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Leiser, Erwin, 1923- . Nazi cinema / Erwin Leiser ; translated from the German by Gertrud Mander and David Wilson. series London : Secker & Warburg, 1974.
Call#: Van Pelt Library PN1993.5.G3 L3813 1974
Call#: Van Pelt Library PN1993.5.G3 L3813 1974
Call#: Van Pelt Library PN1993.5.G3 L3813 1974

Leiser, Erwin. Nazi Cinema. London: Secker & Warburg, 1974.

“The Joseph Goebbels Programme”

    This chapter explains the role of propaganda, specifically Joseph Goebbels' administration of it; Goebbels was minister of propaganda.  Hitler defined the primary goal of propaganda as educating the masses on “the essence and function of the State” (Leiser 11). Hitler wanted film’s only purpose to be propaganda, but Goebbels disagreed, using subtler methods of propaganda. Goebbels was moved by film.  He specifically admired Eisenstein's Battleship Potemkin. Goebbels made his films non-political so that audiences would not suspect political motives, but in reality every film was embedded with political propaganda.  Goebbels preferred “people…to be manipulated without being shown the direction in which they were being led” (Leiser 12).  This method of manipulation was thought to be more effective.  He used different storylines to indirectly parallel it to the Nazi agenda. Goebbels was an ever-present force in film. He influenced basically every film made in Nazi Germany. His great influence was often resented by directors such as Viet Harlan.  In general, Nazi films reaffirmed stereotypes and morals deemed important to the Nazis.  These morals were enough for some “non-political” films to be passable by Goebbels as a form of propaganda since they were promoting  a unified culture approved by the Nazi Party.
    Goebbels recognized the effectiveness of film as a tool for propaganda and manipulation.  He realized that film was necesary in keeping Germany unified culturally and politically.  He was ultimately the man behind the whole propaganda campaign, meaning the he can be credited for all its successes as well as all its downfalls. This means that Goebbels can be blamed for the wasteful film productions at the end of the war.  Kolberg is one of the feature films produced at the end of the war that did not have an overt political message and served no purpose because it could not inspire the German citizens to win the war when they were two months away from defeat. Ultimately, as minister of propaganda and being entrusted with so much power Goebbels becam too absorbed in film production and did not think rationally about the purpose of each film produced.  The chapter describes how Goebbels had a fascination with film.  Goebbels cites several films that "made an 'indelible impression' on him" (Leiser 10). This passion for film  may have clouded Goebbels' jugement in the determination of the importance of film production at the end of the war; this film production conflicted with the war effort.

 

Kaes, Anton. . From Hitler to Heimat : the return of history as film / Anton Kaes. 0674324552 (alk. paper) series Cambridge, Mass. : Harvard University Press, 1989.
Call#: Van Pelt Library PN1993.5.G3 K2913 1989
Call#: Van Pelt Library PN1993.5.G3 K2913 1989
Call#: Van Pelt Library--4 East--Temporary Location Annenberg PN1993.5.G3 K2913 1989
Call#: Van Pelt Library--4 East--Temporary Location Annenberg PN1993.5.G3 K2913 1989

Kaes, Anton. From Hitler to Heimat: the return of hstory as film. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1989.

“The Politics of Representation”

