This article confirms many theories of other articles, including the anarchist nature of the film, the lowbrow comedy, the misfit unity, and the attack on education. All of this transformed the depiction of college in film from an institution of higher learning to the college stereotype we now know. In addition, Bernheimer claims Animal House changed how college-themed movies were made and marketed in Hollywood. It made filmmakers realize that college-themed movies should be specifically made for and marketed to a youth audience by using the popular "crude" humor (and the six themes from Thomas and Heldenfel's article). As said in Bernheim's book, Animal House launched a series of similar comedies made specifically for its audience.
Wright, Jon. "Leaders in Marketing."Journal of Marketing. Vol. 32, No. 1, (1968), pp. 62-63. 2 April 2008. <http://proxy.library.upenn.edu:5549/stable/view/1249199?seq=2>
As shorter workdays and lengthened vacations started to become the norm in the mid-1960s for middle and upper class families, leisure time became a subject worthy of study. Once businesses starting to realize the implications of this new leisure culture, the need for leisure and recreation marketing increased. E. Cardon Walker was the Vice President of marketing for Walt Disney, Inc. and was largely responsible for revolutionizing marketing in this era.
Walker rose through the ranks of Disney starting as a messenger after graduating from UCLA in 1938 and eventually moving to the advertising/publicity department in 1949. He was promoted to head of the department in 1950 and by 1960 became part of the three-man executive committee including Walt Disney himself that served as the top policy-making body. Walker was in charge of sales, advertising, publicity and promotion. In 1966 under his direction, Disney’s sales were $116.5 million and their profits reached over $12 million.
The marketing philosophy that Walker built for Disney in the 1960s has not changed much over the past half decade. Walker’s philosophy is grounded in sound marketing policies. Walker wanted to keep Disney limited to family entertainment and specifically film to maintain complete control of marketing from within the corporation. Approximately half of the corporation was devoted to films and the other half focused on ancillary products such as sound tracks, merchandise and toys, all of which reinforced the advertising of the films themselves. During this time, Disney was able to transition successfully from cartoon shorts to feature length animated films, to feature length live action films and eventually to television. These smooth transitions show Disney’s flexibility and ability to maintain control over its market. For example, when television emerged as a new means of entertainment, Disney embraced it instead of fighting this new technology and starting to produce television programs. Again, Disney’s conservative but modern approach is apparent. Disney did not expand its markets beyond the entertainment and film industry, and when it did, do so slowly and cautiously to avoid risk. In addition, its marketing techniques have not changed significantly over the years. At the same time, they were one of the first to jump on the television bandwagon and utilize marketing techniques to enhance their sales.
eMarketer reports combine original analysis with aggregated numbers from leading sources worldwide. The database includes industry reports, company articles, market projections and analytical commentaries covering every topic from eAdvertising to Wireless. EMarketer also includes a comprehensive compilation of up-to-date internet and e-business statistics (eStat database).
Call#: Van Pelt Library PN1995.9.H6 H674 2004
This edited collection of essays has the overarching goal of exploring the horror film genre by paying attention to the technical and industrial aspects of film that distinguish horror films from horror in other media (such as literature or comic books). The two general questions that the essays-to one degree or another-address are: what role does technology play in the production of horror films, and what role does technology play in the distribution, exhibition, and reception of horror films? ("technology" defined broadly to include production equipment, industrial mechanisms, ideological mechanisms, etc.). The first section of the book consists of essays that explore various technologies and formal innovations employed in the production of horror films. The second section of the book deals with issues surrounding horror films in the marketplace (advertising, distribution, and reception). Finally, the third section examines discursive and ideological aspects of the horror genre from censorship to fan discourse.
