.” The sample was a six-second, three-note snippet of Newton playing the flute. The Beastie Boys acquired a license for the actual sound recording from a record company, but they didn’t obtain one for the underlying musical composition from Newton. The court held that the three-note segment of the composition of “Choir” could not be copyrighted because it lacked requisite originality; further, it stated that if the segment had been copyrightable, the Beastie Boy’s use was de minimis.
The analysis on de minimis, unlike in the Bridgeport case, was on the musical composition, not the sound recording. First, the three-note sequence wasn’t the heart of the work and was insubstantial as it appeared once within the four and one-half minute song. Even more important, though, is that the note sequence in question—C – D flat – C, over a held C note—doesn’t contain sufficient originality to be awarded copyright protection. There are only so many notes, chords, and chord progressions available to musicians. Therefore, some of these basic notes and progressions can’t be “owned” by anyone.
With this type of court decision and interpretation of copyright and de minimis laws, the need for certain sample clearances becomes void. Along with the outcome of the Bridgeport case, if I sampled a one-note snippet of a song, I would still need licensing from whoever owns the master recordings. With the Newton v. Diamond case, however, I would now only need licensing from the record company, for instance, and wouldn’t need to seek approval from a composer or music publishing company. The composer doesn’t own the rights to certain notes, and therefore I can sample certain compositions.
This is an important differentiation for me, or anyone who samples for that matter. It is definitely something to take into consideration for my songs that sample and any future song that I produce. It would allow me to sample small segments and only have to clear them with record companies, saving me time and money. This is an interesting wrinkle in copyright law that is certainly relevant and applicable.
Grand Upright Music v. Warner Bros. Records was the court case that started it all when it comes to sampling, copyright infringement, and the necessity of acquiring clearance to sample a copyrighted work. The case was brought against one of Warner Bros. Records’ artists, a rapper named Biz Markie, by Grand Upright Music, which owns the copyrights to singer and songwriter Gilbert O’Sullivan. Grand Upright claimed that Biz Markie infringed upon O’Sullivan’s song, “Alone Again (Naturally),” by incorporating a partial piece of the copyrighted song into a rap recording. The court found this to be evident.
Markie’s main argument was that he should be excused from liability for infringing copyright because others in the rap world are also engaging in the illegal activity. The judge was quick to point out that this mere statement could do nothing more than lead to that argument’s own refutation. The judge then pointed to the US copyright laws, as well as even the Seventh Commandment, “Though shalt not steal,” as his basis for siding with Grand Upright. Just because stealing might be rampant in the rap music business, there is no way to view this as excusable or justifiable. The court viewed that appropriating copyrighted work into a new one for the sole aim of economic achievement is a blatant disregard for the law and the rights of others.
With this decision, the face and sound of rap music was forever changed. Until that point, sampling had been widespread in the hip-hop world; some artists had even been using ten to twenty samples a song. Now, all of these samples would have to be cleared—and at a cost. Many artists couldn’t afford to sample after this. At the same time, copyright holders could begin refusing to license their songs for one reason or another.
In my project I have two songs with samples. Had I produced them in 1985, for instance, I wouldn’t have to clear the samples, and I would be able to reap every monetary benefit to their success. After this Grand Upright case, however, things are different. To try and release either of my songs, I would have to go through a costly clearance negotiation with record and publishing companies; and for all I know, even if I offered to pay, they might still not clear my samples.
While it is fairly obvious to look towards the official US Copyright Law when doing researching for a copyright paper, two sections in Chapter 1 hold an important relevance to my project. Sections 106 and 114 both touch on factors that relate to the appropriation of copyrighted material for derivative works.
Section 106 states the exclusive rights that accompany a copyrighted work. That is, the exclusive rights of an owner of that copyright. There are six main points; these can range from the right to authorize reproduction of the copyrighted work, to the right to authorize public performance or display. The second of these points, however, is the most appropriate for my project and research. It reads: the owner of copyright has the exclusive right and authorization “to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted work.” Samples, remixes, and mashups fall under this category of derivative work—they aren’t fully original and have been derived from copyrighted sources.