    This chapter starts with a description of the contrasting images of the filming of the extravagant film Kolberg with the harsh realities of war.  Germany was constantly being bombed by the allies; the people were seeking refuge in bomb shelters while director Veit Harlan was concerned with finishing filming.  This introduction shows the ridiculousness of the whole situation.  This situation illustrates how the priorities of the Nazis were very misguided.  Goebbels, who was also overseeing the project, allowed for Harlan to draw away almost 200,000 troops from battle for use in the film.  Kolberg was a film about a historic battle at Kolberg in which the citizens were key to victory.  The film was meant to inspire, but it was released only a couple of months preceding eventual defeat. The film’s propaganda was lost because the war was already lost. “Today, Harlan’s Kolberg has become an emblem of the Third Reich’s unshakable belief in the demagogic power of images” (Kaes 3-4).  The Nazi political system relied on keeping its power through the maintaining of an appearance of strength and a belief in the system, which were both fostered by propaganda through film.  The keeping up of these appearances became a major goal of the Nazis that often interfered with other priorities i.e. the war effort. The only reason the Nazis were successful was because of the Godlike status the Nazis were able to give Hitler through the use of these appearances, which were built using film. 
     The argument of this chapter directly supports the claim that the Nazis placed an overly high value on film because of the over importance of image and appearances to the Nazi system.  Goebbels and the Nazis should have recognized, though, that the resources spent on keeping up these appearances with extravagant films like Kolberg would have been better utilized directly in the war. The maintaining of appearances should not matter once fear of survival is an issue, but Goebbels obviously did not realize this.  The Nazis should have changed their priorities once the threat of defeat became evident.  It is unbelievable that even a couple months before defeat Goebbels still had the production of Kolberg completed.  The propaganda generated by film was seemingly more important to Goebbels than military victory.  Such misguided priorities and principles doomed the Nazis.

 

Marshall. L. "A Nazi Piece of Work," Herald Sun 06 May 1995. LexisNexis. 1 Dec 2008

     While Kolberg, has been criticized for being such an extravagant film that was filmed very late in the war and so close to Germany's defeat, there was another film that was being produced after Kolberg.  The production of this film went on almost until Germany’s defeat.  With shortages, bombings, and death only twenty miles away, Goebbels ordered the making of another extrazagant film, Das Leben geht weiter or Life Goes On. The set designer of this last film of the Nazi era, was instructed to “spare no expense to recreate the aftermath of the devastating Berlin air raids in November 1943”(Marshall).  This film was meant to be an updated version of Kolberg that just as extravagant.  The idea of the film was Goebbels', who definitely became obsessed with film.   This last film had mostly been forgotten in history.  This is in part because those involved were embarrassed they were part of the film , so they did not talk about the film.  The other reason is that the footage was completely lost.
    Most film historians view Kolberg as Goebbels' last production and biggest folly, but Das Leben geht weiter apparently takes its place.  This last film shows how illogical Goebbels was.  Germany did not have the resources to endure in World War II, but Goebbels felt that it had the resources to make a 2.5 million marks budget film.  Goebbels' priorities were very misguided.  He definitely should have had someone checking his power.  Goebbels wasted so many of Germany’s resources on useless film production.  Kolberg was barely viewed by audiences and Das Leben geht weiter was never finished and the footage was completely lost.  Even if these films had been viewed, they still would have been wasteful because the resources were needed so much more for the war effort.  Goebbels definitely overvalued film to the point where he was willing to sacrifice the war.  While this wasteful film production was not the cause of Germany’s loss, it definitely did nothing to help Germany endure with so many resources were being diverted away from the war.

Kracauer, Siegfried, 1889-1966. . From Caligari to Hitler, a psychological history of the German film, by Siegfried Kracauer. series [Princeton, N.J.] Princeton university press, 1947.
Call#: Ctr for Adv Judaic Studies Lib, 4th & Walnut Sts. CJS PN1993.5.G3 K7 1942

Kracauer, Siegfried. From Caligari to Hitler, a psychological history of the German Film. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947.


“Nazi Views And Measures”

