In their paper, Does Peer-to-Peer Harm Copyright Owners: Protecting and Distributing Digital Products, Anne Duchene and Patrick Waelbroeck create an economic model of peer-to-peer content sharing versus traditional distribution with specific respect to online music sharing. Although the paper was written about music in 2003, it can be thought about with respect to film and television today.

            The model makes a few major assumptions to reach its conclusions. First, the original work provides more utility than the copy. This can easily be supported in today's terms that the original versions are of higher quality and can provide additional features such as DVD extras. The second assumption is that content producers will spend a large amount of money marketing and distributing under the traditional methods, but these costs will be 0 for peer-to-peer distribution. This assumption decidedly focuses on small independent produced content and ignores studio produced content. Along with this assumption is that there is a cost to downloading copies both in the opportunity cost of finding the copy and second in the copyright protection both technically and legally. This assumption does seem to hold true to real world issues.

            The findings of their model is that as copyright protection is increased, not only is consumer surplus decreased through decreased utility for copiers but also for buyers in terms of higher prices passed on to implement the higher protection standards, but also that higher copyright protection favors the large studio productions that have the ability to overcome the capital thresholds for marketing and distributing through traditional media. This could easily apply to film and television new media as well. As the studios block access to files through DRM, they are increasing production costs and favoring themselves over low capital producers who cannot afford to implement these strategies.

This has interesting implications over the future of new media in terms of concentration versus fragmentation of the media industry. It appears that if left unfettered, the online channel allows for a fragmentation of content producers. This is evidenced by YouTube, Funny or Die, and other small yet popular independent online content producers. However, if the studios are able to enforce higher levels of copyright protection, for example winning the Viacom v YouTube case, this could further concentrate power in the studios. In this example, the higher costs of copyright protection would lower YouTube or other smaller sites abilities to operate profitably. If these sites that support user generated content are hampered, it will allow sites such as Hulu.com to dominate and favor studio produced content over user produced content.