Section 114 goes further in-depth on the scope of these exclusive rights when it comes to sound recordings specifically. Part two of this section connects back to the aforementioned second point of section 106. It states that the owner of a copyrighted sound recording has the exclusive right “to prepare a derivative work in which the actual sounds fixed in the sound recording are rearranged, remixed, or otherwise altered in sequence or quality,” all of which take place in mashups, remixes, and samples.
Both sections clearly include and declare that the owner of a copyrighted work, including any sound recording, holds the ability and right to authorize derivative works. Since most mashups, and a fair share of remixes and samples, aren’t cleared with copyright holders, they hold an interesting (and illegal) relationship with this law. On top of that, being some of the most fundamental aspects of the US Copyright Law, future court decisions that have affected music of this nature all rely on and relate back to these original points.
tagged copyright copyright_law exclusive_rights by mbandier ...on 01-DEC-08
Patry, William F. "The Visual Artists' Rights Act of 1990 (VARA). Copyright Law and Practice. Vol 2. Arlington: The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc, 1994.
William Patry provides an overview of the Visual Artists’ Rights Act, and this chapter is divided into numerous sections to simplify VARA's breakdown. Patry states that the goal of VARA is to “preserve the physical integrity of the physical embodiment of works of visual art, both as an expression of the creativity of the artist, and in order to ensure that culture is passed on to future generations.” However, because it is so narrowly defined in what it protects, VARA shows how reluctant United States officials are to put moral rights into federal law. Patry provides insight into the reasoning behind certain provisions in VARA, such as the exclusions, which he says were “intended to eliminate opposition from the motion picture, publishing, and computer industries.” This chapter also explains each of the three rights granted by VARA: the right of attribution, integrity, and the right to prohibit destruction. Exceptions are extensively investigated, while also declaring that VARA distinguishes between exceptions regarding subject matter and exceptions regarding rights granted in Section 106A of United States Copyright Law. Interestingly, Patry touches on the issue of fair use as a possible section of conflict between “traditional copyright law and VARA.” VARA prevents parody or satire of visual artwork, because in order for parody or satire to work, the original work must be “distorted or modified” in some way that harms the artist’s reputation. Patry goes on to explain preemption regarding federal vs. state laws, among other forms of preemption.
This chapter in Patry’s book provides an excellent overview of some of the issues that arise regarding VARA. The conflicts that arise due to VARA show how new legislation always comes with its dissenters and supporters, and it always has some type of loophole or problem. Patry’s insight into why Congress added certain provisions helps the average audience to understand the legislation process with regards to copyright.
This essay is a very concise, accessible introduction to copyright law and the concept of participatory culture. One major flaw that I found with the essay, however, was its demand that new copyright law take “information quality” into account. Who, for example, will become judge of the quality of information, and upon what standards will they make their judgments? This would obviously be a contentious issue, and one that the essay only barely addresses. Also, this essay adopts a fairly utopian conception of digital technologies and the internet, a view that seems to be shared by many contemporary cultural critics. The authors see digitization and the internet as great tools of democracy that will allow for a “participatory culture” unlike any previously known. While these are nice, comfortable theoretical positions to take, that does not necessarily make things so. As regards my own project, I am more interested in how these utopian visions of the “democratization” effect of digital technologies and the internet are coerced and manipulated by larger corporate or commercial interests. For example, this essay discusses how new copyright law needs to provide for “informational autonomy,” but I am interested in how this so called autonomy is ideologically coded and oftentimes highly coercive. In addition, this article relishes in the means of production being made available to all through digitization and the internet, but I want to know how this changes and is exploited by companies like Dorito’s that broadcast user generated content. Will these democratized means of production simply be co-opted by corporate interests, or is there something truly liberating and democratic about these tools? Anyway, overall this is a great essay to read as an introduction to participatory culture and copyright law.
tagged Advertising Amateur_Video Copyright_Law Digita Digital Digital_Distribution Digital_Technology Disruptive_Technology Google Hollywood Internet_Culture Marketing Media Movie_Theatres Participatory_Culture User_Generated_Content Video_Rental YouTube by blueher ...on 08-MAR-07
Rogers V Koons. No. 234, 388 and 235. United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. 2 Apr. 1992.