    All films in Nazi Germany were propaganda films.  Newsreels and features were the two forms of propaganda.  Newsreels were a means of propaganda not information.  The purpose of newsreels was to give the German people skewed world views.  The production of newsreels greatly increased at the onset of WWII. While newsreels portrayed falsified messages, the scenes shown were never faked—they were always actual footage taken on site.  This element made these propaganda newsreels more believable.  The Nazis prided themselves on the fact that the cameramen for newsreels were like “regular soldiers, doing a soldier’s full duty, always in the first lines…” (Kracauer 276).  The deaths of these cameramen and reporters at the front lines were emphasized to the public to reiterate the fact that the reporters were, indeed, amongst the soldiers on the war front. These newsreels were considerably long, so that the propaganda techniques could be repeated for increased effectiveness.  While newsreels were long, unlike feature films, newsreels were produced rapidly so that the information was timely and viewed as actual news. 
    While in my thesis I use the broad term film, I only consider the term to describe feature films.  This chapter highlights the importance of the newsreel.  The newsreel is a form of film propaganda that I really should not have ignored.  Because of the newsreel’s entirely different nature, its inclusion would have given my thesis more depth.  The newsreel did not have the same production costs or length of time needed for production because all the footage is filmed live at the scene.  Considering these facts, newsreels as film propaganda were much more cost effective than feature films.  While newsreels directly told Germans what to believe, newsreels still were subtle forms of propaganda because they were being portrayed in documentary style as fact.  In my thesis I argued that film was overvalued by the Nazis at times because of its great cost when resources were needed badly for the war effort.  Newsreels, though, would have served as a good compromise. Still, though, when the situation with the war became very dire, resources should never have been diverted from the war effort.

Did the Nazis overvalue film (specifically during the filming of Kolberg)? The Nazis, embodied by minister of propaganda Joseph Goebbels, did overvalue film at times; specifically, this overvaluation of film is illustrated in the diversion of needed war resources to the film industry when Germany was approaching defeat, i.e. the production of Kolberg. The Nazis (Goebbels) placed a great importance on propaganda because they wanted a unified Germany, and they needed to maintain an appearance of strength to maintain public support, which was necessary to maintain power. Film was the most important form of propaganda because of its great effectiveness due to its subtlety and ability to reach the masses. Because of this importance of film to the Nazi cause, Goebbels, the minister of propaganda, remained preoccupied with the production of propaganda films even when the war was being badly lost. The best example of this is the production of the film Kolberg. During its production Germany was suffering many military losses and its economy was suffering. Despite the fact that Germany needed all the troops and resources it could get for the war, Goebbels diverted these troops and resources to this extravagant film with the hope that the film would inspire the support of the citizens, yet the film was released only a few months prior to German defeat. Overall, these misguided priorities of choosing investment in film versus directly into the war show that the Nazis overvalued film because they stubbornly stuck to the principles that got the Nazis in power, ignoring the dire situation with the war.

Baird, Jay W. "From Berlin to Neubabelsberg: Nazi Film Propaganda and Hitler Youth Quex." Journal of Contemporary History 18.3 (1983): pp. 495-515.

Jay W. Baird’s article discusses how the film Hitler Youth Quex twisted parts of the historical reality of a young member of the Hitler Youth’s story into a narrative that “channeled idealism into action in support of the state.” Baird argues that the “although grounded in fact, reality gave way to symbol” in the film, going further to discussing how filmmakers used symbolism to convey their message of nationalism to audiences. Baird extensively dissects the story of Herbert Norkus (the hero of the film) and analyzes how certain segments of the story are portrayed in the film in order to inspire audiences to relate to the film and move them in a way that audiences leave with a heightened sense of nationalism and patriotism. Some examples that Baird discuss are: twisting elements of the story to fit into the mold of a passion play, the use of stereotypes to portray the “Jewish-Bolshevik” as the enemy, and the romanticization of the role of the youth.

This article is helpful to my research because it describes techniques that another film created to be Nazi propaganda used in order to inspire change. While Jud Suss is commonly regarded as a film that directly cultivated a feeling of anti-Semitism in Nazi-Germany, Hitler Youth Quex is commonly regarded as a film that directly inspired many youth to support and join the Hitler Youth. In addition, Baird argues that Hitler Youth Quex “set the standard for subsequent Nazi film propaganda.” It is useful to compare the techniques used in both films to better understand what aspects of a Nazi propaganda film are effective in inspiring change in attitude as well as inciting audiences to take action as a result of absorbing the messages in a film. In this case, both films drew from the creation of a sense of unity and nationalism among the audience as well as the sense that Jews are non-human entities incredibly different from the upstanding German citizen.

Friedman, Lester D. "The Edge of Knowledge: Jews as Monsters/Jews as Victims." MELUS 11.3 (1984): pp. 49-62.

