Author Fred von Lohmann discusses the role of the 'gatekepers' (such as exhibitors, insurers, distributors, and broadcasters) when filmmakers may have to clear copyright uses in their own works. While fair use is supposed to protect the transformative uses of copyrighted materials, many gatekeepers and large broadcasters and studios are failing to honor the principles of fair use. Instead, we are seeing more of what von Lohmann calls a 'clearance culture' in which full expression is stifled at the hands of media gatekeepers. The content controllers are requiring clearances for every instance of copyrighted material in films, even if it falls under fair use. This is causing many films either to be abondoned during production or distribution or for filmmakers budgets to be severely drained by obtaining clearances. In terms of relevance to my own project, the role of the gatekeepers helps to explain why the full potential of online film distribution has not yet been explored. Although this article focuses mostly on fair use and copyright clearance, when I read this article it made perfect sense why some directors (such as the more established Edward Burns or the newcomer Madonna) reject the traditional distribution system for many different reasons, and choose to distribute through online platforms such as iTunes.

The rise of internet distribution offers new outlets for filmmakers who can not afford the traditional methods of distribution. von Lohmann identifies two distribution options: video hosting sites such as YouTube or Yahoo Video that can get your film to an audience for free and immediately, as well as by purchasing bandwidth from an ISP and running your film online via a filmmakers' own server.

Internet gatekeepers such as a YouTube or an ISP are more lax than traditional ones due to the safe harbor provisions of the DMCA. In the case of online video content sites, they use a 'notice and takedown' policy to enforce copyright infringement violations. In order for a video hosting site to be free from monetary damages incurred through a copyright infringing video posted by a site user, the host must issue notice to the user that the content requires them to takedown their video, followed by a 'counternotice' option for the user's benefit in the event that a user wants to challenge the takedown. So long as the site removes the copyrighted content in a timely manner and follows this procedure, they will remain exempt from prosecution.

If a filmmaker decides to host his own video by buying a service from an ISP, a similar safe harbor under the DMCA protects the ISP's from any possibly copyright lawsuit. Under this provision, ISP's are not required to follow the 'notice and takedown, counternotice' steps as outlined above. They are viewed as only the 'pipe' in providing access, not an entity that can enforce the content present on computers owned by others and therefore out of its control. As in video content sites, ISP's do not act as middlemen in any copyright lawsuits, therefore leaving the filmmakers or other users to work out their own disputes with copyright owners directly. 

von Lohmann argues that these new distribution tools represent a new creative freedom or at least, should ensure new creative freedoms in the future. Under these new options, filmmakers' work can reach the proper audiences first - unlike in traditional media distribution in which work must pass through insurers and lawyers first.

Hatcher, Jordan S. "Of Otaku and Fansubs: A Critical Look at Anime Online in Light of Current Issues in Copyright Law." Script-ed, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2005
Hatcher examines the workings of the American anime industry, paying the most attention to the history and physical process of fansubbing. Fansubbing is the process by which fans take Japanese anime (taped from broadcast television or DVD/home video), translate it and edit the video to include their own subtitles. Fansubs used to be distributed on VHS either in stores or among fan clubs, but are now almost exclusively found online. Hatcher suggests that the anime industry, though it has unquestionably benefited from fansubbing and other forms of high-level fan involvement, is now "held hostage by the internet and their otaku-consumers." By now professional licensing and localization companies can do much of their own advertising and market research due to the growth and age of the domestic marketplace; yet such companies know that to crack down on the core loyal fans will almost certainly result in a huge backlash from those on whom they rely most. In contrast to common internet "pirates," fansubbing groups commit infringing acts in the open (as publicized on websites or individual named in credits attached to their work) and are confident in the moral high ground of their actions (if a work is not yet licensed in America, it is seen as "perfectly legal" to make it available in fansubbed form, for example-despite international copyright laws); the common conception of "anime fair use" makes many technically illegal uses practically immune to legal retaliation

The almost forced acceptance of the fan use of anime in America, in order to maintain loyalty and relevancy among fanbase, makes anime music videos relatively easy to allow for domestic copyright holders. A lawsuit that attacks a now established tradition within the community would alienate much of a company's fanbase, driving them to other sources-including illegal ones if nothing else is available. Given the companies' general tolerance of (or lack of legal action against) the availability of full episodes or movies online, music videos are a much easier sell as "advertisements" for their products as opposed to replacements or illegal derivative works. And given the industry's heavy stake in the convention scene, it is clear that the community aspect of anime fandom must be maintained and courted in order to stay viable.

Scenarios for consideration in copyright relating to documentary films.

Perfect 10 v. Google, Inc. Order by United States District Court of California. February 2006.

In August 2005, Perfect 10 sued Google and Amazon for displaying thumb nail images. Perfect 10, an adult photography company, makes money by selling rights to copyrighted material. Perfect 10 sought an injunction and compensation from Google on the grounds that Google was illegally displaying thumbnail images of copyrighted Perfect 10 photos and linking to third party sites that further illegally host copyrighted materials. Google asserts that it does not infringe directly because it does not create the image that the image search pulls up and displays.

The court issued a preliminary injunction ruling that the thumbnail images from a Google image search did constitute copyright infringement, but the links provided to the full images did not. Google admitted that it created and stored the thumbnail images on its own servers. Thus, as to the thumbnails, Google distributed infringing copies of Perfect 10’s images. The links to the full size photographs do not involve any creation or dissemination even though there is a local browser caching. This local browser caching constitutes fair use. The court found that the use of the thumbnails was not fair use since Google made money from their creation and the thumbnails were not transformative because P10 also licenses thumbnail images. Thus, users could circumvent P10’s licenses by downloading the free thumbnails. The Court did note that Google does “provide great value to the public” as a search engine, stating that “search engines have become essential sources of vital information for individuals, government, non-profits and businesses….” Ultimately, Google’s thumbnail images did economically harm the value of the P10 images. Thus, the Court enjoined Google from further dissemination of the thumbnail images. In the case of AFP, Google must clearly not host and serve the image. However, the act of organizing the web and making news more readily available to users, perhaps even with leads and headlines seems reasonable.

Belgian Court Order in Copiepresse Litigation in Belgium. 8 September, 2006.