This is the 2nd Circuit's appellate ruling on Rogers v Koons. The introduction states that the "key" to the suit "brought by a plaintiff photographer against a defendant sculptor and the gallery representing him, is defendants' borrowing of plaintiff's expression of a typical American scene — a smiling husband and wife holding a litter of charming puppies." It calls the copying deliberate goes on to give the background facts of the case. It first describes Rogers' work and reputation, followed by an account of how the "Puppies" photograph was created. It then does the same for Koons and the creation of "String of Puppies." It goes back over the "prior proceedings," giving the history of litigation between the two parties and affirms the district court initial ruling.
Moving on to the discussion section, the court eleaborates on the ownership of copyright in an original work of art, which Rogers has, discusses unauthorized copying by defendant, which Koons is held guilty of, and defines the fair use doctrine. It then enumerates the four criteria required to satisfactorily pass as fair use. Under the Purpose and Character of Use criterion, the court says, "Relevant to this issue is Koons' conduct, especially his action in tearing the copyright mark off of a Rogers notecard prior to sending it to the Italian artisans. This action suggests bad faith in defendant's use of plaintiff's work, and militates against a finding of fair use." Essentially, they are saying that he was underhanded about his method of copying. As far as Parody or Satire as Fair Use is concerned, the court says "that even given that "String of Puppies" is a satirical critique of our materialistic society, it is difficult to discern any parody of the photograph "Puppies" itself." They argue that Koons was motivated more by profit than satire. The court also holds that Koons copied far more of Puppies than necessary to convey his point. "Koons went well beyond the factual subject matter of the photograph to incorporate the very expression of the work created by Rogers," says the court. Lastly, the court orders that the effect of the use on the market value of the original has been harmed, and "there is simply nothing in the record to support a view that Koons produced "String of Puppies" for anything other than sale as high-priced art. Hence, the likelihood of future harm to Rogers' photograph is presumed, and plaintiff's market for his work has been prejudiced."
Blanch V Koons. No. 05-6433-Cv. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. 26 Oct. 2006.
This is the judgment on the appeal for the Koons v Blanch case with the opinion of Judge Sack. The appeals court rules that Koons’ work was indeed a fair use. Koons was commissioned by the Deutsche Bank and Guggenheim Foundation to create a painting, “Niagra” in which he used Blanch’s “Silk Sandals by Gucci” ad. The court gives background on Koons’ life and work, saying that he is “known for incorporating into his artwork objects and images taken from popular media and consumer advertising, a practice that has been referred to as "neo-Pop art" or (perhaps unfortunately in a legal context) "appropriation art."” It describes both Koons’ painting and Blanch’s photograph and Koons’ use of the photograph in his painting. The two artists’ economic gains and losses are then detailed: Niagra has been appraised at $1 million, while Blanch was paid $750 for her work.
In meeting the criteria for fair use, the court finds Koons’ work transformative, saying it “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message." The court ignores the effect of commercial use because Blanch admits that Koons’ work did nothing to detract from any financial gains Silk Sandals brought her. It does, they say, meet the requirement for parody: “Koons's use of a slick fashion photograph enables him to satirize life as it appears when seen through the prism of slick fashion photography.” Bad faith is cited as the last criteria of fair use. Here the ruling holds that Koons only exhibited bad faith in not first asking Blanch’s permission to use her photo. What I wonder, though, is whether than would have made any difference to her. The other major reason that Koons’ work is said to be acceptable is that he uses only a portion of Blanch’s image, and places that portion with other elements that are not part of her photo, thereby substantially transforming it. In conclusion, the court rules "promoting the Progress of Science and useful Arts," U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8, would be better served by allowing Koons's use of "Silk Sandals" than by preventing it.”
