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. Nazi Germany sourcebook : an anthology of texts / Roderick Stackelberg and Sally A. Winkle. 0415222133 series London ; New York : Routledge, 2002.
Call#: Van Pelt Library DD256.5 .N359 2002

Goebbels, Joseph. "Goebbel's speech in the Berlin Sportpalast, 18 February 1943." The Nazi Germany Sourcebook an anthology of texts. Comp. Roderick Stackelberg and Sally Winkle. New York: Routledge, 2002.

    This speech of Joeseph Goebbels, minister of propaganda, is filled with just that—propaganda.  Goebbels does acknowledge Germany’s military defeats, though.  Specifically, when he mentions the defeat of Stalingrad, he is overly positive and tells the German people that this defeat was actually a good thing because it would unify Germany, ultimately strengthening the country.  This specific example shows how Goebbels takes even the most seemingly negative thing such as a military defeat and turns it into a positive for the Nazi cause.  He compliments the German people while he rallies them to support Germany.  He assures the people that Germany has endured many crises and can endure this one and thrive again.  These difficult times will build virtue in the German people.  Goebbels informs the people of the bleak military situation, so that they understand the magnitude of the situation and will be moved to help the war effort.  He states that the German cause is noble, in that as Germans, it is their duty to protect the world from the failed Bolshevik ideology that surely would have swept through Europe had Germany not stepped in.  Germany did initially underestimate the strength of their enemy, the Soviet Union.  Goebbels continually reminds the German people that to win Germany needs the full support of its citizens.  Goebbels concludes his speech by rallying the people with a series of ten questions.  One example is that he asks whether the German people believe in victory.  Obviously, the people answer with a resounding, “YES!”  He ends his speech with a last appeal to the German citizens for patriotism. 
    This speech shows the importance of the support of the citizens. Joseph Goebbels was in charge of rallying the people’s support, and this speech is one concrete example of how he did so and its importance.  The Nazis needed the support from the people in order to win the war, and Goebbels used this speech in an attempt to do so.  Generally, though, Goebbels employed film as his primary tool for propaganda.  This speech was a direct appeal to the people.  In contrast, film appeals to the people in more subtle ways.  Because of its subtlety, film is a very effective propaganda tool.  The film Kolberg, for example, also calls on the citizens to help with the war effort.  This film does so indirectly through the use of a historic example, the battle of Kolberg.  The efforts of the average citizens is pivotal in the battle of Kolberg. The importance of the average citizen in history was meant to inspire people to do the same thing for WWII.  Goebbels spent so many resources on this film because he felt that this support from the people was necessary to win; however, Goebbels got carried away with the project, wasting many needed resources.  In the end, the film was useless because it was not released until the war was practically already lost. 

 

Leiser, Erwin, 1923- . Nazi cinema / Erwin Leiser ; translated from the German by Gertrud Mander and David Wilson. series London : Secker & Warburg, 1974.
Call#: Van Pelt Library PN1993.5.G3 L3813 1974
Call#: Van Pelt Library PN1993.5.G3 L3813 1974
Call#: Van Pelt Library PN1993.5.G3 L3813 1974

Leiser, Erwin. Nazi Cinema. London: Secker & Warburg, 1974.

“The Joseph Goebbels Programme”

    This chapter explains the role of propaganda, specifically Joseph Goebbels' administration of it; Goebbels was minister of propaganda.  Hitler defined the primary goal of propaganda as educating the masses on “the essence and function of the State” (Leiser 11). Hitler wanted film’s only purpose to be propaganda, but Goebbels disagreed, using subtler methods of propaganda. Goebbels was moved by film.  He specifically admired Eisenstein's Battleship Potemkin. Goebbels made his films non-political so that audiences would not suspect political motives, but in reality every film was embedded with political propaganda.  Goebbels preferred “people…to be manipulated without being shown the direction in which they were being led” (Leiser 12).  This method of manipulation was thought to be more effective.  He used different storylines to indirectly parallel it to the Nazi agenda. Goebbels was an ever-present force in film. He influenced basically every film made in Nazi Germany. His great influence was often resented by directors such as Viet Harlan.  In general, Nazi films reaffirmed stereotypes and morals deemed important to the Nazis.  These morals were enough for some “non-political” films to be passable by Goebbels as a form of propaganda since they were promoting  a unified culture approved by the Nazi Party.
    Goebbels recognized the effectiveness of film as a tool for propaganda and manipulation.  He realized that film was necesary in keeping Germany unified culturally and politically.  He was ultimately the man behind the whole propaganda campaign, meaning the he can be credited for all its successes as well as all its downfalls. This means that Goebbels can be blamed for the wasteful film productions at the end of the war.  Kolberg is one of the feature films produced at the end of the war that did not have an overt political message and served no purpose because it could not inspire the German citizens to win the war when they were two months away from defeat. Ultimately, as minister of propaganda and being entrusted with so much power Goebbels becam too absorbed in film production and did not think rationally about the purpose of each film produced.  The chapter describes how Goebbels had a fascination with film.  Goebbels cites several films that "made an 'indelible impression' on him" (Leiser 10). This passion for film  may have clouded Goebbels' jugement in the determination of the importance of film production at the end of the war; this film production conflicted with the war effort.