In September 2006, a Belgian Court ordered in response to a suit for copyright infringement brought by Belgium copyright firm Copiepresse that Google had no right to publish online properties represented by Copiepresse. Copiepresse based its suit on the Belgium copyright laws of 1994 and 2005 and the database law of 1998. Google did not appear at the hearing. Further proceedings were scheduled for a later date.

Google News, according to the Belgiam Court, receives search terms from users and returns automated results that ignore whether or not the news item returned is protected by copyright. As a result, the Belgium Court treated Google News as providing news content, not acting merely as a search engine. The Court held that Google News’s use of the copyrighted materials is illegal under the copyright law and database law. Moreover, Google’s caching is reprehensible and literally causing news agencies to “lose control of their web sites and their contents.” In caching websites, according to the Court, Google leverages its massive infrastructure to essentially create a local copy of the Internet. Consequently, if a newspaper publisher pulls an article off the Internet or charges for access to article archives, Google News users might still be able to see the article free of charge through a cached link. The caching process evades the newspaper publisher’s right to control its copyrighted materials.

Ultimately the Court ruled that Google News caused great financial loss to Copiepresse and would cause great harm to news services across Europe. The Court ordered Google to withdraw the cached articles, not to reference any of the five entities Copiepresse represented at all, to post the Court Order on Google Belgium and Google Belgium News, and that if Google did not comply with the Court Order to incur damages of $1 million euros a day.

While this Order addresses the effect of Google News under Belgium law, the case does not address United States copyright law raised in the AFP litigation. Fundamentally, though, this decision and lawsuit raises the question of whether Google News properly should be viewed as a search engine that organizes news or a source of news and whether Google News may be legitimately lawful under the law of one country but not under the law of another country.

**Update: Google appears headed to a settlement with Copiepresse. Neither side has provided the financial details of the agreement. On November 28, the Copiepresse secretary general stated, "The Internet is not the Wild West…We want to be part of Google, but not without control over our content.'' For its part, Google commented that without Copiepresse content, their Belgian news coverage was lacking and insufficient.

Despite the predictions that the Internet would be tool of consensus for the world’s countries, applicable law continue to vary from nation to nation, luckily without impeding the growth of the Internet. Internet traffic, specifically ecommerce and media continue to thrive despite the application of local laws (148). Content providers have adapted to the wants and needs of local users across a variety of cultures and continents (149). There is no concept of universal free speech on the internet – what one country may consider as blasphemy might be the most treasured item of another country (150).

More relevantly, Goldsmith and Wu discuss how a court ruling in one country can be enforced in and intersect with the laws of another country. Using the example of Gutnick v. Dow Jones, in which business man Joseph Gutnick sued Baron’s online magazine, a subsidiary of Dow Jones, for defamation in an Australian court, the authors demonstrate that local law can coexist with the international scope of the Internet. While Gutnick won its defamation lawsuit against Dow Jones in Australia, it did not stop Dow Jones from continuing to have an Internet presence. The decision is not unlike any other decision that impacts a “multinational” business (157). Large corporations that have financial interests across the world like Dow Jones, Google and Yahoo! must be ready to defend their online content and business against the laws of any jurisdiction.

The Internet is not free of regulation just because it does not have the physical tentacles that other aspects of multinational companies do. For example, by operating Google.be and Google.fr, Google has a financial interest and presence in Belgium and France. They must be prepared to either pull their content out of those countries or comply with the laws of these jurisdictions, even if it undermines principles of American law. It is simply the cost of doing business. Smaller companies who have an Internet presence that may reach these same countries but who have no financial assets there will be in a different situation. They will need only to comply with the law of the country where their assets and physical presence can be found. Thus, the copyright law that applies on the Internet is not likely to be uniform but is more likely to reflect the public policies and interests of the local jurisdiction deciding the copyright question.

CAMPBELL v. ACUFF-ROSE MUSIC, INC (1994)

Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. filed lawsuit against the members of the rap music group 2 Live Crew and their record company, claiming that 2 Live Crew's song, "Pretty Woman," infringed Acuff-Rose's copyright in Roy Orbison's rock ballad, "Oh Pretty Woman."  The District Court had ruled that 2 Live Crew’s song was a parody of the original; however, appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the commercial nature of the parody rendered it presumptively unfair for the purpose of the parody (first factor of the fair use doctrine), that by taking the "heart" of the original and making it the "heart" of a new work, 2 Live Crew had taken too much (third factor), and that market harm for (fourth factor) had been established by a presumption attaching to commercial uses.  The courts decided that the song fell into the proper categories of fair use, detailing the four different aspects of fair use and how the song accomplishes each of them.  2 Live Crew’s version was transformative and would not harm the reputation or financial gain of the original work.  The final decision of Campbell v. Acuff-Rose, ruling the work as parody and therefore satisfying fair use judgment, leads me to believe that my transformation of the South Park’s narrative through film clips will be considered fair use and a parody of the original work.

“Parody: Fair Use or Copyright Infringement” – Lloyd L. Rich

Rich begins his article by defining parody as the imitation of a serious piece of work, such as literature, music or artwork, for a comical effect. Parody, as a method of criticism, has been a very popular means to communicate a particular message or point of view to the public, and thus must inevitably use another creative work, creating an inherent conflict between the parodied and the creator of the parody. Rich cites Copyright Act in Section 107 as enumerating four fair use factors that should be analyzed when determining whether a particular use of a copyrighted work is considered fair use: the purpose and character of the use (whether commercially motivated or nonprofit educational), the nature of the copyrighted work, the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work, the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work. Rich states that a court takes into consideration each of the four factors when evaluating fair use defense, and that no single factor by itself is sufficient to prove or disprove fair use. In creating a parody, we all must take into account each of the fair use factors:

1) educational purpose for a class assignment, noncommercial, hopefully transformative and giving new meaning to the narrative

2) nature of copyrighted work is creative and for entertainment, published and open to the public

3) only a few clips from a few episodes will be used, copyrighted work will not be copied in its entirety

4) parody will not attempt to substitute or compete with the show itself as they are in different markets (mashup vs. TV show), and if anything, will stimulate interest to the audience

After defining the terms of use for my project, I believe my video mashup falls under fair use terms.

Rogers V Koons. No. 234, 388 and 235. United States Court of Appeals, Second Circuit. 2 Apr. 1992.