"Koons Affirmed (Don't Blanch)." The Patry Copyright Blog. 26 Oct. 2006. 28 Nov. 2006 <http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2006/10/koons-affirmed-dont-blanch.html>.
This article is a guide to the Koons v Blanch ruling and takes us through the courts' decisions regarding the four criteria that constitute fair use step by step. Fundementally, he says, the case boils down to two points, that "Koons' use was highly transformative and the copyright owner suffered no harm to her market; the rest is window dressing." He summarizes the background of the case (Blanch paid $750 for original ad in Allure magazine, Koons incorperates exact image in his work "Niagra" in order to comment on the way popular images appeal to our most basic instincts and desires.)
Party thinks the majority's distinction between parody and satire is helpful and shows that "Koons had a genuine creative rationale for borrowing Blanch's image, rather than merely using it merely 'to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in working something fresh up.'" He also brings up the issue of bad faith, which has not been mentioned in the two other cases. I think this comes out of Blanch's claims that its pratically a matter of etiquette, she's been quoted as saying something along the lines of "if the artist is still alive, you should at least ask for permission to use their work." I am also interested in the comment posted in reply to this blog in which the author writes, "A major factor in the difference between Rogers and Blanch appears to be that the court found the use of the feet from the Blanch photograph transformative because they were recast in a different position and that the important background elements (man’s lap, aircraft cabin) were not copied. In other words, the Blanch photograph was used more as a reference than as the foundation for the painting."
Greenberg, Lynne A. "THE ART OF APPROPRIATION: PUPPIES, PIRACY, AND POST-MODERNISM." Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 11 (1992): 1.
Greenberg calls appropriation art a “wide-reaching trend which has arisen as a response to post-modernist criticism.” She says its reaction to the formalism and aesthetics of a media-saturated society. Most importantly, echoing Koons claims about the school of thought he belongs to, Greenberg says, “Aggressively and self-consciously derivative in its ideology, post-modernist art critiques the very attributes that copyright law uses to define art: namely, artistic creativity and originality.”
In the introduction, she says the article will focus on the challenges postmodernist art poses on copyright law and argues, like the Columbia Law Review editorial that visual art requires a different set of rules than other copyrightable entities. In the section of her piece about the infringement vulnerability of photography, and “its relationship to the originality requirement” she uses Rogers v. Koons to illustrate her point that we need a different way to interpret copyright as it interferes with the objectives of postmodern art. In her analysis of the case, Greenberg maintains that the court’s perspective is skewed because Koons’ work is so expensive. She says that although the court claims that Koons’ work has an economic impact on Rogers, “It seems farfetched to imagine that Koons's "high-priced" kitsch, sold in the elite world of the art gallery, could even tangentially affect the market for either Rogers's commissioned photographs or Rogers's postcards, sold predominantly in gift shops”. Basically, she concludes, the court ruled fairly according to current laws, this case shows that these doctrines are in need of revision in order to make allowances for appropriation art. “The recent decision of Rogers v. Koons simultaneously underscores the precarious position occupied by artists practicing radical appropriation strategies, and accentuates the consequences of so rigorously enforcing the limited monopoly rights granted by copyright law,” she explains.
Tyson, Kimball. "The Illegal Art Exhibit: Art or Exploitation? a Look At the Fair Use Doctrine in Relation to Corporate Degenerate Art." Southern Methodist University School of Law Computer Law Review & Technology Review 9 (2005): 425.