Philip Simpson's chapter entitled "The Horror 'Event' Movie: The Mummy, Hannibal, and Signs" explores horror films as they are positioned as Hollywood blockbusters. These marketing and promotion of these films often downplay or outright deny the film's association with the horror genre (still often seen as a marginal or low brow genre). Simpson argues that these horror 'event' movies reach a larger mainstream audience by using star actors and high profile directors, high production values, and genre mixing. Simpson distinguishes between major studio horror films and "second tier" cult audience films. While it is true that many of the films that Simpson discusses are marketed as something other than horror (either as thrillers, adventure films, or even supernatural thrillers), it is not clear where the division between A-list productions and "second tier" films lies. He cites the $100 million dollar domestic theatrical gross mark as certifying a blockbuster, but fails to cite many of the low budget, independent, or "second tier" horror films that crossed that barrier such as The Blair Witch Project (1999), The Ring (2002), and The Grudge (2004).
This is a somewhat informative essay, particularly if one is interested in the production and distribution of anime films, but the argument it makes is an exceptionally simple one (although it dons the clothes of profundity). Cubbison’s essay basically wants to say that form effects content, and that now consumers are allowed to dictate (to a certain, very limited extent) form. She also adds that the form consumers desire is based on an idea of authenticity, but this aspect of the essay is only explored through the relation of a few contrasting anecdotes and resulting in the conclusion: nobody is really certain what an authentic text is but there are lots of opinions about what it may be. To get back to form, content, and consumers, though, one must admit that her argument is not a very novel or complex one. Form and content have always been interrelated, and have always been seen to mutually affect one another. Cubbison’s argument that anime fans have some control over the form (or work) of the anime VHS or DVDs they buy is interesting, but as she herself admits, the debate over what form the work takes is moot at this point since DVDs are now able to provide dubbed and subtitled, original and edited versions of any given work (whereas before VHS had to make formal judgments that often upset fans). DVDs have rendered the debate amongst fans about the most authentic form an anime work can take irrelevant because they can now offer every potential “authentic text.” Anyway, this essay is an interesting look at the way that anime fans have been involved with the distribution of anime films historically, and how these debates have been waged over “authentic” anime texts, but as you will find if you read this essay the tensions and squabbles surrounding the distribution of anime films has been squelched by the capacity of DVDs to provide all possible “authentic texts.” So, for a historical glimpse of the debates about form amongst anime fans definitely read this article, but beyond this the essay is little more than a rehashing of a now dead debate.
Variety.com - MPAA tries to remove NC-17 stigma: Glickman takes a hard look at ratings
Sat., Mar. 10, 2007
Variety.com - Fox Atomic brings new twists: Genre Label Adds to Conventional Tactics.
Tue., Feb. 20, 2007
by Steven Zeitchick
The article discusses the creation of Fox Atomic--a division of Fox Film Entertainment dedicated to genre films and youth markets. However, Fox Atomic doesn't want to just create and market movies, rather "it wants to create entire worlds around those movies." The Fox Atomic website enlists current trends in digital culture to reach out to young, tech savy audiences. The studio has a presence in Second Life called "Fox Atomic Island, a virtual movie studio where citizens can pick up and play with avatars from all its leading pics." It also holds mashup and machinima contests, includes movie related video games on its website, as well as user forums and information on forthcoming releases. In addition, Fox Atomic has created a comics division that will release comics based on movie properties that are not adaptations of the films, but rather engage in "cross-media" storytelling. Current and upcoming film releases include The Hills Have Eyes 2, 28 Weeks Later, and Touristas.
Although other film studios and distributors have a web presence and engage with digital culture, few have ventured quite as far as Fox Atomic. The article remains skeptical as to the success of this strategy as it is still unproven in its ability to generate ticket sales, but this sort of "web 2.0" interactivity and media convergence may be something that film studios can ill afford to ignore.