This is the 2nd Circuit's appellate ruling on Rogers v Koons. The introduction states that the "key" to the suit "brought by a plaintiff photographer against a defendant sculptor and the gallery representing him, is defendants' borrowing of plaintiff's expression of a typical American scene — a smiling husband and wife holding a litter of charming puppies." It calls the copying deliberate goes on to give the background facts of the case. It first describes Rogers' work and reputation, followed by an account of how the "Puppies" photograph was created. It then does the same for Koons and the creation of "String of Puppies." It goes back over the "prior proceedings," giving the history of litigation between the two parties and affirms the district court initial ruling.

Moving on to the discussion section, the court eleaborates on the ownership of copyright in an original work of art, which Rogers has, discusses unauthorized copying by defendant, which Koons is held guilty of, and defines the fair use doctrine. It then enumerates the four criteria required to satisfactorily pass as fair use. Under the Purpose and Character of Use criterion, the court says, "Relevant to this issue is Koons' conduct, especially his action in tearing the copyright mark off of a Rogers notecard prior to sending it to the Italian artisans. This action suggests bad faith in defendant's use of plaintiff's work, and militates against a finding of fair use." Essentially, they are saying that he was underhanded about his method of copying. As far as Parody or Satire as Fair Use is concerned, the court says "that even given that "String of Puppies" is a satirical critique of our materialistic society, it is difficult to discern any parody of the photograph "Puppies" itself." They argue that Koons was motivated more by profit than satire. The court also holds that Koons copied far more of Puppies than necessary to convey his point. "Koons went well beyond the factual subject matter of the photograph to incorporate the very expression of the work created by Rogers," says the court. Lastly, the court orders that the effect of the use on the market value of the original has been harmed, and "there is simply nothing in the record to support a view that Koons produced "String of Puppies" for anything other than sale as high-priced art. Hence, the likelihood of future harm to Rogers' photograph is presumed, and plaintiff's market for his work has been prejudiced."

Blanch V Koons. No. 05-6433-Cv. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. 26 Oct. 2006.

This is the judgment on the appeal for the Koons v Blanch case with the opinion of Judge Sack. The appeals court rules that Koons’ work was indeed a fair use. Koons was commissioned by the Deutsche Bank and Guggenheim Foundation to create a painting, “Niagra” in which he used Blanch’s “Silk Sandals by Gucci” ad. The court gives background on Koons’ life and work, saying that he is “known for incorporating into his artwork objects and images taken from popular media and consumer advertising, a practice that has been referred to as "neo-Pop art" or (perhaps unfortunately in a legal context) "appropriation art."” It describes both Koons’ painting and Blanch’s photograph and Koons’ use of the photograph in his painting. The two artists’ economic gains and losses are then detailed: Niagra has been appraised at $1 million, while Blanch was paid $750 for her work.

In meeting the criteria for fair use, the court finds Koons’ work transformative, saying it “adds something new, with a further purpose or different character, altering the first with new expression, meaning, or message." The court ignores the effect of commercial use because Blanch admits that Koons’ work did nothing to detract from any financial gains Silk Sandals brought her. It does, they say, meet the requirement for parody: “Koons's use of a slick fashion photograph enables him to satirize life as it appears when seen through the prism of slick fashion photography.” Bad faith is cited as the last criteria of fair use. Here the ruling holds that Koons only exhibited bad faith in not first asking Blanch’s permission to use her photo. What I wonder, though, is whether than would have made any difference to her. The other major reason that Koons’ work is said to be acceptable is that he uses only a portion of Blanch’s image, and places that portion with other elements that are not part of her photo, thereby substantially transforming it. In conclusion, the court rules "promoting the Progress of Science and useful Arts," U.S. Const., art. I, § 8, cl. 8, would be better served by allowing Koons's use of "Silk Sandals" than by preventing it.”

For my project, I want to examine three cases in chronological order: Koons v Rogers, Mattel v Forsythe, and Koons v Blanch with the purpose of determining whether Forsythe set a clear precedent affecting the way Koons v Blanch was interpreted. I hope to pinpoint instances of perceptible differences in thinking about appropriation art in the three cases and see if I can trace the different outcomes in the Koons rulings back to Forsythe's victory against Mattel.

"Koons Affirmed (Don't Blanch)." The Patry Copyright Blog. 26 Oct. 2006. 28 Nov. 2006 <http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2006/10/koons-affirmed-dont-blanch.html>.

 
This article is a guide to the Koons v Blanch ruling and takes us through the courts' decisions regarding the four criteria that constitute fair use step by step. Fundementally, he says, the case boils down to two points, that "Koons' use was highly transformative and the copyright owner suffered no harm to her market; the rest is window dressing." He summarizes the background of the case (Blanch paid $750 for original ad in Allure magazine, Koons incorperates exact image in his work "Niagra" in order to comment on the way popular images appeal to our most basic instincts and desires.)

Party thinks the majority's distinction between parody and satire is helpful and shows that "Koons had a genuine creative rationale for borrowing Blanch's image, rather than merely using it merely 'to get attention or to avoid the drudgery in working something fresh up.'" He also brings up the issue of bad faith, which has not been mentioned in the two other cases. I think this comes out of Blanch's claims that its pratically a matter of etiquette, she's been quoted as saying something along the lines of "if the artist is still alive, you should at least ask for permission to use their work." I am also interested in the comment posted in reply to this blog in which the author writes, "A major factor in the difference between Rogers and Blanch appears to be that the court found the use of the feet from the Blanch photograph transformative because they were recast in a different position and that the important background elements (man’s lap, aircraft cabin) were not copied. In other words, the Blanch photograph was used more as a reference than as the foundation for the painting."

"When is Parody Fair Use?" - Robert Posner 

A parody takes parts or aspects of another expressive work.  If that work is copyrighted, why isn’t the parodist an infringer?  Parody is considered ‘fair use’ under copyrighted law and is therefore considered lawful.  It takes from a piece of work but injects creativity into it—taking characters, incidents, dialogue, or other aspects and creates a new work.  The risk of infringement arises when the parodist extracts certain copyrighted elements of the original work—the parody is a derivative work and the copyright holder controls it.  However, the fair use doctrine stipulates, in economic terms, that when the “costs of transacting with the copyright owner over permission to use the copyrighted work would exceed the benefits of transacting,” the derivative work is considered fair use.  This includes economizing on other transactions and stimulating the production of intellectual property, e.g., arousing public interest through use of book reviews.  Parody is a form of limited criticism, may supply a part of demand for the original work, and does not always ridicule or criticize the original work.  It is different from a book review in that it does not introduce new material to the public; audience acquaintance with the work renders the need to steal much less.  Within terms of fair use, parody should use the parodied work as a target and not a weapon, should not take a large fraction of the original work so as to reproduce it entirely, and the relative minimum work taken will not redeem the infringement.   Often parodies achieve a common effect and not at the expense of the original work of art.  In relation to my project, I will create a parody of the popular show South Park by virtue of a video mashup, and we will see how this translates into fair use.

