11th Annual LITA National Forum
October 16-19, 2008
Hilton Netherland Plaza Hotel, Cincinnati, OH
How can we advance arts and humanities research through the development of shared technology services?
cf:
SenseCam:
http://research.microsoft.com/sendev/projects/sensecam/?0sr=a
Articles about the MyLifeBits Project and Gordon Bell:
http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn3084
http://research.microsoft.com/~gbell/bio.htm
http://www.computerworld.com.au/index.php/id;363346268;pp;1
Annotation
Gordon Bell has a distinguished career in the IT industry. He's also decided to catalogue his life. This brings up interesting questions as to why keep all this stuff? Is there some purpose to being able to forget some or most of it?
Bell is refining his technique to store everything about himself on one terrabyte of data. He wants to get it all on his Dell laptop. He started out motivated by Bill Gates' book and decided to scan all the paper he owned. Co-conspirator Jim Gray helped him set-up a database for searching and archival purposes, but when Jim went sailing and never came back, Bell's quest became personal. Now he captures all web sites he goes to, he wears a sensecam to capture photos whenever light or heat changes (or in timed intervals). He works for Microsoft's research arm and can leverage Microsoft's power to create technology that allows data to be easily retrievable and identifable. He doesn't see it as lifelogging because he doesn't want the information public. One article likens it to "immortality" but rather, it's more like a huge digital scrapbook or time capsule. His laptop is so valuable to him now as a repository of memories, that he doesn't carry it around with him anymore.
Through the lens of forgetting, one should ask if keeping all this data is useful. The technology is more for identifying and retrieving information more than collecting the information. Collection is still a time-consuming and cumbersome process. On top of that, for the information to be retrievable, he has to annotate all of his data. How much of the data will anyone actually access in the future? What are the benefits of the system. Who benefits from the data? He says he doesn't have a problem with persistence -- all of the data should exist in perpitude, but is this a realistic recollection of him as a person?
Citation
Lightfoot, Geofrey, Steven D. Brown, and David Middleton. 2001. Performing the Past in Electronic Archives: Interdependencies in the Discursive and Non-discursive Ordering of Institutional Rememberings. Culture & Psychology 7, no. 2:123.
An exploration of forgetting: Bannon showcases several examples which demonstrate that while we don't consciously think about forgetting, not being able to forget severely impacts our ability to move easily through every day life because of the sensory overload. The discussion of collective memory (that is, what a society chooses to remember and pass on to the next generation) has been through the lens of cultural identity and national solidarity (see the work of French sociologist Maurice Halbwachs). The question is: can there be collective forgetting? Bannon posits that collective forgetting occurs when a group, passively or deliberatively, chooses to not carry the past into the future. (wouldn't this rather be the case that the group chooses not to carry forward the present into the future?) Historical conflicts often use forgetting to further a particular perspective or heal wounds. Collective forgetting is both a blessing (allows society to move forward) and a curse (society doomed to repeat history). Justice system employs deliberate forgetting to allow individuals a fresh start. Politically, collective forgetting is amnesty. (discussion of amnesty, blanchette, south Africa)
He continues differentiating individual vs. collective remembering and forgetting, similarities and difference between humans and computers, remembering and forgetting in the age of ubiquitous computing and finally forgetting in design.
Bannon, Liam J. 2006. Forgetting as a feature, not a bug: the duality of memory and implications for ubiquitous computing. CoDesign 2, no. 1:3-15.
Perhaps we can think of ephemeral technologies, or perhaps more correctly, technologies that support ephemeral events, in distinction to the persistent technologies that are usually envisaged. The ideas presented are very simple and playful, a starter-pack to begin to explore an alternative design space incorporating aspects of forgetting.