Call#: Van Pelt Library PN1995.9.H6 H45 2004
Heffernan’s book seeks to investigate the economic and industrial aspects of the horror film genre that many scholarly accounts (which typically focus on cultural and/or aesthetic issues) fail to adequately consider. The book focuses on the postwar period (1953-1968); a period comprised of drastic changes in the film industry (i.e., Paramount decree, TV, technological innovation), and charts some of the functions or positions that horror genre pictures filled during this time period. He argues that this period—which is book-ended by 3D technology and the adoption of the MPAA rating system—saw a major cultural and economic shift in the production and reception of horror movies. This was partially due to the Supreme Court’s Paramount decision in 1948 which required the break-up of Hollywood’s vertically integrated system of production, distribution, and exhibition. As Hollywood studios began producing fewer films, independent distributors and exhibitors needed more product to fill out their schedules including B-pictures for the bottom half of popular double-feature bills. Heffernan argues that “low” genres like horror and sci-fi played an important part in the testing and development of new technologies and methods of production, distribution, and advertising to accommodate various changes including suburbanization, the growth of television, new youth markets, and the new economic and business structures of the film industry. Although written as a “corrective” to scholarship which focuses solely on culture and aesthetics, Heffernan avoids “economic determinism” by deftly intertwining the exploration of various aesthetic and formal changes of the horror genre during this period including greater psychological realism and, of course, graphic gore.
Using Philadelphia as his test market, Heffernan chronologically traces the distribution and exhibition patterns of various horror films across both theatrical and television venues. He begins with the early 1950s cycle of 3D horror films arguing that the narrative and stylistic norms of the horror genre could best negotiate the conflicting demands of “attraction” (the gimmick shots) and narrative integration of the classical Hollywood model, and also detailing the challenges faced by small theater owners to equip theaters to show 3D. Heffernan continues through the 50s and 60s exploring the impact of Hammer’s color saturated and bloody Gothic updates of the classic Universal monsters, how shortages in production from majors caused independent distributors and exhibitors to get into the production business, how the rise in art theaters utilized both exploitation/genre films and art cinema (i.e., “paracinema”), and the rise of “adult” horror in the late 60s. Overall, Heffernan’s book is well-researched, clearly written, and provides a wealth of knowledge for film scholars interested in the economic side of the industry—especially those interested in genre film. The only quibble is with the brief conclusion “The Horror Film in the New Hollywood.” It feels not only tacked on, but somewhat dismissive of the horror film post-1968. He also makes some broad—and I believe incorrect—claims such as that in the 1980s horror film spectacle overwhelms narrative. This comment flies in the face of the convincing arguments he lays out in discussing the intricate relation between technology and genre film of the 50s and 60s (such as horror’s ability to navigate 3D and narrative).
This piece seemed to lament the fact that the Super Bowl advertisers were not able to monopolize traffic to the ads post-game. It sympathizes with the disappointment these giant companies must be feeling over only getting several hundred thousand hits (instead, presumably, of the several million which they no doubt deserved). Then the article goes on to give the companies tips for how to increase traffic next year, and strategies they should employ if they want fully capitalize on the online branding opportunity. This article testifies to the corporate interests of many media outlets, and can only be of interest if read for what the article is doing, not saying.
For my project, though, this piece is very relevant. It shows the way that commercial interests are sometimes subverted, and how in order to “set things right” (i.e. stop subversion of corporate interests) plans are being made to integrate the very thing that was the cause of subversion. Thus we see how the article calls for the companies to “work with” (i.e. subsume) those aggregator sites that so wickedly usurped their web traffic. This, then, is another example of how commercial interests appropriate more independent forms of media distribution.
This article is an interesting, albeit dated, piece. It brings up some relevant concerns about what happens when community based sites like YouTube are bought up by giant corporations, and does a mediocre job of reporting the ambivalence surrounding this issue. On the other hand, this article lacks a good deal of information that seems critical for understanding exactly what it means that Google has purchased YouTube. For example, it mentions that YouTube is already selling homepage space to advertisers, and this will only increase under Google’s control, but it does not explain what space it is talking about. Are these advertising videos parading as user generated content, or simply banner ads asking you to join Match.com or other such ubiquitous internet advertisements? This would be good information to know since advertising is such a protean, mutable form. Also, the article mentions that YouTube has already made deals with several other large companies (e.g. CBS, NBC, etc.), but does not explain what these deals entail. Do these companies post fake user generated videos that are truly advertisements, or do they simply get to advertise on YouTube in some other manner? So, while this article does touch upon some interesting issues surrounding both the dot.com universe and marketing, it also fails to provide sufficient information to make it a truly useful document.