Greenberg, Lynne A. "THE ART OF APPROPRIATION: PUPPIES, PIRACY, AND POST-MODERNISM." Cardozo Arts & Entertainment Law Journal 11 (1992): 1.

Greenberg calls appropriation art a “wide-reaching trend which has arisen as a response to post-modernist criticism.” She says its reaction to the formalism and aesthetics of a media-saturated society. Most importantly, echoing Koons claims about the school of thought he belongs to, Greenberg says, “Aggressively and self-consciously derivative in its ideology, post-modernist art critiques the very attributes that copyright law uses to define art: namely, artistic creativity and originality.”

In the introduction, she says the article will focus on the challenges postmodernist art poses on copyright law and argues, like the Columbia Law Review editorial that visual art requires a different set of rules than other copyrightable entities. In the section of her piece about the infringement vulnerability of photography, and “its relationship to the originality requirement” she uses Rogers v. Koons to illustrate her point that we need a different way to interpret copyright as it interferes with the objectives of postmodern art. In her analysis of the case, Greenberg maintains that the court’s perspective is skewed because Koons’ work is so expensive. She says that although the court claims that Koons’ work has an economic impact on Rogers, “It seems farfetched to imagine that Koons's "high-priced" kitsch, sold in the elite world of the art gallery, could even tangentially affect the market for either Rogers's commissioned photographs or Rogers's postcards, sold predominantly in gift shops”. Basically, she concludes, the court ruled fairly according to current laws, this case shows that these doctrines are in need of revision in order to make allowances for appropriation art. “The recent decision of Rogers v. Koons simultaneously underscores the precarious position occupied by artists practicing radical appropriation strategies, and accentuates the consequences of so rigorously enforcing the limited monopoly rights granted by copyright law,” she explains.
 

Anime music videos (known as AMVs) hold a peculiar place in American culture - they are arguably (in some cases more than others) flagrantly illegal and unfair uses of copyrighted material, yet are tolerated, even tacitly endorsed, by the copyright holders. This endorsement does not even come with any kind of control or regimentation, as it might in other fan circles. By a fortuitous mix of the original Japanese artists' treatment of copyrights and fan-made material (rather than simply Japanese copyright law), and the domestic anime market's existence and continued life and being owed to the loyal and proactive fanbase, AMVs are allowed to thrive. Their only tangible opposition (and not much at that) comes from the music industry's reluctance to allow songs to be distributed wholesale over the internet. Yet so far, AMVs as whole have been allowed to give people an artistic outlet in the manipulation of media that would normally be protected.

Konami v. Spec Computer K.K. (Osaka High Court, Apr. 27, 1999)
In this Japanese court decision, Spec Computer is sued (this is the appeal) by game manufacturer Konami for copyright infringement. Spec Computer loses and is forced to pay Konami. Konami had created a game that simulated a love story, where the player/main character would progress over a specific set of days, building personal "stats" and romantic relationships. Spec created a memory unit that could boost a player's stats and start the game at any point in the game's calendar. Konami argued, and the court agreed, that this action changed the essential contents and purpose of how the game was meant to be enjoyed, thus infringing upon the author's "right to preserve the integrity of a work." The case is similar to the Nintendo of America v. Lewis Galoob Toys case in the US, where Nintendo challenged Galoob's right to produce the Game Genie (which did basically the same thing as Spec Computer's product); Nintendo lost. Yet in Japan, the original game creator won out over the party who created the means to modify it. When comparing these two cases, it seems as if Japanese copyright law is enforced more strictly than American.

As other sources indicate, Japanese anime and manga artists happily live with fan-made comics starring copyrighted characters (called dojinshi, or doujinshi). In fact, much of the talent and creativity within the industry can be attributed to artists starting out in the dojinshi field. But in Konami v. Spec Computer it is clear that such infringement is technically against Japanese law as much as it would be against American law (even more so, given this case's similarity to Nintendo v. Galoob). So it is not the law that dictates the products of Japanese fan-culture, but rather common opinion and recognition of the positive effects to come out of certain forms of infringement.

And yet, American copyright holders still try their best to limit what kinds of fan fiction can be easily found online, in hopes of keeping some control over the perception (or decency) of their brand. None have tried to actually take a sexually explicit fan fiction author to court for fear of alienating fans and setting the wrong precedent, but they have tried to quash such expression. And the more affinity towards the fanbase, the more the fans will be willing to censor themselves in order to please their benevolent masters (of the copyright).

On page 155 (chapter 4), Jenkins mentions "song videos" as a form of fan fiction. He talks about fan fiction here in contrast to the kind of fan productions LucasFilm endorses, which can only be parody-flavored or about the fans themselves. "Song videos" are often the kind of production preferred by female fans, who take the time to explore and develop certain relationships and themes that may or may not have been present in the original work. LucasFilm acts along the same lines as the law might approach various kinds of derivative works-though it is comfortable with parodies, anything that might be seen as "expanding upon" the original universe could technically be illegal derivative work and therefore to be avoided. The difference between monolithic character properties such as Harry Potter and Star Wars and an entire (niche) medium is also very important to note. Unlike the more specific fan cultures, the anime fan culture is both less mainstream (and therefore even more dependant on the loyal and active few) and unable to be corralled and manipulated by one corporate body. Since an entire genre of cinema and comics are the focus and instead of one copyrightable property, lots of varying interests are at stake and no single one can control fans as a whole.

"Gainax: Past, Present and Future." Anime Tourist. 18 August 2002
In 2002, American website Anime Tourist conducted a convention interview with two of the founding members of the respected Japanese anime production company Gainax, Hiroyuki Yamaga and Takami Akai. The two discuss their current and upcoming projects at Gainax, provided some details on their past at the company, as well as explaining some of the themes and such of their more famous works. Finally they speak on American localization of their works and American fandom.