 

Miller. Peter. " Evil genius of Hitler's propaganda machine," Sunday Times (London) 05 Jul 1992. LexisNexis. 29 Nov 2008

      This article is about Joseph Goebbels and his pivotal role in the formation of Adolph Hitler’s status and power.  Goebbels was one of few individuals that realized early on the importance of the support of the masses in attaining power.  As minister of propaganda, Goebbels was in charge of making sure that the citizens perceived all information the way that the Nazi Party wanted them to.  While originally he was against Hitler, he soon recognized Hitler’s great oratory talents.  While Hitler was the orator that delivered the message to the German people, Goebbels was the one making sure that the content of the message was, indeed, the "proper" message to be relayed to the masses.  Goebbels utilized radio, television, and cinema to spread his propaganda.  He was very effective with this media and realized their importance in fostering public support. Through this manipulation of the public did Goebbels enable the Nazi Party to accomplish its many terrible deeds.  Goebbels was very committed to the Nazi cause and arguably was just as or even more important to many of its “accomplishments” than Hitler.  Like Hitler, Goebbels and his family also suffered a bloody fate.
     Goebbels realized that before the Nazi Party could gain power and take over the state, they had to win over the hearts and minds of the people.  Because of the importance of fostering the support of the masses, Goebbels placed such a great emphasis on propaganda.  His use of film allowed his propaganda to most effectively reach the masses. Film was the most influential medium for propaganda because it allowed for great subtlety in the portrayal of the message the Nazis wanted.  The importance of film as a tool for propaganda and Joseph Gobbels’ high priority of attaining the support of the German public as minister of propaganda led to an overemphasis of the value of film, specifically when he unwisely allocated an excessive amount of money and troops—much needed resources for the war—to the making of the film Kolberg.

Did the Nazis overvalue film (specifically during the filming of Kolberg)? The Nazis, embodied by minister of propaganda Joseph Goebbels, did overvalue film at times; specifically, this overvaluation of film is illustrated in the diversion of needed war resources to the film industry when Germany was approaching defeat, i.e. the production of Kolberg. The Nazis (Goebbels) placed a great importance on propaganda because they wanted a unified Germany, and they needed to maintain an appearance of strength to maintain public support, which was necessary to maintain power. Film was the most important form of propaganda because of its great effectiveness due to its subtlety and ability to reach the masses. Because of this importance of film to the Nazi cause, Goebbels, the minister of propaganda, remained preoccupied with the production of propaganda films even when the war was being badly lost. The best example of this is the production of the film Kolberg. During its production Germany was suffering many military losses and its economy was suffering. Despite the fact that Germany needed all the troops and resources it could get for the war, Goebbels diverted these troops and resources to this extravagant film with the hope that the film would inspire the support of the citizens, yet the film was released only a few months prior to German defeat. Overall, these misguided priorities of choosing investment in film versus directly into the war show that the Nazis overvalued film because they stubbornly stuck to the principles that got the Nazis in power, ignoring the dire situation with the war.

Baird, Jay W. "From Berlin to Neubabelsberg: Nazi Film Propaganda and Hitler Youth Quex." Journal of Contemporary History 18.3 (1983): pp. 495-515.

Jay W. Baird’s article discusses how the film Hitler Youth Quex twisted parts of the historical reality of a young member of the Hitler Youth’s story into a narrative that “channeled idealism into action in support of the state.” Baird argues that the “although grounded in fact, reality gave way to symbol” in the film, going further to discussing how filmmakers used symbolism to convey their message of nationalism to audiences. Baird extensively dissects the story of Herbert Norkus (the hero of the film) and analyzes how certain segments of the story are portrayed in the film in order to inspire audiences to relate to the film and move them in a way that audiences leave with a heightened sense of nationalism and patriotism. Some examples that Baird discuss are: twisting elements of the story to fit into the mold of a passion play, the use of stereotypes to portray the “Jewish-Bolshevik” as the enemy, and the romanticization of the role of the youth.

This article is helpful to my research because it describes techniques that another film created to be Nazi propaganda used in order to inspire change. While Jud Suss is commonly regarded as a film that directly cultivated a feeling of anti-Semitism in Nazi-Germany, Hitler Youth Quex is commonly regarded as a film that directly inspired many youth to support and join the Hitler Youth. In addition, Baird argues that Hitler Youth Quex “set the standard for subsequent Nazi film propaganda.” It is useful to compare the techniques used in both films to better understand what aspects of a Nazi propaganda film are effective in inspiring change in attitude as well as inciting audiences to take action as a result of absorbing the messages in a film. In this case, both films drew from the creation of a sense of unity and nationalism among the audience as well as the sense that Jews are non-human entities incredibly different from the upstanding German citizen.