In this article, William Landes looks at the “enduring legal question” that asks to what extent tools, services and venues that individuals use to infringe copyright should be held liable for the resulting infringement. In other words, Landes asks “how far should copyright liability extend beyond any direct lawbreakers?” Copyright law uses a variety of common law doctrines and statutory provisions in order to address issues of secondary and tertiary liability. In this article, Landes looks at these laws of copyright and evaluates them from an economic perspective. Landes states that unlike the Patent Act, the Copyright Act of 1976 “does not explicitly recognize the possibility of indirect liability.” He writes that courts have held third parties liable for copyright infringement by turning to the long-standing common law doctrines of contributory infringement and vicarious liability. Landes goes into a great deal of detail in explaining what these two terms actually mean and explaining their role in the Sony decision.

Landes claims that in the Sony decision the Courts failed to consider the balance between the benefits associated with legitimate use and the harms associated with illegitimate use. Landes writes that the ruling “implies that VCR manufacturers can facilitate any copyright violation they wish so long as they can prove that VCRs also facilitate some non-trivial amount of legitimate behavior.” However, Landes concedes that “mere dissection of the legal analysis misses the heart of the Sony decision” and goes on to write that “the driving concern in Sony was a fear that indirect liability would have given copyright holders control over what was then a new and still-developing technology.” Overall, the Court wrote that Copyright law must “strike a balance between a copyright holder’s legitimate demand for effective . . . protection . . . and the rights of others freely to engage in substantially unrelated areas of commerce.” This same idea can be analogized to a lawsuit that attempts to hold Internet service providers liable for online copyright infringement. Landes writes that “it is easy to see why courts would be reluctant to enforce such liability.”

From an economic standpoint, Landes explains that although Copyright law is important “at some point copyright incentives must take a backseat to other societal interests, including an interest in promoting the development of new technologies and an interest in experimenting with new business opportunities and market structures.” Overall Landes concludes that “the main argument in favor of liability is that, although [secondary] parties are only indirectly responsible, they are typically in a good position to either prevent copyright infringement or pay for the harm it causes.” However, “indirect liability has a significant drawback […] in that legal liability — even if carefully tailored — inevitably interferes with the legitimate use of implicated tools, services, and venues. Sometimes raising the prices of services, or even just setting the prices of in the first place, dissuades legitimate users from engaging in legal activity because they don’t want to pay the price. Landes points out that “one can only wonder, for example, how different the Internet would look today had it been clear from that outset that, say, Internet service providers were going to be held accountable for online copyright violations.” Landes concludes by saying that “ the only way to determine the proper scope for indirect liability is to weigh its costs and benefits against the costs and benefits associated with other plausible mechanisms for rewarding authors.”