An audience member asks the creators for their opinion on the music videos made from their work by American fans. Akai seems not to have been aware of them (the translation perhaps makes it a bit confusing), but Yamaga appreciates the fan-made works. He discusses the often-pointed-to model of manga and anime creators getting their start in the industry by writing and drawing dojinshi, or unlicensed fan comics based on copyrighted properties: "as Gainax, they got their start doing similar stuff so it's very hard for them to say, ‘No, We won't allow that.'" As a company, they have to plead ignorance that such fan material exists or else even Japanese copyright law would dictate that they shut infringers down. He points to the line between fan/hobbyist and professional as the deciding factor in whether or not infringing work is worth going after legally; in the Japanese manga business, the line is extremely blurred as young artists very often earn their stripes and build their skill on dojinshi before tackling original projects of their own. Japanese creators such as these may not be aware of the American arm of fan's use of their characters and work, but they are used to letting such forms of use slide within their Japanese fan culture.

Lessig, Lawrence. ""Creatives face a closed Net." 28 December 2005
Lessig writes about the recent development of a record company, Wind-Up Records, requesting AnimeMusicVideos.org (perhaps the largest online collection of anime music videos and "AMV" artists) to remove all links to music videos containing music by their artists. These artists included Evanescence and Creed, bands popular among fans and with a large number of music videos on the site, roughly 3,000. He points to the AMV movement as a sign of the growing read-write culture allowed by the internet and computers that new generations are increasingly participating in. Where content owners try to enforce a "Read-Only" environment where viewers/users can look, but not touch, Lessig advocates the development of creativity and benefits thereof for those (often young) fans who take it upon themselves to add to the artistic tableau of a medium. He even relates a personal anecdote about his son, in which the only way he was accepted to a prominent university was by showing them the AMVs he had made as an example of his artistic talent. Lessig sees the struggle between copyright holders and young, artistically motivated fans as the new battle to be fought, and one in which it should be easy to see which side is in the right. Of course, according to current US copyright law (backed by copyright holding corporations) such employment of "Read-Write" culture is illegal. The internet, however, has afforded both an opportunity to put such artistic expression on easy display and an at least temporary hurdle for content owners to leap in order to stomp down on "unfair" uses due to its expanse and level of anonymity.

Hatcher, Jordan S. "Of Otaku and Fansubs: A Critical Look at Anime Online in Light of Current Issues in Copyright Law." Script-ed, Vol. 2, No. 4, 2005
Hatcher examines the workings of the American anime industry, paying the most attention to the history and physical process of fansubbing. Fansubbing is the process by which fans take Japanese anime (taped from broadcast television or DVD/home video), translate it and edit the video to include their own subtitles. Fansubs used to be distributed on VHS either in stores or among fan clubs, but are now almost exclusively found online. Hatcher suggests that the anime industry, though it has unquestionably benefited from fansubbing and other forms of high-level fan involvement, is now "held hostage by the internet and their otaku-consumers." By now professional licensing and localization companies can do much of their own advertising and market research due to the growth and age of the domestic marketplace; yet such companies know that to crack down on the core loyal fans will almost certainly result in a huge backlash from those on whom they rely most. In contrast to common internet "pirates," fansubbing groups commit infringing acts in the open (as publicized on websites or individual named in credits attached to their work) and are confident in the moral high ground of their actions (if a work is not yet licensed in America, it is seen as "perfectly legal" to make it available in fansubbed form, for example-despite international copyright laws); the common conception of "anime fair use" makes many technically illegal uses practically immune to legal retaliation

The almost forced acceptance of the fan use of anime in America, in order to maintain loyalty and relevancy among fanbase, makes anime music videos relatively easy to allow for domestic copyright holders. A lawsuit that attacks a now established tradition within the community would alienate much of a company's fanbase, driving them to other sources-including illegal ones if nothing else is available. Given the companies' general tolerance of (or lack of legal action against) the availability of full episodes or movies online, music videos are a much easier sell as "advertisements" for their products as opposed to replacements or illegal derivative works. And given the industry's heavy stake in the convention scene, it is clear that the community aspect of anime fandom must be maintained and courted in order to stay viable.

By Judge Alex Kozinski and Christopher Newman. Published in the Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA, Volume 46, No. 4, Summer 1999, pages 513-530

This article is a speech given by Judge Kozinski, a member of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. While the speech is an overall discussion about the legitimacy of fair use, there is a significant portion devoted towards the idea of satire and parody and its place in fair use.

Kozinski disagrees with Seuss's thought that "The Cat NOT in the Hat!" is an attempt "to avoid the drudgery in working up something fresh." Instead, Kozinski feels that "It’s easy enough to spew a few lines of impromptu Seussian doggerel, but it takes some creativity and work to write a sustained satirical pastiche that people will enjoy enough to pay money for and recommend to their friends."

In general, Kozinski disagrees with the Bisceglia thought that a satirist can just pick a new work to focus on if he cannot acquire a license to the original work. He states:

"Even if the original work is used only as a vehicle, not just any vehicle will get you where you want to go. You can only get so many chuckles by mimicking something familiar. When this kind of satire really works well, it’s because there is something about the original that fits - or pointedly doesn’t fit - the subject"

Kozinski's stance demonstrates a willingness to grant more freedom to satirists. Similar to the Collado article, Kozinski is cognizant of the creative process and is aware that there are not always other options for satirists to choose from to make their point. In fact, Kozinski adds that "the fundamental premise of our copyright law is that the best way to encourage creation of valuable works is to let authors capture the market value of those works." It is the point of satire to create a different view on a well known material, and by restricting it too much, the spirit of copyright law will be broken.

Overall, Kozinski is a strong supporter of more fair use for satire and disagrees with his colleagues of the Ninth Circuit regarding the Seuss case.

"BEYOND ROGERS V. KOONS: a FAIR USE STANDARD FOR APPROPRIATION." Editorial. The Columbia Law Review Oct. 1993: 1473.

