Berlowe et al begins by enumerating the five rights granted under moral rights, and differentiates those protections from those of Copyright Law, which has an economic basis in the United States. Compared to the Berne Convention, VARA is “analogous to Article 6(b),” but its scope is significantly narrower. By examining the language of VARA, the definition of a painting and a drawing are vague enough that protection could be extended to include some computer drawings. Both sides of the issue of whether digital art should be protected by VARA are argued. Some say that digital art is just mathematical, while others say that with the way technology is moving, digital art is just another new medium that artists are utilizing. The scope of VARA is also described, and then applied to digital art. In addition, Berlowe et al illuminates that because digital works are not protected under federal law, state laws can provide moral rights to digital graphic artists without preemption by VARA. Berlowe et al also states that artists should be advised on the other ways they can protect their works, which could include trademarks, licensing agreements, etc.
This article is important to argue the progressive intentions of Congress when creating VARA. Technology is always changing and it is clear that it is necessary to create laws that have room for technological advancements. With added works and ways of creating them, it is necessary to pass legislation with room for advancement. The fact that Berlowe et al explains the importance of “the environment in which the artist works, the medium of the work, the artist’s reputation, and the stature of his or her work” shows the complicated factors that go into determining protection of works. By comparing VARA to state laws, such as those in Florida, it is clear that there is tension between federal and state protection and jurisdiction. States have provided moral rights protection long before United States federal law ever did, so there is inherent conflict between the two.