Abstract: Planners' concerns for spatial equity and for racial equity are expressed tangibly through legislation designed to promote regional development, enterprise zones, affirmative action, and in other spheres of practice. Equity concerns take on heightened meaning where issues of space and race intersect, such as inner-city revitalization or environmental justice. This article explores the underlying basis for issues of social justice in the context of race and space, leading to two principle findings. First, there is a tight correspondence between the role of race and space in the social construction of identity and corresponding formulations of social justice. This point is demonstrated using five diverse examples from the realm of practice. Second, there is a danger of misapplication of principles of social justice where the implicit dimensions of one problem sphere are applied to another. This point is illustrated with two examples; a defunct World Bank proposal to marketize waste disposal and an effort in California to restore racial equity in public university admissions through spatially mediated interventions. [ABSTRACT FROM AUTHOR]

University of Cape Town, South Africa; watson@eng.uct.ac.za

The article suggests that planning's current sources of moral philosophy are no longer an entirely satisfactory guide on issues of ethical judgement in a context of deepening social difference and an increasingly hegemonic market rationality. A focus on process in planning and a relative neglect of product, together with the assumption that such processes can be guided by a universal set of deontological values shaped by the liberal tradition, are rendered particularly problematic in a world which is characterized by deepening social and economic differences and inequalities and by the aggressive promotion of neoliberal values by particular dominant nation-states. The notion of introducing values into deliberative processes is explored.

Key Words: conflict • ethics • judgement • social difference • values

Beatley, T. (Winter) 1989
JOURNAL OF PLANNING LITERATURE 4:1-32

Northwestern University, Evanston, USA

In this paper I focus on the discussion between Rawls and Habermas on procedural justice. I use Rawls's distinction between pure, perfect, and imperfect procedural justice to distinguish three possible readings of discourse ethics. Then I argue, against Habermas's own recent claims, that only an interpretation of discourse ethics as imperfect procedural justice can make compatible its professed cognitivism with its proceduralism. Thus discourse ethics cannot be understood as a purely procedural account of the notion of justice. Finally I draw the different consequences that follow from this reading.

Key Words: discourse ethics • Jürgen Habermas • imperfect procedural justice • moral anti-realism • moral cognitivism • moral realism • perfect procedural justice • pure procedural justice • John Rawls

University of Michigan

This article uses social movement theory to analyze environmental justice rhetoric. It argues that the environmental justice frame is a master frame that uses discourses about injustice as an effective mobilizing tool. The article identifies an environmental justice paradigm and compares it with the new environmental paradigm. In addition, the article discusses why the environmental justice movement grew so fast and why its adherents find the environmental justice frame so appealing.

Department of Town and Regional Planning at the University of Sheffield.

The conceptualizations of justice that have most influenced recent debates in planning theory have focused on procedural concerns, while questions of value and the good have been regarded as problematic given a world of plurality and difference. This article argues that questions of value are an inescapable part of the activity of planning and hence its purpose is to identify the key dimensions of a reconceptualized notion of justice for planning. The argument is presented through consideration of two key themes: the relationship between the individual and the collective, and the notion of "reasonableness" in relation to matters of public policy related to planning. The implications of this analysis lead on to consideration of the scope of collective obligations and the nature of judgment and reasoning in planning. The article concludes by arguing that justice in planning is about situated ethical judgment- a conceptualization of justice that raises significant issues in relation to future developments in planning thought.

Key Words: justice • ethical judgment • planning theory