This article gives some background to the case, describing how Koons found a postcard bearing Art Rogers' "Puppies" photograph, sent to it a foundry in Italy and instructed them to make four sculptures that looked exactly like it (with some slight variation in coloring), showed the work in an exhibited entitled "Banality Show" and sold three of the sculptures for a total of $367,000, whereafter Art Rogers sued him for copyright infringement. The court's position was: "The copying was so deliberate as to suggest that Koons and Sonnabend Gallery resolved so long as they were significant players in the art business, and the copies they produced bettered the price of the copied work by a thousand to one, their piracy of a less well-known artist's work would escape being sullied by an accusation of plagiarism."

Koons is accused of plagerizing just because he can. He defended the works as parodic in nature, but despite his stated intent to comment on the banality of much commericial art, the both the district and appelate courts ruled in favor of Rogers. This article quotes Koons as saying that he belongs to the school of American artists who believe the mass production of commodities and media images has caused a deterioration in the quality of society, and this artistic tradition of which he is a member proposes through incorporating these images into works of art to comment critically both on the incorporated object and the political and economic system that created it. It also argues that art that stems from found images is a "valid form of criticism and comment" and that failing to protect artists from infringement stifles expression. It calls for a revised fair use policy tailored to the specific conditions of visual art.

As noted in the introduction, the first part discusses the development appropriation art form within a philosophical and conceptual framework and describes how subject matter is affected by the threat of legal consequences. The article then covers the current definition of parody and fair use, identifies their weaknesses in the “context of appropriation,” and reviews and analyzes academic attempts to develop standards protecting artists’ creativity and their plausibility. It then goes on to suggest a better solution to the problem of parody and fair use that tries to accommodate both the originating and borrowing artists based on preserving the copyright owner’s “economic incentives for further creation” without prohibiting all possible infringements, which reflects of the “unlikelihood that the copyright holder would suffer substantial economic harm to the value of or the market for her work because of the appropriator's activity.” It reflects the idea that any minor harm is “outweighed by the strong public interest in fostering the creation of artworks that speak critically about social norms and constructs.” Ultimately, this article claims, “Appropriation is an art form and a method of creation conceived and defined as a critical force - as such, it is deserving of liberal protection from copyright infringement suits.” 

Leonard, Sean. "Celebrating Two Decades of Unlawful Progress: Fan Distribution, Proselytization Commons, and the Explosive Growth of Japanese Animation." UCLA Entertainment Law Review, Spring 2005
Leonard's paper on American fans' use and distribution of anime goes into great depth on the legal issues raised, and often ignored, in regards to copyrighted works. The original Japanese copyright holders spurred on American fan-imports and fansubs by "abandoning" the market early on; in this way it was law-breaking American fans, clubs and conventions that created almost single-handedly what is now a visible and profitable market for the Japanese owners and the American licensors. Currently, though the Japanese owners do finally play in the American marketplace, they are nearly as willfully ignorant (in practice) of fan infringement than they were when America was still written off as an impossible market. But while first this ignorance was a result of their not thinking any American infringement could possibly hinder them financially, reasons for this now include the historical and continued support and "free publicity" for anime that American fans would not be so willing to embrace legitimately had it not gained buzz from prior illegal distribution among fan networks. Yet Leonard outlines all of the various ways that obtaining, translating, distributing and showing fansubs break any number of American and international copyright laws. Though fans often cite fair use as a defense for their actions (though a case has never been brought to court), Leonard dismisses all of the potential factors that would constitute fair use save for the "purpose and character" in the commerciality of fansubbing; in this case, fans often do their work for no profit and as a courtesy to fellow fans. In every other sense, their use is wholly unfair.

Here we see the rough legal guidelines that both Japanese and American anime copyright holders tend to adhere to when dealing with fans. In general, fan's use of anime is forgiven and often ignored, unless it exists in direct competition with legitimate localized releases. Anime Music Videos (not mentioned by Leonard) are another, altogether less potentially dangerous (than importing and fansubbing) form of "free advertising" for anime and of strengthening the fan networks that built and maintain the American anime audience. Again, Japanese copyright holders are shown to display a willful ignorance of American fans use for the most part.

Mehra, Salil K. "Copyright and Comics in Japan: Does Law Explain Why All the Comics My Kid Watches Are Japanese Imports?" Rutgers Law Review 55 (2002): 155, 182.17
Mehra explores the disconnect between Japanese (and American) written law and the tolerated success of dojinshi, a growing industry that could even be seen as direct competition for its copyright-holding cousin manga. Part of this issue is explained by the differences in which America and Japanese copyright law (especially that concerning character copyrights), though very similar on paper, are interpreted by courts and the common man. The few key differences include affording authors moral rights (Mehra points to the Konami case mentioned above as an example, given their ability to control how their characters are portrayed) and lacking a "generalized fair use provision." Mehra discusses the various reasons manga artists and copyright holders generally do not prosecute dojinshi artists; such reasons could include the social norms among artists where the good of the industry (in recruiting new talent, filling a niche unfillable by traditional manga, or catering to all its audience's favor) as a whole is placed before individual needs and the lower profitability of Japanese litigation (not to mention the average dojinshi author's common lack of real funds). Taking the dojinshi model, Mehra claims that "in some contexts, a certain level of fair use may help generate an economically efficient level of collective action;" in other words, allowing some level of infringement can foster a stronger and more creative artistic industry.

The reaction of the Japanese manga artist is examined here in relation to artifacts of fan culture. As manga and anime have penetrated foreign markets, it has brought some of that mindset with it, particularly to America. To begin with it sprang from fans' proactivity creating the American market itself, but the Japanese fan mindset has only been strengthened by the original authors' willful ignorance, and in some cases support, of classically infringing fan works. Despite the differences in American and Japanese case law concerning character copyrights, Japanese characters remain for the most part fair game for dojinshi, music videos, and the like on either side of the Pacific.

By Adriana Collado. Published in Journal of Technology, Law, and Policy, Vol. 9, Issue 1, June 2004.

Collado's article goes through the differences between parody and satire as stated by various court cases. This analysis includes a look into the Campbell and Seuss cases. With regards to the Seuss case, Collado states that the Ninth Circuit "unnecessarily narrowed the Campbell holding and set a precedent inconsistent with the goals of copyright law and with the Campbell decision itself" reaching the same conclusion as the Tushnet article.

Collado then analyzes satire as a fair use and how Seuss was inconsistent with Campbell. Specifically, Collado takes issue with the conclusion that there would be significant market harm from "The Cat NOT in the Hat!" 