This article responds to the "Illegal Art" exhibit that toured the country and features Forsythe's work. The author (who repeatedly spells the artist's name "Forsyth") wants to assess whether or not Food Chain Barbie is fair use--even though the court has already ruled it is. She contends the artists are not sincere in their parodies, and thinks they are actually using art to serve their personal "greedy" objectives. After an abbreviated history of art, Tyson says these works are "an ancillary to Pop Art of the 1960's that take corporate images and use them in their works to convey a parodic message not only of the image itself but of the larger societal scheme of which it reflects." She also summarizes the Copyright Act and defines Fair Use. Instead of actually analyzing what the court said about Forsythe's work, she merely repeats it, and it seems, decides to agree with their ruling. One of the few useful things about this article is her comparison of Forsythe and Koons:
"In the Rogers case, there is no doubt that Koons' use of the original work would compromise Rogers' market of the "Puppies" and "would prejudice the market for the sale of "Puppies" notecards or any other derivative uses he might plan." 247 However, in Forsyth's situation, his photographs seem to have little to no effect on the commercial gain of Mattel based on their copyrighted Barbie Doll. Photographs of Barbie in a blender or in a casserole dish are not really going to have a significant chilling effect on Mattel's market; [this] weighs in his favor."
Tyson allows that the Barbie series is a fair use, but remains suspicious of Forsythe's motives. She writes, "The idea of using art and distorting already existing images to convey a message, to illustrate the absurdity of our times, seems very vulnerable to exploitation. In Mattel Inc. v. Forsyth, the artist had very distinct aims in his creation. Call this a derivative work, call it exploitation. Regardless, perhaps these artists used the well-known corporate images as a way to make money. Just as Volkswagen manipulated the automobile market and somehow made consumers feel as though they were really stepping out of conformity in buying a VW, so these artists, under the pretense of satire and art as corporate parody, had an objective no different than that of the corporations and consumer crazed society which they mocked: personal gain motivated by greed, selfishness, and envy." To me, her argument falls flat given that Forsythe did not profit hugely from the works. Art is his profession, his means of making a living, and to charge $400 for a work that he spent time creating does not seem greedy or unreasonable. She contradicts herself, but this piece is valuable to my research because it takes a position I haven't yet encountered and deals with the concept of artists' "worthiness" so to speak and the merit of their intentions.
Zando-Dennis, Julie. "NOT PLAYING AROUND: THE CHILLING POWER OF THE FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION ACT OF 1995." Cardozo Women's Law Journal 11 (2005): 599.
This article is about the Dilution Act of 1995, which is relevant to the Forsythe case because Mattel claimed that his use of their trademark could both blur and tarnish it, meaning, confuse consumers or damage the product’s image/reputation. Zando-Dennis explains that works of satire and parody are most likely to be accused of causing dilution. Mattel has a history of filing suit as soon as they get wind of any unauthorized use of the Barbie name or image, says Zando-Dennis, who points to the website www.trademarks.org (devoted to criticizing Mattel) as evidence of the loathing their lawsuits have engendered amoung advocates of free speech. She delves further into the definitions of blurring and tarnishing, giving useful and clear examples how they can be both beneficial and harmful.
The second section of her article is dedicated to “Subversive Activities that Parody Mattel’s Barbie Doll,” including Mark Napier, an internet artist who produced digitally altered images of Barbie and the band Aqua, famous for their song "Barbie Girl" that all resulted in litigation. "Another artist, Paul Hansen, sold 150 modified Barbies as art works, on which he made a profit of around $ 2,000. Mattel sued for damages of $ 1.2 billion," she writes illustrating how rediculous Mattel makes itself appear. Forsythe's case is discussed in the section "Current Trends, Successes and Remaining Challenges." Zando-Dennis quotes Forsythe's lawyer as saying "This case is about insisting that a corporate giant can't stop an artist from using one of their products to create art and to comment on our society. If we were to allow that to happen, the content of our culture would be greatly reduced and emptied. We cannot allow Mattel to do that." Clearly, Zando-Dennis vigorusly agrees with the ruling in Forsythe's favor. She admires the way the case has "significantly liberalized trademark law" and hopes other circuits (the 8th in particular) will follow the 9th's lead.