This article relates to my own project in its focus on corporate conglomeration and marketing. Similar to how Google subsumes a digital community like YouTube, companies like Dorito’s are appropriating the work of independent, non-professional individuals. While this article expresses some fear about the implications of a company like Google buying YouTube, my project will express a good deal more skepticism about what happens when companies like Dorito’s start soliciting user generated content.
While this appears to be a fairly innocuous article about the future of user generated content and the marketing that companies are putting into attracting consumers to create their own video content, there are many insidious implications in this piece. For one, the article mentions how YouTube will soon be providing “branded channels,” which are essentially user generated video channels that are intended to attract consumers by allowing them to create advertisements for a certain company. Companies see this interactive opportunity as a great way to raise “brand loyalty.” Also, the article mentions the six “sample commercials” that CBS created, which are intended to “be as close to authentic” as possible. Authenticity, then, simply becomes something that can be created and produced by companies like CBS. Finally, the article mentions how CBS will be screening every video submitted “for language and appropriateness of content.” The article assures the reader, though, that CBS will “preserve their [the videos] reality and spontaneity.” There are many troubling things about this form of tacit (sort of) censorship, one being that CBS is now the arbiter of what is and is not “appropriate.” Also, the notion that “reality and spontaneity” need to be screened for is blatantly contradictory, but ultimately very telling about this so-called democratizing force known as user generated content. Read this article with skepticism and ire (i.e. critically), though, and it can be very illuminating. For this reason I think it can be useful for my project that deals with exactly what this article addresses (although approaches it from a much different perspective).
“Supreme Court Finds Marketing Activity Creates Liability in Peer-to-Peer (P2P) File-Sharing Case” from the Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science looks at how the Grokster decision will affect the marketing of new technologies that could potentially have copyright infringing capabilities. In the Grokster case the court looked beyond the Sony ruling on the issue of whether the distributor induced copyright infringement. The court put forth the active inducement test which meant that a company could be held liable if the courts could interpret its actions as inducing, enticing or persuading its users to infringe on copyrighted works.
The Supreme Court has been trying to find the line to balance technological innovation and protect copyrighted materials. The members of the Supreme Court differed on the extent of protecting the Sony ruling. Justices Breyer, Stevens, and O’Connor believed that Sony protects distributors unless it can be proved that their products are almost exclusively used for infringement. Justices Ginsberg, Kennedy, and Rehnquist would have supported modifying Sony to require that distributors anticipate and prevent infringing uses. While at present time, the law does not require companies to anticipate infringing uses, firms can be held liable if they intentionally profit off of illegal uses. It is possible that future courts will see acts that would not previously be seen as intentional as being sufficeint to hold companies liable.
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Call#: Van Pelt Library HF6146.T42 N364 2003
The book was complex if you do not know a lot about advertising. At times it was hard to follow and a bit dense, but overall, it provided an interesting look at how the market is determined in entertainment media as well as how new media and technology effect the audience market.
In this scholarly paper, Arthur De Vany and W. David Walls discuss, among many other things, how the studios used the “blockbuster” strategy in which advertising, box office ranking, and movie stars play integral roles in a film’s success. They acknowledge Jaws as the first movie to employ this technique on a national level, using television advertising in addition to a nationwide release.
According to this theory, the opening of the movie is the most important event in a film’s life. Producer Robert Evans compared it to a parachute jump, “If it doesn’t open, you are dead.” De Vany and Walls believe that if the theory were true, the choices of early movie-goers directly affect the decisions of people who see the movie later. Furthermore, a strong opening weekend or week can lead to a “dominant position in the film market.”