"[I]t seems unlikely readers would regard “The Cat NOT in the Hat!” as a substitute for the original, especially since the works target different audiences. While the original Dr. Seuss work is sold in the children’s section of the bookstore, “The Cat NOT in the Hat!” would likely be sold in the adult humor section. Furthermore, the fact “The Cat NOT in the Hat!” was labeled as a parody on its front cover and the author’s name was clearly depicted reduced the possibility readers would confuse or substitute the secondary work for the original."

By Footnote 14 of the Campbell decision (cited above), Collado concludes, there should have been fair use protection for this satire as the potential for market harm was slight.

Collado is a proponent of more freedom for satires. She disagrees with the Bisceglia opinion that satirists can "shop around" for other material if they cannot find a way to make a comment on the original work. Instead, Collado feels that a satirist's ideas are "often intertwined with their underlying source material" and if a satirist must look elsewhere for material, "the idea might not be created at all, thus generating a result...contrary to the goals of copyright law." Finally, Collado argues that satires not only do not displace the market, but could even "increase demand for the copyrighted work" by increasing interest in the original .  

Overall, Collado's article provides a well-reasoned insight into the reasons why satire should be given fuller fair use protection as opposed to the Seuss case.

Leslie A. Kelly, et al. v. Arriba Soft Corp., et al., SA CV 99-560 GLT[JW]. (US District Court, Central District of California, Southern Division Dec. 15, 1999)
This case concerned a search engine run by Arriba Soft displaying thumbnail images of Kelly's copyrighted photographs. In deciding that the use was fair and therefore acceptable for Arriba to continue, the court set an important precedent in applying the guidelines of fair use to determine infringement. Four basic principles could be applied to a use to weigh whether or not it is legal: the purpose and character of the use, the nature of the original work, the amount or substantiality of the portion used, and the impact upon the potential market for the original work. According to how a use fares in each of these categories, the court may decide that it is fair.

First of all when it comes to anime, the nature of the original work is almost never anything but pure entertainment-and thus not favorable for allowed fair use. Sometimes anime music videos honestly transformative, when they display completely new stories or mash-ups of various anime. All (or most) by definition add a certain basic level of creativity not necessarily found in the original. But they all still use copyrighted characters in a (most often) non-parody work of original fiction. They also "quote" heavily (given that a single anime is the focus) from a single artistic source for arguably no critical/analytical point; although usually only 2-5 minutes of footage are taken, those few minutes will often contain the "heart" of the original work. AMVs are often concerned with bringing out themes, relationships, plots or action sequences already visible in the original anime. Thus, they are a sort of highlighted text thrown into a tumble dryer. While a level of creativity is evident in virtually every anime music video, that alone may not excuse the distribution of material centered on copyrighted and protected characters. And although they are not sold for profit and their character is largely to enrich the fan community and inspire creativity, there are still ways in which distributors indirectly benefit financially-through internet ad space, or through expensive convention tickets where AMV contests/showings are a main attraction. However, it would be hard to make a case claiming AMVs impacted the market for the original product. They surely straddle the line between fair and unfair use, but as far as the American copyright holders are concerned, the most important aspect of music videos seems to be their usefulness as tools to excite existing fans and advertise to new ones.

Clean Flicks of Colorado, LLC. v. Motion Picture Studios, 02-cv-01662-RPM (US District Court, Colorado Jul. 7, 2006)
Clean Flicks was one of several companies that would purchase a normal retail DVD, edit it to remove offensive material such as sex, profanity, and violence, then sell it to consumers who wanted family-safe entertainment. The Colorado District Court decided that such a product infringed upon the creator's original intent and vision for a given work and creating and unlicensed derivative work; further, it constituted illegal copying and distribution over which the copyright holder should have control. The court denied a fair use defense completely. In addition, DVD encryption must be cracked to produce these copies, and that itself is illegal. The Family Entertainment and Copyright Act of 2005 clarified that this kind of product was illegal, where programs that changed movies on the fly (creating no "fixed" clean version) were permissible.

Here the major modern precedent is set for the illegality of the sale and distribution (even if not infringing on the market for the originals) of derivative works that change the expression of the original authors without their consent. If films with swearing edited out do that, so surely do music videos where a 26-episode plotline is boiled down to a 3-minute montage, for example. But where Clean Flicks was found to be adding nothing creatively to the original works, AMVs add both a new soundtrack, wholly new editing, and a new or simply focused narrative (or at least a novel collection of moments). This is a strong precedent for the ability of anime copyright holders in America to take action against distributors of music videos containing copyrighted footage. As further sources demonstrate, however, legal action against fans (especially those ardent enough to create music videos) is exactly what anime distributors want to avoid doing no matter how flagrantly the law is being broken. Worse than the music video issue is that of fansubbing, which only transforms works to the extent that subtitles are added, and nothing more; these are distributed over the internet and (mostly in the past) through retail and continue to exist without real legal action against them.

Tyson, Kimball. "The Illegal Art Exhibit: Art or Exploitation? a Look At the Fair Use Doctrine in Relation to Corporate Degenerate Art." Southern Methodist University School of Law Computer Law Review & Technology Review 9 (2005): 425.

This article responds to the "Illegal Art" exhibit that toured the country and features Forsythe's work. The author (who repeatedly spells the artist's name "Forsyth") wants to assess whether or not Food Chain Barbie is fair use--even though the court has already ruled it is. She contends the artists are not sincere in their parodies, and thinks they are actually using art to serve their personal "greedy" objectives. After an abbreviated history of art, Tyson says these works are "an ancillary to Pop Art of the 1960's that take corporate images and use them in their works to convey a parodic message not only of the image itself but of the larger societal scheme of which it reflects." She also summarizes the Copyright Act and defines Fair Use. Instead of actually analyzing what the court said about Forsythe's work, she merely repeats it, and it seems, decides to agree with their ruling. One of the few useful things about this article is her comparison of Forsythe and Koons:

"In the Rogers case, there is no doubt that Koons' use of the original work would compromise Rogers' market of the "Puppies" and "would prejudice the market for the sale of "Puppies" notecards or any other derivative uses he might plan." ²⁴⁷ However, in Forsyth's situation, his photographs seem to have little to no effect on the commercial gain of Mattel based on their copyrighted Barbie Doll. Photographs of Barbie in a blender or in a casserole dish are not really going to have a significant chilling effect on Mattel's market; [this] weighs in his favor."