One radical idea elaborates a notion of a ‘digital shelter' where various forms of electronic signals are blocked within certain spaces or places, thus allowing people the freedom to chose to be electronically ‘on' or ‘off' (Sepulveda-Sandoval 2001). We could imagine the development of personal ‘sweeper' technologies that would inform us if particular spaces were being bugged, and activities recorded. Similarly, we could imagine the design of electronic ‘jamming' technologies that would hinder the pickup of meaningful signals from particular sites, akin to the current military jamming technologies. We could imagine various kinds of electronic tagging systems for messages or material that could time-stamp material and contain something like a ‘sell-by' date, where the information would self-destruct after the elapsed time, or where the distribution of your original message could be tracked, although the latter idea raises further privacy issues. My point here is not to provide simple technological fixes to what are ultimately societal practices. Rather, the aim is to highlight different design options. We need to explore augmentation means for all human activities, both remembering and forgetting.
Citation full pdf at ebsco megafile
Bannon, Liam J. 2006. Forgetting as a feature, not a bug: the duality of memory and implications for ubiquitous computing. CoDesign 2, no. 1:3-15.
Problems with the computer model of memory: Our understanding of the human mind has always been informed by technology. Because the dominant perspective of the human mind has been that of an information-processing device (much like that of a computer), the duality of memory (remembering and forgetting) have been seen as a passive model rather than remembering and forgetting being actions. This perspective reifies human memory, turning it into a thing rather than an active process. While the cognitive sciences frame memory with words like “erasure” and “retrieval”, we’ve known for decades that human memory is not like computer memory. Rather than reproduction, remembering is constructive and reconstructive; it is not exact, nor is it important that it is. (Barlett) Cultural historical psychologists (Soviet Vygotsky) view remembering in the context of activity such that if a memory is used in an activity different than its original context, the memory will be reinterpreted with respect to the new activity and there is no guarantee that the memory is relevant anymore in the same manner that it was when it was stored. (not so useful for my purposes) In the computational framework, forgetting is seen as the simple erasure of memory, or the loss of the link to the memory location. Forgetting is seen as an example of the fragility of the mind whereas computer memory with its indefinite and persistent storage is much better. Thus, forgetting is seen as a negative bug, but Bannon hopes to show how it is a positive feature.
Citation full pdf at ebsco megafile
Bannon, Liam J. 2006. Forgetting as a feature, not a bug: the duality of memory and implications for ubiquitous computing. CoDesign 2, no. 1:3-15.
Annotation
Dodge & Kitchin explore pervasive computing in regards to surveillance and increasingly sousveillance (capturing data about yourself). They look at the development of life-logs, sociospatial archives that document every action, every event, every conversation, and every material expression of an individual's life and the potential social, political, and ethical implications of machines that never forget. They suggest that given the new possible paradigm, forgetting needs to be incorporated into new technologies. They look to Schacter's modes of forgetting as a basis for creating an ethics of forgetting. They go over the main types of forgetting in Schacter and call for implementing Schacter's models in technological design to create a humane but still useful system. They also champion the idea of incorporating forgetting into architecture (as a kernel) instead of legislating forgetting as a blanket.
Citation
Dodge, Martin, and Rob Kitchin. 2005. 'Outlines of a world coming into existence': pervasive computing and the ethics of forgetting. Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design 34, no. 3:431 - 445.
Annotation
Forgetting is easier to do than remembering. Empirically cultures have tried to preserve memory through devices like books, film, record, etc. However, conservation has always been expensive, thus strict limits are applied as to what to keep. New digital memory is relatively inexpensive and it allows us to store everything, regardless of significance. Also, digital data is easily reproduced and accessed bringing up issues of privacy. Because of this, Mayer-Schonberger sees a shift from discarding to preserving. Is this a good thing? No.
Three conventional responses:
- Comprehensive privacy litigation is difficult because lobby groups exert a lot of power but represent only a few, while the masses who would benefit are diffuse and disorganized;
- constitutional reinterpretation while potentially valid under the First, Fourth, and implicit "privacy" amendments (first, third, fourth, fifth, ninth, and fourteenth) is difficult to pass and would not regulate private parties only public government;
- Null response or inaction can be argued as the best approach if there is no demand for legal action, however, the null response argument is naive when considering political theory's acknowledgment of the difficulty the majority has in transforming its will into law.
Lawrence Lessig proposes a solution that is a combination of law and code, but Mayer-Schonberger finds solution too complex for this focused issue of data retention. Instead, Mayer-Schonberger proposes a simple solution of reinstating forgetting over time through
- user-defined storage timelines,
- decreasing cookie life,
- requiring companies to delete/forget data, including cell phone software, and
- limiting sensor data.
