America’s insistence on involving itself in the control of foreign nations, an issue recurrent in many of the articles regarding Dr. Strangelove and more broadly the Cold War, is again addressed in the article “Central America as a Theater of U.S. Cold War Politics.” Here author Susanne Jonas observes the late 1980s political movements in Central America that mirror actions of the Cold War era. Jonas also notes tendencies of US government to “control its allies (particularly in Europe)” (p. 125). As mentioned in the article by Robert Frase, Jonas points out that elitists run political programs, especially international agendas, and in the case of Central America the majority’s interests were not considered when drafting policy. For example when considering wealth reallocations Jonas points out that “[i]n short, the new strategy was based on the assumption that the Central American working class (both rural and urban) would be kept at bare subsistence level” (p. 124).

The article by Jonas also recognizes the effects of Vietnam on the Cold War attitude of the US. After essential losing in Vietnam, America “no longer dominat[ed] the capitalist world like it once did and [was] no longer able to impose its will by unilateral action” (p. 126). The circumstances of Vietnam help put in perspectives the policies adopted by the US government regarding arms. Confronted with failure, the US may have found it necessary to outpace the USSR to reaffirm its position as an international superpower. Such competition would drive the arms race and create tensions between the countries.

America’s actions in Central America resemble the type that Dr. Strangelove satirizes. Again, the US appears like the over-zealous fighter ready to get a hand into other countries operations. Although the Central American countries don’t have the resources that were available to Russia, the underlying circumstances of the situation resemble those that started the arms race and Cold War between the US and the USSR.

Robert Frase’s article “International Control of Nuclear Weapons” immediately addresses the notion that control of nuclear power “is as much a psychological and political problem as a technical one” (p. 16).  In the article Frase recognizes four issues that prevented the United Nations and the Soviet Union from establishing an atomic energy resolution, a deal which would have allowed the international observation of nuclear programs and possibly have prevented an arms race.  The four issues Frase identifies are 1) a fear of contact with the west, 2) Soviet attitude of inferiority in joint enterprise, 3) lack of immediate economic benefits included in a Soviet atomic energy plan, and 4) hedges placed around offers of an international joint effort (p. 17).  Recurrent behind these points is the issue of American insistence upon cooperation in joint projects.  Soviet concern that non-military information would be given up then lead to adamant rejection of energy proposals.  It seems, as mentioned in the Maland piece, that determination on both sides to establish themself as the superior power lead to the irreversible accumulation of weapons.  It is interesting to consider that the Frase article, written in 1953, essentially identifies reasons for and predicts a tense continuation of the arms race yet could not create a change to prevent it.

In Dr. Strangelove the obstinate doggedness of each leader and the illogical agreement between countries epitomizes the actual indifferences the US and the Soviet Union couldn’t overcome.  Also, unlike the rather ineffective message of the Frase article, Kubrick’s satirical approach to the confrontations between countries opened the doors to a great deal of political criticism.       

Phyllis La Farge’s book The Strangelove Legacy examines how anxiety of nuclear threats from the Cold War impacted children and adolescents.  La Farge utilizes prior research dating back to the early years of the Cold War and presents studies of her own from the 1980s.  The findings from the studies are surprising, showing significant percentages of students across periods confident of inevitable nuclear war and disheartened by prospects of surviving such an event.  For example, a study from 1962 showed that 45 percent of junior-high students expected a war (p. 25).  Similarly, a study from 1984 reported that 29.5 percent of high-school seniors often worried about the chance of nuclear war, while another 39.9 percent responded that they sometimes worried (p. 27).  The numbers show the immediacy of nuclear concerns and demonstrate that “mutually assured destruction”, which left unalleviated society’s angst, wasn’t the best international policy.

La Farge’s work also indicates that since the beginning of the Cold War concerns of nuclear war have actually increased.  Surveys show that in 1955 only 27 percent of high school respondents thought the world would be destroyed in nuclear war.  In 1984 a similar survey found 89 percent said they thought the world would (p. 34).  This increased concern shows how nuclear accumulation failed to alleviate global disagreement and kept the public in a state of panic.    

            The Strangelove Legacy illustrates that inherent in the stalemate that stems from nuclear proliferation is a constant fear of conflict.  The plot of Dr. Strangelove stems from that alarm in society in an exaggerated manner that illuminates the irrationality behind perilous security.  The findings of The Strangelove Legacy bolster the message of Dr. Strangelove; defense guaranteed by retaliation is counterproductive.         

Reelpolitik II studies how political perspectives influenced and were influenced by film and media in the 1950s and 60s. Specifically, chapter 9 of the book, “Cold War Dovism in Dr. Strangelove”, closely examines social perception of nuclear war and the effect opinions had on the acceptance of the film’s message. In the book, author Beverly Kelley argues that “dovism”, pacifist, anti-war attitude, overwhelmed militarism because of the public’s apprehension of the consequences of international conflict.

The chapter starts by detailing important Cold War events that escalated international alarm, and shows the impact such incidents had on the public. The book then focuses on the presidents that guided the country through the perilous times, noting how both President Eisenhower and President Kennedy (it notes President Johnson only briefly) avoided nuclear warfare using polar approaches. Finally, the chapter turns its attention to Dr. Strangelove, or, How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb. This section addresses first the representation of characters in the film, and then the consequences of the message on the public. Dr. Strangelove satirically highlights the absurdity of nuclear armament, and, though humorously, addresses frightening issues.

In its review of mid-1900 political ideology, Reelpolitik II illuminates the issues that underlie the message of Dr. Strangelove. The film wittily captures the irrationality behind the use of weapons as protection. Reelpolitik II summarizes the political atmosphere that the film satirizes and indicates how socieity's attitude was influenced by the film's message and how the film's message was shaped by society's posture.