Mattel Inc V Walking Mountain Productions. No. 01-56695, 01-57193. US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 6 Mar. 2003.
Filed December 29, 2003. Opinion by Judge Pregerson. This appellate ruling confirms the district court’s grant of summary judgment to Tom Forsythe and dismisses Mattel’s claims that he infringed on their copyrights. Because this article contains a “background” section that details the previous trial extensively, I am going to use this case instead of the first one. It is more comprehensive and recent. The document begins by describing the nature of Forsythe’s work: “a series of 78 photos entitled ‘Food Chain Barbie’ in which he depicted Barbie in various absurd and often sexualized positions…For example, ‘Fondue a la Barbie’ depicts Barbie heads in a fondue pot.’” It talks about the series’ limited market success which amounted to an income of $3,659, half of which came from purchases made by Mattel investigators. The court notes his self-given title of “Artsurdist” and concedes that his work attempts to communicate a “serious message with an element of humor” that intends to critique and ridicule Barbie. It then goes over the various motions and actions that lead up to this particular appeal before reaching the “discussion” section.
This is really the heart of the case, where Pregerson explains why “Food Chain Barbie” is considered fair use. He confirms the three reasons cited by the district court which are that 1) his use was a parody criticizing Barbie 2) he only copied what was necessary for this purpose 3) his photos couldn’t affect the market demand for Mattel’s products. He argues that Forsythe’s work is transformative because it “presents the viewer with a different set of associations and a different context” than Mattel does. Forsythe did not display the entire Barbie in his pictures, and only showed what he needed to in order to convey his message. “We do not require that parodic works to take the absolute minimum amount of the copyrighted work possible,” Pregerson says. And although the works were intended to be sold commercially, the fact that they were unsuccessful shows that he’s not taking any business from Mattel because they appeal to different markets; Mattel to children’s toys, and Forsythe to adult-oriented artistic photographs.
Forsythe, Tom. "Food Chain Barbie & the Fight for Free Speech." National Coalition Against Censorship. 10 Aug. 2004. 27 Nov. 2006 <www.ncac.org/art/20040810~USA~Tom_Forsythe_Food_Chain_Barbie.cfm>.
Forsythe posted this statement on August 10, 2004 as a follow-up to the District Court’s June 24th ruling ordering Mattel to pay his legal fees, which amounted to $2.1 million over the course of five years of litigation, from 1999-2004. In this piece, he maintains that Mattel’s only tactical strategy was to overwhelm him with the cost of his defense and essentially bankrupt him into submission. He calls his case precedent-setting and says it should will discourage corporations from filing suit against artists who criticize their product and will encourage lawyers to work for other artists that get sued because they are more likely to be compensated, like Forsythe’s counsel was.
The rest of the statement details the Mattel v Walking Mountain productions saga from start to finish. He was served with a copyright and trademark complaint from Mattel, decided to fight back, searched unsuccessfully for representation, finally got some help from the ACLU of Southern California who petitioned a San Francisco firm (Howard, Rice, Nemerovsky, Canady, Falk & Rabin) to take the case pro bono. He defends his work as an “obvious” example of fair use—“political and social criticism presented with humor and parody.” Forsythe calls the trial “an essential fight” and says that free speech is paramount to our free society. He argues that it is not the government that censors us, but corporations. “They make their brand ubiquitous and then complain if anyone uses the brands to criticize the resulting crass consumerism,” he writes.
Because we are so sensitive to the threat of official censorship, we don’t notice when it is privately exercised by powerful companies with unlimited funds at their disposal. Forsythe calls the legal system a “boxing ring for the rich.” “I created the Food Chain Barbie series as a seriously funny stab at mindless consumerism, the impossible beauty myth and the advertising that brings it all into our lives,” he explains. The artist’s responsibility is thus to comment on the brands that dominate our lives in order to communicate with the world.