Mayer-Schonberger briefly covers the strengths and weaknesses of his plan and summarizes article in the conclusion.
Source citation
Mayer-Schoenberger, Viktor. "Useful Void: The Art of Forgetting in the Age of Ubiquitous Computing." Working Paper RWP07-022, Cambridge, Mass.: John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, 2007 Apr.
Call#: Engineering Library T14 .F56
mentioned in peter morville's library2.0 talk at michigan.
ranganathan -> ncsu -> berkeley?
Call#: Van Pelt Library P91.28 .M43 2004
The above argument also prodded me to consider the Internet’s role in how the screen culture changes from TV/cinema to computer/iPod/PDA/whatever. I had not thoroughly contemplated how it changes the media experience, but it clearly does; it also complicates my two divisions somewhat. You can, for example, have the Internet on your phone and computer, but not on your iPod (yet); but the iPod screen, to me, fits so clearly in with a new media approach to absorbing screen images that I feel compelled to fit it in with computer and phone image absorption. Perhaps, then, I’ll approach a discussion of the Internet’s effect on only certain new screen technologies.
The other aspect of this chapter that I thought I could prove useful was the authors’ discussion of the process of media access. They devote a good portion of the chapter to this concept, outlining both linear and nonlinear accesses and their presence in media. Ultimately, they suggest that linear access fits in with older (read: TV, non-Internet) screen cultures, and a nonlinear, or more engaging, method of media consumption, with new forms of screen technologies. While this simplifies the argument somewhat, it’s useful in a general way to indicate a potentially more active user response in newer media forms, which may in turn hint to a larger difference between viewer engagement with different forms of screen media.
Berton’s ideas here hold a lot of relevance to my paper because he somewhat suggests that old media and new media perhaps faced similar beginnings. Since we’re more or less now still in the beginning of the new media phase, we’ve been able to experience firsthand if Berton is correct. I think that there was a time when digital media was so new and cool, that anything it created was met with awe and glee. This has worn off now, but I believe this has transferred to a certain extent to new media technologies like the iPod and the cell phone. Pretty much anything you put on an iPod (at least to the younger generation) is cool not because of what you’re watching, but because you’re using the technology. We’re still starting to figure out what movies and clips work best on a 2” portable screen; it’s likely we won’t discover a good answer for awhile. In the meantime, we’re in the pre-theory phase. Melies and Kuleshov don’t yet apply to the iPod (but do, perhaps arguably, to the computer, which is an interesting separation). Thus, Berton’s overall concept can be applied to my paper in a unique and unexpected way.
However, one drawback to this approach is precisely that no difference seems to appear between a television screen and a computer screen. Baetens, in endorsing a theory by Anne-Marie Christin as well as his own views (which align rather closely with Christin’s), renders the material aspect of a screen virtually immaterial. I agree that there’s more to a screen than the technology to which it’s tied; but, nonetheless, we do see new technologies through this screen, and thus it has to have something to do with the technology itself. Utilizing Maynard’s definition for his argument may cause some of the problem here, because a screen might constitute more than “a surface with a symbol.” His definition also clearly encompasses more than I’d care to discuss (windows, maps, playing cards, etc.), which enters into metaphorical areas of screen culture and thus guide him even further from any discussion of possible physical connections between screen and culture.
Overall, however, I do like the fact that the theory links screens with visual elements, and with the act of looking at something. This is the only source I have that explicitly examines the concept of a screen, and I think it would provide a good background (and healthy opposition to) my own ideas on what a screen is in different media. His idea of screen-thinking, or a dialogue on thoughts about screen, as a technology whereby several meanings are constructed at once, holds much relevance (and much potential discussion!) for ideas about the place of the screen as a one-way or multiple-way medium of information release.