Tyson allows that the Barbie series is a fair use, but remains suspicious of Forsythe's motives. She writes, "The idea of using art and distorting already existing images to convey a message, to illustrate the absurdity of our times, seems very vulnerable to exploitation. In Mattel Inc. v. Forsyth, the artist had very distinct aims in his creation. Call this a derivative work, call it exploitation. Regardless, perhaps these artists used the well-known corporate images as a way to make money. Just as Volkswagen manipulated the automobile market and somehow made consumers feel as though they were really stepping out of conformity in buying a VW, so these artists, under the pretense of satire and art as corporate parody, had an objective no different than that of the corporations and consumer crazed society which they mocked: personal gain motivated by greed, selfishness, and envy." To me, her argument falls flat given that Forsythe did not profit hugely from the works. Art is his profession, his means of making a living, and to charge $400 for a work that he spent time creating does not seem greedy or unreasonable. She contradicts herself, but this piece is valuable to my research because it takes a position I haven't yet encountered and deals with the concept of artists' "worthiness" so to speak and the merit of their intentions.

 

 

Newman, Jon O. EFF: Appellate Decision in Universal v. Reimerdes. Electronic Frontier Foundation. 22 November 2006. <http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/MPAA_DVD_cases/?f=20011128_ny_appeal_decision.html>.

This famous court case involved the publication of the "DeCSS" decryption program on the website 2600.com.  "DeCSS" was designed to break through the CSS encryption on DVDs.  The action of posting this program challenged the Digital Millenium Copyright Act which bans any measure of breaking through digital encryption, or any publication or distribution of any such measure. Eight film studios, including Universal, brought a suit against the operators of 2600.com, seeking to have "DeCSS" and any links to other sites containing it removed from 2600.com for violations of the DMCA.

The appeal challenged the constitutionality of the DMCA, claiming that it restricts free speech, and called for a narrow construction of its terms.  They also claimed that "is rooted in and required by both the Copyright Clause and the First Amendment," and that the DMCA restricts this.  However, the appeals court found no reasoning for these claims, and upheld an earlier injunction by a lower court requiring the removal of the "DeCSS" program and any links to it.

This case is extremely important because it establishes that arguments regarding fair use and free speech are almost no match for the terms of the DMCA.  Were it not for the DMCA, I think it would definitely be easy to argue for my video project as a fair use; however, cases like this clearly state that this is no defense.  The court states that there is no constitutional requirement for a fair use standard, and that such claims cannot supersede violations of anticircumvention laws.

McLaren, Carrie. "Illegal Art: Freedom of Expression in the Corporate Age." illegal-art.org :: A Project of Stay Free! magazine. 2002. Stay Free! magazine. 22 November 2006. .

This is the web site of the "Illegal Art" exhibition which has traveled the United States in the past year. The site contains a copy of curator Carrie McLaren's introduction to the show, in which she states, "The laws governing "intellectual property" have grown so expansive in recent years that artists need legal experts to sort them all out... If the current copyright laws had been in effect back in the day, whole genres such as collage, hiphop, and Pop Art might have never have existed... Should artists be allowed to use copyrighted materials? Where do the First Amendment and "intellectual property" law collide? What is art's future if the current laws are allowed to stand? Stay Free! [the magazine sponsoring the "Illegal Art" exhibition] considers these questions and others in our multimedia program." The site also includes a gallery of the various pieces included in the exhibit, which include a Mickey Mouse gas mask, photographs of Barbie dolls in kitchen appliances, a re-interpretation of the Starbucks logo as a "Consumer Whore", and various pieces including the "DeCSS" program.  Many of the artists involved in the "Illegal Art" show were or are the targets of legal action by the holders of the copyrights to the works they appropriated.

The "Illegal Art" website is definitely a valuable resource in the creation of my project; through the gallery of the included works, I will be able to see how other creators used appropriated materials to comment directly on the nature of copyright issues.  The artists involved in the exhibition used many different media to create their pieces, including a number of video pieces. 

            This case is an appeal by Napster of an injunction that does not require the plaintiffs to provide any individual file names of potentially infringing works available on the Napster system. The orders require the plaintiff to provide notice to Napster of copyrighted works by providing the title and artist name for each work. When given a list of copyrighted recordings, Napster would have three days to search all files on its system and prevent the transmitting or distribution of those files. Plaintiffs had sent in notices of hundreds of thousands of copyrighted works without the corresponding file names in the Napster system. Napster complained that the plaintiffs did not provide variants in song and artist name and could mix complying items in the same notice as non-complying items because Napster could not check in the time allowed by the injunction. The consequence was that Napster would end up blocking many authorized files.  The arguments were that the DMCA set limitations on the judicial power of ISPs such as Napster, did not assess the "staple article of commerce" doctrine set forth in Sony, and that Napster has commercially significant non-infringing uses but is forced to block sharing of files even though the names do not always correspond with the contents of those files.

 

            This case brings up some important points in my research about why copyright holders are finding it beneficial in some cases to waive some of their copyright in order to use new technologies such as MP3 blogs to promote music, while they continue to fight similar technology such as peer-to-peer services. Any discussion of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) liability is important because it affects how people can make blogs and share new things over the internet. There are several ISPs which allow anyone to create a blog from them, and these businesses are based on previous cases such as the Sony Corp v. Universal City Studios, Inc case where liability of technology providers is limited if they do not have specific knowledge of infringing uses of the technology. It also shows how even though a company can send take down notices, it is still difficult and costly to actually take a case to court and win it, no matter how clear cut it originally seems.

            This case was brought to raise questions about the legality and constitutionality of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. The argument is that "the DMCA's anti-device provisions are not a valid exercise of any of Congress' enumerated powers," and that they also "violate limits on the scope of copyright protection required by the First Amendment." The first part says that the Intellectual Property Clause does not give the authorization that anti-device provisions give, which allow technology to be banned regardless of how the device is actually used. The second argument is that in the anti-device provisions, Congress overstepped the authority given by both the Intellectual Property Clause, and the Necessary and Proper Clause, and upset the balance created by the Intellectual Property Clause, resulting in the monopolies that the framer sought to avoid. The third argument is that the Commerce Clause does not empower Congress to override other constitutional constraints. The fourth argument is that anti-device provisions violate First Amendment Limits on the scale of copyright protection.