ETS-HOKIN v. SKYY, a decision centering on photographs of Skyy vodka used for advertisement, raises key factors in judging copyrightability of the work. First, is the photograph an original, or a derivative artwork? Secondly, which originality requirement should be applied? The difference in the answer to part one cost a photograph a copyright protection.

The case was brought to motion when Ets-Hopkin, who was hired by Skyy to photograph the vodka bottle for their advertisement campaigned, sued the company for copyright infringement when the Skyy Inc. used his image in various advertisements under limited license without his consent. Also, he argued that other photographers who photographed the vodka for the campaign had copied his photos, virtually producing identical images. The company argued in defense that the plaintiff’s photograph is not subject to copyright protection, since the work is a derivative work of Skyy’s signature vodka bottle itself. The district court has concluded that the photography was in fact a derivative work, since Skyy vodka bottle, from the color, font, to the label, is a “pre-existing work.” Since the photograph was a derivative work, the “substantial originality” clause was used to evaluate copyrightability of the photo. The court ruled that photos were “insufficiently original” and denied photos’ copyright protection.

However, the Court of Appeals concluded differently. The court declared Ets-Hopkin’s photos original work of art. The argument to consider vodka bottle as a work of art, was not subject to copyright because the bottle was driven mainly by function, and could not be protected by copyright law as a result. The court recognized that the label might have been protected by copyright, but it was ruled to be incidental part of the photograph, not a substantial part. Since the first work of art, especially photography, only require “minimal amount of originality” by the Copyright Act, the court stated that the photography demonstrated sufficient creativity and granted the photograph copyright protection, but the issue of infringement was not settled in the case.

This case is a fascinating study of how one subjective of thought, in this case in what the court believes to a derivative work, can influence so far as being the key determining factor in granting copyright protection for a work. Especially by the weight of value that comes from copyright monopoly, there is a need for a more rigid standard to match the gravity of power granted by copyright law. 

Burrow-Giles Lithographic Company v. Sarony. 111 U.S. 53; 4 S. Ct. 279; 28 L. Ed. 349; 1884 U.S. LEXIS 1757

 

This landmark Supreme Court case rose about when Burrow-Giles lithographic company when Napoleon Sarony, a photographer of “Oscar Wilde No. 18,” sued the company for copyright infringement when it distributed lithographs of the photography without author’s consent and permission. The Company’s main argument was that photographs are products of a mechanical process, and is therefore not an art, and are not protected under article I, section 8, clause 8 of the United States Constitution—photographs are not produced under authorship as other means of art, such as writing and painting, are. Supreme Court concludes that Congress has the constitutional power to extend copyright protection to new emerging medium of expression, such as photography that represent “original intellectual conceptions” and “ his own genius and intellect.” The Court first argued that since Sarony included “Copyright, 1882, by N. Sarony,” at the corner of his photograph, it gave sufficient notice to the public of his exclusive right to the work. Secondly, although the Constitution does not include photographs under works of authorship in which are protected under copyright, it is only because the technology, when the statute was written in 1790, was not in existence. Providing the evidence that charts and maps were included under protection in Copyright Act of 1790, the court concludes that since photographs are a medium in which “idea of mind given a visible expression,” they also qualify under copyright protection under the constitution. Court goes further on, stating no ordinary photography of which “transferring to the plate the visible representation of some existing object” will not be given a copyright. Only photographs that are “useful, new, harmonious, characteristic, and graceful…entirely from his own original mental conception” and in effectively doing so—showcasing enough expression and originality to be granted such a protection. With this case, Supreme Court demonstrated a great activism in promoting and introducing new medium of expression to the culture. However, the last clause to the court’s argument, that a photograph must express sufficient originality according to court’s standard to be considered an art, creates a very subjective and aesthetic basis to which future photographic art/and recreations of the medium are to be judged. Words that were used by Justice Miller to describe an original photography are words conceptualized with different meanings according to every person’s mind and artistic taste. Law should be a concrete rule which should be understood and interpreted, to an extent, on a same level, and the aesthetics required by the court’s decision set minimal base to which people can agree on. This was the first real case in which the court’s decision in granting the copyright based entirely upon a subjective and aesthetic decision. I will argue the loosely set standards in the decision created inconsistency and unpredictability in future cases and did little to mold society a clear conception of photography as art.

"It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons trained only to the law to constitute themselves final judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside of the narrowest and most obvious limits" Justice Holmes, Bleinstein v. Donaldson(1903) Despite Court's reservation about being judges of aesthetics values which grants 2D art an authorship, great display of judicial activism by courts have been demonstrated since Burrow-Giles v. Sarony(1884), where the court has reshaped copyright law through "aesthetic" determinations that newly define originality and authorship in two dimensional art. As a result, couple issues are at stake. 1) The change in the norm and societal definition of originality and authorship in 2D art. 2) Should such qualitative (subjective) analysis be used, or new quantative standards of determining originality is needed? 3) Lack of consistency and coherency in court's decision over time, and no predictability; does it promote progress? The fundamental question arises: should courts be making aesthetic decisions? I will be focusing on judicial activism displayed in cases about authorship of 2-D art determining what is copyrightable, most importantly in photography. Looking through landmark cases starting with Burrow-Giles v. Sarony(1884) to as recent as Bridgman Art Library v. Corel Corp(1999), I will argue that court's lack of "quantitative standards" in determining originality of each work created inconsistency and failed to create a societal norm of authorship and originality in 2D art realm. I will propose that legislation is needed in which the government clearly defines consistent, more quantative standards to judge "originality" of a two dimensional art to determine its qualifications for copyright privilege.