Call#: Van Pelt Library P94.6 .M673 2007
Morley then turns to examining newer media technologies, with the purpose of refuting the concept that with new media comes new social and cultural uses for that media. He argues that while technologies like cell phones and computers do bring with them new ways of consumption, their arrival does not signal the death of traditional social rituals. Living traditions tend to incorporate new technologies rather than become obsolete in the face of media development. This fits with Michele White’s ideas on spectatorship, thus providing a non-traditional viewpoint to help me balance my paper.
That this book focuses very little on a viewer’s actual engagement with the screen prevents this source from becoming a major on for my paper. However, I do think that some of the ideas present here and Morley’s background on the evolution of these technologies can give me some good basic background information, as a foundation for my arguments.
Call#: Van Pelt Library P91.28 .M43 2004
The above argument also prodded me to consider the Internet’s role in how the screen culture changes from TV/cinema to computer/iPod/PDA/whatever. I had not thoroughly contemplated how it changes the media experience, but it clearly does; it also complicates my two divisions somewhat. You can, for example, have the Internet on your phone and computer, but not on your iPod (yet); but the iPod screen, to me, fits so clearly in with a new media approach to absorbing screen images that I feel compelled to fit it in with computer and phone image absorption. Perhaps, then, I’ll approach a discussion of the Internet’s effect on only certain new screen technologies.
The other aspect of this chapter that I thought I could prove useful was the authors’ discussion of the process of media access. They devote a good portion of the chapter to this concept, outlining both linear and nonlinear accesses and their presence in media. Ultimately, they suggest that linear access fits in with older (read: TV, non-Internet) screen cultures, and a nonlinear, or more engaging, method of media consumption, with new forms of screen technologies. While this simplifies the argument somewhat, it’s useful in a general way to indicate a potentially more active user response in newer media forms, which may in turn hint to a larger difference between viewer engagement with different forms of screen media.
Call#: Van Pelt Library PN1992.4.H36 A3 2002
not good
Call#: Van Pelt Library HM846 .V57 2004
Call#: Van Pelt Library Q222 .R46 1990
cited by Gitelman Scripts Grooves.
Technopoetics. cited by Gitelman Scripts Grooves
Call#: Van Pelt Library PN98.I54 P38 1988
Call#: -
Call#: Van Pelt Library T14.5 .N93 1994
Call#: Van Pelt Library TK18 .M37 1988
Call#: Van Pelt Library CB478 .K46 1983
cited by gitelman scripts grooves
Call#: T47 .R44 1808
Citedy by Gitelman Scripts Grooves. Also in microfilm.
Call#: TA145 .F37 1992
Cited by Gitelman Scripts Grooves.
Same author, "The Mind's Eye: Nonverbal Thought in Technology." Science 197 (1977): 827-36.
Call#: Van Pelt Library DT33 .F313 2004
http://williampatry.blogspot.com/2006/10/not-model-decision.html
William Patry presents the recent opinion from District of Utah, Meshwerks, Inc v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A. Inc—a case in which Meshwerks, hired to make computerized and animated 3D models Toyota cars for an ad campaign, sued the company for copyright infringement when the models were used without his consent. Meshwerks describes his models as a work of “the graphic sculptor” using new graphic technology. The process is not just mechanical, but creative as well; it requires the designer to sketch, from scratch, the 2D picture of a 3D object using the computer as a tool, like a brush for a painter. Therefore, he argues that no two models will ever be alike, for ultimately every design is a unique creation. In defense, Toyota argued that digital models are not entitled to copyright protection, because the purpose of the graphic tool is to create an exact replica and inherently lacks originality. The court declared “lack of a creative recasting of the Toyota vehicles” through its digital medium and therefore Mershwerk’s models are not protected under copyright law.