Jaws is indeed a strong example of the “blockbuster” strategy of marketing because it was the highest grossing film at the time (dominating the box office), and created a national buzz about the film, which included television advertising. However, Jaws was somewhat different in that it did not have any big stars, but rather quality actors on the rise in the industry.
There are people who refute the “blockbuster” strategy and argue that the success of a film depends almost entirely on the early audience of the film and how those moviegoers express their opinions to friends, family and acquaintances. In closing, De Vany and Walls agree that the aspects of a successful film depend both on a strong opening as well as positive feedback from the early viewers.
In this article, James Surowiecki analyzes the marketing scheme of big Hollywood films like Jaws. In doing so, he looks at how blockbusters have been marketed since Jaws first opened in 1975. Among the factors discussed, the opening weekend and the behavior of the moviegoers are the most important.
In 1975, Stephen Farber, a movie critic, wrote that the success of Steven Spielberg’s Jaws was due to an “aggressive media blitz” that utilized prime-time television advertising along with an unusual national opening weekend at over 400 theaters across the country. Farber believed that audience members were manipulated into seeing the film and that the studio executives controlled what they wanted people to see.
As Surowiecki writes, Hollywood wanted to believe that the success of Jaws could be imitated by employing the same marketing strategies because there were huge profit opportunities. The studios believed that by giving certain films “a big enough push out of the gate” that enough people would go see it without regard for the actual quality of the movie’s content. This is called a “non-informative information cascade” in which the actions of the later moviegoers are based on the early moviegoers, who were persuaded to see the film due to the massive advertising campaign. Unfortunately, there have been many blockbusters that bring in large profits early on, followed by mediocre numbers in the following weeks (i.e. The Matrix: Reloaded).
However, as De Vany and Walls state in their in-depth study of what makes a blockbuster, they find that a big budget and expensive advertising campaign may make it possible for a big opening; its success truly depends on how the audience rates the film. This strategy has garnered some media criticism, but Surowicki argues Hollywood is sensible because this method increases revenues in a shorter time so that they can remove the film from theaters in order to keep a larger percentage of the profits.
This article has to do with video games that are based on movies and the profitability of these games. In particular, many video game companies are looking to acquire licenses for older, successful movies. The reason behind this is that the companies, like Electronic Arts and Buena Vista Games, see a huge potential market in selling video games based on popular films because they can market the games to the people who loved the movie.
However, as P.J. McNealy, video game analyst at American Technology Research, states, it is sometimes a difficult decision whether or not to make a game based on a new Hollywood movie or an established “Hollywood intellectual property” with a built-in audience. Games such as “Bruce Lee: Quest of the Dragon” had minimal success because the audience that appreciated the movie did not necessarily want to play the game.
The movie Jaws is a good example of an older movie that had huge success, thus Majesco decided to produce a game based on the film. Additionally, the release date was timed with the release of the 30th anniversary edition of Jaws. By combining these two products, the company hoped to see interest in one market lead to interest in the other (i.e. video games and DVD).
The Vice President of Majesco stated in the article that “By adding the Jaws license, one of the best-known movies of all time, we instantly gave our game a better chance to reach the mass-market gamer, while allowing us to delve more into character and story.” Players will be able to control the man-eating shark as well as experience a different story line based on the blockbuster hit. The video game market adds another reason to the lengthy list of why Jaws and other popular action movies are able to have such lasting impacts on audiences because the games offer more action and information to the fans of the original films.
This article discusses the ways in which record companies are compensating for their losses through marketing. After the Sony/BMG merge, Columbia Record Executive Charlie Walk, leads the way. He asserts his belief that for the majors to stay in on the game they need to legitimize the online music downloading space and create alliances with consumer-goods companies to make a profit where it is being lost. Thus downloading has changed artist marketing too.


