This is an article written by Shujen Wang which was published in Cinema Journal, Vol. 43, No. 1 (Autumn, 2003), pp. 25-43 by the University of Texas. This article focuses on how anti-piracy initiatives of industrial states and transnational corporations seek to maintain control over property and markets, even in the fact of technological challenges and changes. This paper provides a market oriented analysis of the purpose of anti-piracy initiatives including anti-circumvention provisions in order to extract their net effect on global markets for content and property. Wang does a good job of analyzing the relevant policies--as all of the other scholars do--but he extends his analysis a step further to show how big corporations and their subsidiaries (for example the MPAA) have a huge role in shaping national and international trade policies. This is particularly poignant in light of the WIPO standards that led to the perceived need to pass legislation like the DMCA, as well as the growing role of copyright legislation in other, prominent international talks, including the Uruguay round of GATT talks (which established the WTO), as well as the WTO's subsequent agreement on TRIPS (trade-related aspects of intellectual property rights).
This topic is critical to national and international governmental policies; however, an analysis of firms, consumers, producers, owners and creators alike is essential to the analysis of the direct impact of these policies on the economy. Wang's work masterfully details the size and scope of the booming technology industry--both globally and within the United States--and offers a detailed account of what their biggest goals are, and how they will wield market dominance to maintain their control and prosperity. Wang details how piracy effects large firms, and how anti-circumvention measures have deterred piracy.
This piece is unique within my body of sources, and absolutely essential to my research. It is very refreshing that Wang offers more market oriented analysis, rather than getting caught up on the legislative details. Although it is often best to conduct one's own theoretical survey of the effects of legislative language on the economy, Wang's piece provides substantive detail that is will be very beneficial to the clarity and consistency of my paper.
"Locks & Levies" is an article written by Jeremy F. DeBeer that was published in the Denver Law Review Vol. 84, No. 1 (2006).
DeBeer does not entirely fault the original legislation for the massive shortcomings that have subsequently come from it. America was one of the earliest nations to adopt the standards of WIPO, and as such, passed legislation that overextended itself. Since the DMCA passed in 1998, American courts--according to DeBeer--have been unwilling to expand or broadly interpret the list of enumerated exceptions to the anti-circumvention provisions, which are made on the basis of a triennial review. DeBeer's argues persuasively that the DMCA provisions have lead to self-censorship by technology researchers, and anti-competitive and anti-technology sentiments in the business world.
In terms of those who have stake in the system of locks on information technologies, big multinational movie studios, record labels, and large-scale producers have the most to gain. TPMs allow corporate giants to further their consolidated control over the distribution of digital content. It is obvious that large corporate players are in favor of anti-circumvention measures; however, DeBeer offers the unique position that some consumer groups might also share this view. He argues that in some senses, the ability for entertainment industries to maximize profits allows them to distribute more information, giving consumers a larger variety of goods. However, some downsides might include limitation on copies, and less creative variety of material as consumer-authors won't have as easy access to copyrighted materials.
DeBeer's article is of great value to my paper because it analyzes the situation from every possible perspective; not simply bashing the anti-circumvention provisions of the DMCA. In the end, I take out that the consumers who are most likely to accept lock-schemes are passive investors; whereas those who oppose the anti-circumvention provisions are consumers who have a more active interaction with the information that they consume. These are the consumers who ought to be protected, for it is they who innovate.