Patry, however, argues that the Court has failed to evaluate the case on the heart of matter, the issue of originality, but instead focused forming its opinion on technical process in which the models were produced. Patry argues that since Bleinstein v. Donaldson, “purpose is irrelevant,” or the intent in which the work is created: the only question in matter is whether original contribution exists or not in its final outcome. Patry argues that the fact that both the court and the defendant recognized that skill, technical know-how, and the creative process that is born from this technology in the creation of models should have been sufficient to grant Meshwerk’s models copyright protection; a creative input, also called original input, is required in creating the model. Patry uses past decisions on copyright protections of photography, particularly of SHL Imaging, Inc. v. Artisan House, Inc. to mirror the inconsistency of this decision with which Supreme Court has stated: “To be sure, the requisite level of creativity is extremely low, even a slight amount will suffice.” The determination of copyright protection with photography has been made completely on original input, judged by its aesthetic quality. Camera is also a medium that creates exact replicas of life in 2D, but the court has focused on “artistic choices” made by the photographer. Patry pinpoints that in this particular decision, the court focuses on the purpose of creating the models and since the digital technology attempts to create a real-life picture of the car, it lacks the “creative recasting,” ignoring the creative input required to create the model in the process.
This entry forthright demonstrates the inconsistency that the loosely written and interpreted copyright law in the court. It allows room to argue that perhaps aesthetic qualities are too abstract to be good basis for determining copyright qualification.
FBI shut down the unauthorized computer game server L2Extreme, which hosted the NCSoft MMORPG Lineage II. Owners of L2Extreme provided its 50,000 active users with service and code for the online game for a fee. NCSoft claimed millions of dollars of annual loss due to this illegal service. L2Extreme operated pirated server software copied from the NCSoft server software. Users then registered with L2Extreme to play Lineage II instead of using NCSoft’s servers.
The financial effect is of course significant, but NCSoft also had to defend its intellectual property rights. The case, at first glance, is similar to the Blizzard v. BnetD case. However, BnetD reverse engineered the Blizzard server software without direct infringement on the original software. It was a fair use copy with no copyright violation involved. Contrarily, L2Extreme simply pirated the software from NCSoft. In addition, L2Extreme was a profitable business whereas BnetD was fueled by volunteer game enthusiasts. Otherwise, the details of both cases seem very similar.
Comparing the Blizzard v. BnetD case with this event, it becomes clear that seemingly minor details are in fact the deciding factors in many copyright decisions. In one, the FBI abruptly closed down operation without proper legal decision whereas in the other, the original game company could not persuade the court of any wrongdoing on the defendant’s part. Noticeably, intellectual property laws and their applications to the game industry remains a relatively new field. Hence, it is difficult to pinpoint what is right and what is wrong. Perhaps the single greatest law which many intellectual property and gaming related cases are based on is the Digital Millennium Copyright Act. However, there are many critics of the DMCA simply because of some of the consequences of invoking the Act. It remains to be seen how long the DMCA can last before undergoing major renovations. Much of that is derived from the evolutionary nature of gaming, where much change can occur in just a few years. Laws that are applicable in one year may become outdated the next year. This is the inevitable change of technology.
This case is an appeal by Napster of an injunction that does not require the plaintiffs to provide any individual file names of potentially infringing works available on the Napster system. The orders require the plaintiff to provide notice to Napster of copyrighted works by providing the title and artist name for each work. When given a list of copyrighted recordings, Napster would have three days to search all files on its system and prevent the transmitting or distribution of those files. Plaintiffs had sent in notices of hundreds of thousands of copyrighted works without the corresponding file names in the Napster system. Napster complained that the plaintiffs did not provide variants in song and artist name and could mix complying items in the same notice as non-complying items because Napster could not check in the time allowed by the injunction. The consequence was that Napster would end up blocking many authorized files. The arguments were that the DMCA set limitations on the judicial power of ISPs such as Napster, did not assess the "staple article of commerce" doctrine set forth in Sony, and that Napster has commercially significant non-infringing uses but is forced to block sharing of files even though the names do not always correspond with the contents of those files.
This case brings up some important points in my research about why copyright holders are finding it beneficial in some cases to waive some of their copyright in order to use new technologies such as MP3 blogs to promote music, while they continue to fight similar technology such as peer-to-peer services. Any discussion of Internet Service Providers (ISPs) liability is important because it affects how people can make blogs and share new things over the internet. There are several ISPs which allow anyone to create a blog from them, and these businesses are based on previous cases such as the Sony Corp v. Universal City Studios, Inc case where liability of technology providers is limited if they do not have specific knowledge of infringing uses of the technology. It also shows how even though a company can send take down notices, it is still difficult and costly to actually take a case to court and win it, no matter how clear cut it originally seems.