Friedman argues that many of our deepest feelings about minorities are formed and cultivated by visual media, such as film or television. He borrows film critic Robin Wood’s simple formula for horror films: “normality is threatened by the monster.” (49) This postulate is then applied to the representation of Jews in film. Friedman argues that usually films tend to avoid including any sort of allusions to specifically ethnic characters as to make the film as universally appealing as possible. He argues that once a character is identified with a specific ethnicity or race, then that character takes on a wealth of political, social, and sexual connotations that increase the complexity of the film. However, these connotations also run the risk of offending certain audiences. He examines the role of the Jewish “monster” in Paul Wegener’s The Golem, a German Expressionist film from 1920.

This idea of the Jew as the “monster” is one that is repeated in several of the texts that I have selected for this project. Here, it is applied not to Jud Suss, but to The Golem, a German film created twenty years prior to the creation of Jud Suss. However, many of the stereotypes of Jews that are used in The Golem are seen again in Jud Suss, as well as other anti-Semitic films created in Germany. It is interesting to note how Jewish stereotypes are treated even before the rise of the Weimar Republic and to draw comparisons between the representations of Jews in The Golem and those in Nazi films.

Additionally, Friedman discusses a question similar to my thesis: “What demonic power could match Hitler’s feat of turning members of the most humane professions into murders and supporters of a totally immoral regime?” (56). According to the article, the answer lies in propaganda’s ability to depict the world as “vast and terrifying horror movie” where the lines between good and evil are very clear. German audiences internalized the depictions of good and evil that were fed to them through various cultural texts, one of which was the Jewish “monster.”

  Kolberg. Dir. Veit Harlan. Perf. Horst Caspar, Gustav Diessl, Heinrich George, Kurt Meisel, Kristina Soderbaum . DVD. UFA, 1945. 

    Kolberg is a historical epic of the Nazi film era.  It is about the patriotism of the people of Kolberg during the Napoleonic wars and the importance of the average citizen.  The film highlights the patriotism of Nettleback.  He steps on the toes of his superiors to make sure that victory was had in Kolberg at all costs because that is what the people of Kolberg desire, for they are a proud and loyal people.  The officer in charge of Kolberg’s defense is doing a poor job and conflicts with Nettelback, imprisoning Nettelback, who was merely trying to correct the deficits in Kolberg?s defenses.  Nettelback sends his trusted Maria to the king to ask for a different officer for Kolberg.  Maria meets with the queen and is struck speechless by the Queen’s beauty and majesty.  She is successful in getting Nettelback’s request granted.  The way Nettelback and the newly appointed officer work together shows how the citizens and the government can truly combine efforts for the greater good.  Romance also finds its way in the film with Maria and Lieutenant Schill.  The reoccurring theme throughout the film is that a citizen must be willing to sacrifice all for his country.  Honor and loyalty to one’s country trump all else. This theme is illustrated in Maria and Lieutenant Schill's conversation about their willingness to sacrifice all for Kolberg and how only then would it be enough.
    Joseph Goebbels, minister of propaganda, felt that Kolberg would inspire the citizens to support World War II by drawing on astounding examples of patriotism by average citizens and its great significance to Germany.  Because of the importance Goebbels placed in the impact of the film, he was willing to divert many of Germany’s much needed war resources to the making of this movie, which was the one of costliest of this era.  Two hundred thousand troops were used in the making of the film, troops that were taken away from battle.  The cost of the film was very extravagant, and Germany really did not have the surplus of resources to accommodate such a project.  Film production began in 1943 and was not completed until 1945, so the film’s impact as a source of propaganda was very minimal, considering Germany was on the brink of defeat and most of the theaters were closed from the mass destruction from the Allies’ bombings.  “The film remained virtually unseen as the city fell to Soviet troops” (Thompson and Bordwell 274).  Overall, Kolberg was a great folly of Goebbels and a waste of money and resources that Germany could not afford. (Thompson and Bordwell 274)
Thompson, Kristin, and David Bordwell. Film History An Introduction. 2nd. New York: McGraw Hill, 2003.