This is suit that Lexmark International, Inc filed against Static Control Components (SCC), Inc. It is the appeal case, where the court overturns the findings against SCC. Lexmark claims that SCC violates the DMCA by selling printer toner cartridges that work with Lexmark’s printer engine program. Lexmark claims that SCC’s chip violates the DMCA and federal copyright law. Part I A of the case provides a description of the companies and the computer programs and how they work. It also explains Lexmark’s toner cartridges and the chips manufactured by SCC. Part I B is a summary of the proceedings and findings of the district court. Section II says that the district court abused its power and outlines four criteria that have to be fulfilled in order to uphold the preliminary injunction. Part III is the beginning of the decision. The first part of the decision outlines the laws that relevant to the case and what each side has to prove in order to win. The court uses the idea-expression dichotomy and other copyright principles to find that one part of the software, the Toner Loading Program, is not copyrightable. The court also states three errors that the district court made in its ruling on the issue of copyright infringement by SCC. The district court was mistaken about what is protectable and what is not when it comes software copyright. Part C of the decision assesses Lexmark’s counter arguments that support the ruling of the district court. Part D comments on the district court’s response to SCC’s fair use arguments, even thought they were irrelevant because the Toner Loading Program is not copyrightable. The court says the district court was right in the four factors SCC had to have for a successful argument and comments on these. Section IV of the decision looks at the DMCA element of the case. Part IV A looks at the laws and what claims the parties make under these laws. Part B says that reading the printer’s memory, not only by the code, can access the Printer Engine Program because it is not encrypted. Since no security device has to be circumvented to get to the code, SCC is not in violation of the DMCA. The rest of this section looks at Lexmark’s case and responds to it. Part C states that the SCC chip does not provide access to the Printer Engine Program, it instead replaces it. Part D addresses the district court’s assessment of SCC’s case because it could become relevant. The court vacates the preliminary injunction and orders further proceedings.
This case is relevant to my paper because it shows how companies attempt to use the DMCA to prevent aftermarket competition. Even though Lexmark fails, the courts ruling has nothing to do with the DMCA and its wording, rather it is about technicalities in a sense. Lexmark lost its case because one of its programs cannot be copyrighted and the other was not encrypted, not because of interpretation of the DMCA. Even though there are court cases regarding the law and its uses, they are not effective in setting precedents or helping with DMCA interpretation.
This article is a good example of how the DMCA can be manipulated in a very effective manner. The DMCA is a tool that creates a new business model of monopolization, and this article is evidence of that. The court cases show how the courts have not ruled on the DMCA itself, they have only applied it to situations. The paper outlines how to avoid loopholes and make your business plan sound under the DMCA in order to create a monopoly. The DMCA has clearly created a new way of doing and controlling business that is contrary to the original intentions of copyright law.
This is the section of the DMCA that many hardware manufacturers are using to create software that is copyright protected and is the only software that the hardware can be used with. This is the law that allows small monopolies on the market to exist until something new is invented or the monopoly is challenged by law. This section of the DMCA allows for copyright protected material to be impermeable to circumvention. This is an important part of the DMCA and is one that draws a lot of attention both in and out of the legal system. It has, in some ways, created a new business model and a new way for companies to enter another market by exploiting the copyright protection and anti-circumvention clauses. It allows companies like The Chamberlain Group to try and block the market and control it by claiming copyright infringement. It also allows hardware companies to enter the software market because they create hardware that can only be used on their copyright protected software platforms. Although a lot of this has not held up in court, when challenged, it has become a popular way of doing business and entering into a new market. This part of the DMCA is the backbone of my paper. I will analyze its words to show how it allows for companies to attempt to monopolize markets and control aftermarkets. I will also suggess that it needs to be ammended because although the courts have limited the attempts of some companies to control their market and aftermarkets, the DMCA is still open to exploitation because the court rulings do not create any legal precedents that go against the DMCA itself.