This essay describes what an MP3 blog is, and how record labels want to capitalize on the promotion that they provide while fighting file sharing at the same time. The essay discusses the types of copyright infringement and fair use and how they apply to MP3 blogs, as well as the factors that cause the court to view MP3 blogs more favorably than peer-to-peer networks. It discusses law suits against Napster and also by the RIAA against peer-to-peer users. The article explains what establishes liability for infringing use, and the different expansions of the Copyright Act which have been brought by copyright owners in addressing new technologies. It then discusses some of these acts and gives some examples of violators. The next section explains the defense used when copyright owners bring suits, which is fair use, and it lists and describes the four factors in deciding fair use on a case by case basis.
This essay incorporates basically every aspect of my research into why copyright holders are willing to waive certain copyright in cases such as MP3 blogs, while they continue to fight against much of new technology such as peer-to-peer services. It describes what MP3 blogs are and how they are used and different sites that can link to the unauthorized music. It shows what the copyright holder needs to look for in order to bring a suit against infringing users, and also explains how the user of the work can try to use fair use as a defense.
This is a long essay about corporate power in the music industry. The argument is that cross-ownership in the media tends to reduce competition and increases profits, in turn, forcing music production to become increasingly uniform and profit driven, and harming artistic expression. It has descriptions of corporate sponsorship, and the loss of diversity. The next section is about Clear Channel Communications, and how the consolidation takes away jobs, excludes a large variety of music, and provides listeners with a biased source of information. Next, is the analysis of a recent hit, which examines the predetermined song structure which results in homogenized music and play lists, this is called the sound of corporate music. The conclusion suggests that a number of musicians would prefer to circumvent the bureaucratic systems of the industry, and that in order to preserve the artists ability to express sometimes controversial and diverse views, that musicians and the population at large would prefer legislation that moves away from monopolies.
This article is relevant to my research in finding out why copyright holders are willing to waive some of their copyright in such cases as MP3 blogs, which often involve unauthorized downloading of copyrighted work. In the conclusion of the article, it suggests that a majority of musicians are not so upset about free downloads and many who are independently minded, support distribution systems that are not connected with the industry devotion to profit. Some artists who want to make more controversial material release it for free on the internet. It also suggests that this is a reaction to media consolidation, and provides some argument that more copyright control leads to the growth of monopolies, and the limiting of new technology and expression.
This article is written by Cary Sherman, president of the RIAA as a response to a speech by Consumer Electronics CEO Gary Shapiro in which Shapiro stated that downloading off the Web is neither illegal nor immoral. Sherman says that statement is wrong and misleading. Shapiro says that legal downloading from record companies and legitimate online music companies is fine but there is a problem with unauthorized downloading of copyrighted material, and sites Title 17 of the United States Code. Sherman writes that the fair use argument employed by Shapiro makes falsely seem as if copyright owners are against fair use, and that the fair use claim is unsupported when it comes to unauthorized use. Sherman argues against Shapiro's claim that downloading is different from taking a tangible property by writing that both owners have been deprived of something of value. Sherman refutes Shapiro's use of the first amendment and also says that companies are in fact aggressively pursuing a more flexible business model that does take advantage of new technology. Shapiro writes that the industry using technology and the internet is beside the point and that the real issue in what Shapiro is saying is that "digital stealing isn't really stealing" and the last thing we need is more polarizing rhetoric.
For my research on why copyright holders are willing to waive copyright in some instances such as MP3 blogs because the new technology has benefits in promotion, this article is a firm example of the view from the record labels about copyright law and internet uses. It is written by the president of the RIAA, Cary Sherman and gives an argument in favor of strong copyright law, and a rebuttal to a speech by the Consumer Electronics CEO Gary Shapiro in favor of weaker copyright law. It provides the viewpoint of the music industry about downloading, but it is interesting in that it does not mention anything about record companies such as Warner who at times chose to solicit certain independent blogs and will send the bloggers music with the hope that the blog will help promote the record label's artist for free.
This is a speech given by Gary Shapiro, the President and CEO of the Consumer Electronics Association about growing tension between copyright owners and new technology. Shapiro speaks about how new reproduction technology and transmission technology has increased the fears of the music and motion picture industries. He draws parallels to new technology in the past such as the VCR, and CD and cassette recording. Today with mass availability of copies of music and movies, the content community has used congress, courts, and the media to challenge new technologies. Shapiro says that he believes that hardware and software companies have an interest in working together to see more products, and that they can misuse source protection and DVD encryption to sell more products while limiting new technologies. Shapiro says that lawsuits have shut down file -sharing services, threaten peer-to-peer networks, challegenged as illegal devices which allow consumers to skip commercials, and has subpoenaed ISPs to identify downloading subscribers. Congress has introduced legislation that will require technology to be shaped by a government-mandated copy protection system. Shapiro comments on the language used by Hollywood and the music industry using words like "piracy" and "stealing" to describe downloading. Shapiro asserts that downloading is neither illegal nor immoral. He says that downloading is not taking away a copy of the product from someone, and in some cases helps promotion. His principles for policymakers to follow ask that a very high amount of evidence be found before restricting technology.
For my research on MP3 blogs and why copyright holders are willing to waive some of their copyrights and allow the blogs to post their music this speech shows a view which is far to the fair-use and weak copyright law. It is clear support for allowing the new technologies and the internet to be created and exist, and for there to be significant evidence of a negative effect on the copyright holder before the technology is restricted. The key line by Shapiro for my project is when he submits that downloading off the Web is neither illegal nor immoral. He sites fair use as being given on a case by case basis and that in many cases of downloading the use has "been shown to be neutral or beneficial to the copyright owners, and have either been tolerated or accepted as fair use." He also discusses how downloading can even lead to further sales, when people buy the whole CD from the song he or she heard on the internet.
Buse goes on to discuss Video Game narrative, and its ability to immerse the player to the point of obsession. His views are not too kind, as he claims that video games are based on belligerence, and they teach through a process of negative reinforcement, considering they are for the most part, based upon competition and combat. He also declares them to be almost chauvinistic in that they primarily show what he describes as a "worst case scenario of patriarchal gender relations" (pg 166) and that they do not ever possess a narrative. Buse even goes as far as to equate video games with cocaine, considering that they can appear to be addictive.
While this article does not have anything to do with video game or computer copyright issues, it does serve as an example of the way in people of different field must strive to interpret them. Buse's discussion of technology and the way in which it causes immersion is also of importance to my paper. The idea that video games are becoming increasingly more interactive begs the question of whether or not technology will progress to a point where interactivity within the game will demand copyright protection.
In this article, the Boston Globe reporter talks to several bloggers and discusses what motivates audiobloggers otherwise known as MP3 bloggers to create sites and post songs. In these blogs, the author finds a song he or she wants to share, and posts it online as an MP3 file along with a commentary or review about the song so that readers can learn about the band and download and listen to the song if they choose. Bloggers will do this for free, as one blogger says "Selfishly, I get validation that people like my music taste... But I want people to find new music that they love." The music industry tends to leave blogs alone because they promote artists for free and are capable of creating "buzz" for an unknown artists and quickly establishing them among a loyal fan base. Litigation is expensive and MP3 blogs are small-scale and some labels have begun supplying blogs with music so there have not been many confrontations between record labels and bloggers. Some bloggers receive "cease and desist" letters from labels and although a code of conduct has not been written, there is a concept of ethical audioblogging. Songs are removed after being posted for typically around one or two weeks, no more than two tracks are posted from each album, and links to sites where readers can buy the albums are provided.
For my research on why copyright owners are willing to waive some of their copyright when it comes to MP3 blogs, this is a useful article in seeing a little bit of the motivation for both bloggers and record labels to coexist. It provides some commentary by the bloggers themselves as to why they put work into blogs and what makes it important for them to exist. It also discusses blog ethics which are part of the reason labels are not against MP3 blogs, and looks at one blogger's idea for a possible future move for the labels which could start their own blogs in order to promote their back catalogues. That provides an interesting comparison between a legal MP3 blog created by a label and an illegal MP3 blog which may have


